On Point: 4. Surcharges

State ex rel. DeLorean Bryson v. Kevin Carr, 2022 WI App 34; case activity (including briefs)

A few months ago the court of appeals decided Ortiz v. Carr, holding (with a number of important caveats) that DOC may not take a greater percentage of an inmate’s wages for restitution than the circuit court has ordered–if the circuit court has ordered a specific percentage. Here, the court applies similar logic to obligations other than restitution. It holds that DOC has the authority to set a percentage rate for the crime lab surcharge and the DNA surcharge, but that the circuit court has the authority to set a different rate for collection of court fees. It does not decide who has authority over the victim-witness surcharge, because DOC did not appeal the circuit court’s determination of that question (which was that DOC has the authority to set the percentage, but that its new policy of taking 50 percent violates the administrative rules it earlier promulgated).

State v. William C. MacDonald, 2020AP605-CR, 10/14/21, District 4 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Section 973.042(2) mandates a $500 surcharge for each image “associated with the crime” of possession of child pornography. The State charged MacDonald with 10 counts of possessing child porn. He pled “no contest” to a single charge. The State dismissed and read in 9 charges at sentencing. It then requested a $5,000 surcharge for the 10 images supporting the conceded and read-in charges. But it also requested (and received) $45,000 for MacDonald’s possession of an additional 90 images for which he was not charged.

State v. Anthony M. Schmidt, 2021 WI 65, 6/18/21, on bypass from the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

“We also conclude that the child pornography surcharge applies to images of child pornography that form the basis of read-in charges of sexual exploitation of a child or possession of child pornography, so long as those images of child pornography are connected to and brought into relation with the convicted individual’s offense of sexual exploitation of a child or possession of child pornography.” (¶61). What does it mean for images to be “brought into relation with” an offense? What kind of inquiry is it? Factual? Legal? We don’t know, the partial dissent doesn’t know, and as it observes, the majority seems also not to know, as they refrain from addressing any facts but the ones before them. The most reliable SCOW imperative–upholding criminal sanctions–seems once again to have made the “law development” function an afterthought.

State v. Anthony M. Schmidt, 2020AP616-CR, petition for bypass granted 12/28/20; case activity

1. Does Wis. Stat. §973.042 (the child pornography surcharge statute) permit the circuit court to impose a child pornography surcharge for an offense that is “read in” for sentencing purposes?
2. Is the child pornography surcharge a punishment that must be explained during a plea colloquy? If so, was Schmidt entitled to a hearing on his claim that the plea colloquy was deficient in this case?

State v. William Francis Kuehn, 2018AP2355, 7/28/20, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Kuehn pleaded to 5 counts of possession of child pornography; 10 more were dismissed and read-in. The court of appeals rejects Kuehn’s three challenges to his conviction and sentence. It holds trial counsel wasn’t deficient in deciding a third-party-perpetrator (Denny) defense wasn’t viable at trial. It says the circuit court properly assessed the $500 per-image surcharge for the 10 images that made up the read-ins. And, it finds not overbroad the circuit court’s imposition of an ES condition that Kuehn have no contact with his girlfriend.

State v. Amanuel A. Ayele, 2019AP432, 11/7/19, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Ayele pleaded to a battery after an attack on his father, with whom he lived. The state had charged the crime as an incident of domestic abuse carrying a surcharge under Wis. Stat. § 973.o55 but moved, as part of the plea deal, to remove this provision. The court wouldn’t go along though, and Ayele pleaded anyway. What the court did do is waive the actual imposition of the surcharge under § 973.055(4). But the judgment of conviction still notes “Domestic Abuse Assessments” in the description of the charge, and Ayele wants the notation struck.

State v. Marvin Frank Robinson, 2019AP105-106-CR; 9/24/19; District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Robinson pled to misdemeanor battery with domestic abuse assessements and to knowingly violating a temporary restraining order in one case. He also pled to misdemeanor bail jumping (violation of the TRO) and other crimes in a second case.  On appeal, he challenged trial court’s application of the domestic abuse modifier and its imposition of the domestic abuse surcharge, but the court of appeals affirmed.

State v. Sandra D. Solomon, 2018AP298-CR, 9/25/18, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Solomon sought plea withdrawal arguing that the circuit court had denied her request to represent herself and insisted on proceeding with the scheduled trial date, so her newly-retained lawyer was not prepared to defend her. The court of appeals held that her invocation of this right was not clear and unequivocal. It also held that the domestic abuse assessment clearly applied to this case.

State v. Arthur Allen Freiboth, 2018 WI App 46; case activity (including briefs)

In light of the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s May 2018 decisions in State v. Muldrow, 2018 WI 52, 381 Wis. 2d 492, 912 N.W.2d 74, and State v. Williams, 2018 WI 59, 381 Wis. 2d 661, 912 N.W.2d 373, the court of appeals now holds:

State v. Michael L. Cox, 2018 WI 67, 6/15/18, on certification from the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

For years the DNA surcharge statute said that a court “shall” impose a surcharge on certain felony sex offenses and “may” impose a surcharge on any other felony offense. See § 973.046 (1g) and (1r) (2011-12). That changed in 2013 Wis. Act 20, §§ 2353 and 2354, which amended the statute to say a court “shall” impose a surcharge for all criminal convictions, including misdemeanors, committed on or after January 1, 2014. A unanimous supreme court holds that in making this change the legislature intended to eliminate a circuit court’s discretion to waive the surcharge by requiring the surcharge to be imposed in every case.