On Point blog, page 15 of 26
Terry stop — reasonable suspicion; DNA surcharge — exercise of discretion; sentence credit — time between revocation and return to prison
State v. Manuel R. Williams, 2012AP357-CR, District 1, 1/29/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Terry stop – reasonable suspicion
Police had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant where, based on suppression hearing testimony, circuit court found that: the officers were sent to a shooting in “a high risk area”; when police arrived, they noticed Williams because he had a big jacket on and was holding his hands in an “odd” way,
Kebodeaux v. U.S., USSC 12-418, cert. granted 1/11/13
1. Whether the court of appeals erred in conducting its constitutional analysis on the premise that respondent was not under a federal registration obligation until SORNA was enacted, when pre-SORNA federal law obligated him to register as a sex offender.
2. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that Congress lacks the Article I authority to provide for criminal penalties under 18 U.S.C.
Restitution – “causal nexus” between crime and disputed damage
State v. Thomas G. Felski, 2012AP1115-CR, District 2, 1/3/13
Court of appeals decision (1 judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Felski was convicted of violating Wis. Admin. Code ATCP § 110.05 (criminalized by virtue of § 100.20(2)) for failing to have a written contract covering some remodeling projects. Evidence at trial focused on construction of a garage, but Felski also worked on an addition to the house not covered by a written contract.
Restitution — cost of new security system
State v. Jesse D. Fries, 2011AP517-CR, District 4, 12/27/12
Court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Cost of installing new, upgraded security system in a convenience store after robbery was a “special damage” and therefore a proper item of restitution:
¶8 Fries’ primary contention is that an expenditure does not qualify as a special damage unless it was “spent to return the victim to the financial state he was in before the crime occurred.” Here,
Summary Contempt, §§ 785.01(1)(a), 785.04(2)(b); Conduct Prompted by the Court
Cesar Deleon v. Circuit Court for Brown County, 2012AP278, District 3, 10/10/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity
Summary Contempt, §§ 785.01(1)(a), 785.04(2)(b) – “Unit” of Sanctionable Conduct
Separate, consecutive punishments meted out for each of 11 profane utterances and 1 act of spitting during brief exchange with judge upheld, against argument they “amounted only to a single act of contempt because they took place during a short period of time.”
Restitution: Insurance-Related, Difference between Appraised Value and Salvage-Auction Price
State v. Cody A. Gibson, 2012 WI App 103 (recommended for publication); case activity
Restitution order to reimburse insurance company and owner for insurance deductible, in relation to losses arising from stolen auto, upheld. The company (Acuity) paid the owners $11,113 the same day the car was stolen, but the car was recovered with very little damage the very next day. The car was appraised at $10,379 and Acuity turned it over to a salvage company,
Fines Come Within Apprendi, Jury Determination Required for Determination of Facts Supporting Fine Beyond Statutory Maximum
Southern Union Company v. United States, USSC No. 11-94, 6/21/12, reversing 630 F.3d 17 (1st Cir 2010)
Criminal fines, no less than length of imprisonment, come within the “Apprendi” doctrine, such that a fine beyond the maximum statutory amount must be based on facts decided by the jury. Southern Union was tried for violating environmental laws carrying a fine of up to $50,000 per day in violation.
Sex Offender Registration, § 973.048(1m): “Sexually Motivated” Conduct
State v. Willie H. Jackson, 2012 WI App 76 (recommended for publication); case activity
§ 973.048(1m) (2003-04) authorizes the sentencing court to require sex offender registration under § 301.45 for conviction of enumerated crimes, “if the court determines that the underlying conduct was sexually motivated as defined in s. 980.01(5)” and public protection would be advanced thereby. (“Sexually motivated,” as might be imagined, means that “sexual arousal or gratification”
Restitution – Finality and Double Jeopardy
State v. Eric Archie Armstrong, District 2/1, 2010AP1056-CR, 5/30/12
court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Armstrong: Ellen Henak, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; case activity
Setting restitution four years after sentencing didn’t violate double jeopardy principles, turning principally on whether Johnson “had a legitimate expectation of finality in the first judgment,” State v. Greene, 2008 WI App 100, ¶15, 313 Wis.
Mootness Doctrine – Generally ; Probation – Conditions – No-Contact Order
State v. Matthew O. Roach, 2011AP2105-CR, District 4, 5/17/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Roach: Brandon Kuhl; case activity
Mootness Doctrine – Generally
¶8 n. 2:
The State also contends that this issue is moot because the condition of probation Roach challenges expired on January 19, 2012. An issue is moot when its resolution will have no practical effect on the underlying controversy.