On Point blog, page 17 of 26
Restitution
State v. Gary R. Sampson, 2010AP1930-CR, District 3, 2/1/11
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Sampson: Donna L. Hintze, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity; Sampson BiC; State Resp.; Reply
Sampson was guilty of theft for keeping a down payment to make improvements to a business without finishing the work. However, he is liable for restitution,
Delinquency – Restitution
State v. Michael S. L., 2010AP2352, District 2, 1/19/11
court of appeals decision; for Michael S.L.: Leonard D. Kachinski; case activity
Restitution order of 200 hours’ community service, on adjudication for disorderly conduct for “prank” bomb threat to school, and based on school’s estimate of economic loss due to evacuating students and staff for the bomb scare, was within juvenile court’s authority. Although Michael S.L. did not admit to making the threats himself,
Sentencing Conditions, § 973.049(2): No-Contact Order – “Victim” Definition
State v. Mark Allan Campbell, 2011 WI App 18; for Campbell: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate; Campbell BiC;State Resp.; Reply
(Issue of plea bargain breach discussed in separate post, here.)
On sentencing Campbell for sexual assault of his daughter, the trial court had, and properly exercised, authority under § 973.049(2) to bar Campbell’s contact with his son until completion of sex offender treatment.
DNA Surcharge – Timeliness of Challenge
State v. Raymond Allen Nickel, 2010 WI App 161 (recommended for publication); pro se; State Resp.; Robert R. Henak, WACDL, Amicus Brief
Nickel’s challenge to his DNA surcharge was untimely, because made outside the direct appeal time limits:
¶5 When a defendant moves to vacate a DNA surcharge, the defendant seeks sentence modification. Pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 973.19, a defendant may move for sentence modification within ninety days after sentencing.
State v. Brandon G. Johnson, 2010AP233-CR, District 4, 10/14/10
court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Johnson: Philip J. Brehm; BiC; Resp.; Reply
Restitution – Psychiatric Care – Sexual Assault
Johnson, 17, had sex with 14-year-old W.M.K., resulting in conviction for 3rd degree sexual assault. Restitution ($10k), awarded for W.M.K.’s 10-month residence at Thayer Learning Center, (described as “a boot camp, behavior modification experience”) satisfied “substantial factor”
State v. Brent S. Watling, 2009AP1727-CR, District 2, 8/11/10
court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Watling: Margaret A. Maroney, Shelley M. Fite, SPD, Madison Appellate; BiC; Resp.; Reply
Sentencing – Exercise of Discretion – Sex Offender Registration
The sentencing court properly exercised discretion in requiring Watling to register as a sex offender on his conviction for 4th-degree sexual assault, ¶¶7-15.
Registration requirements are set out in § 301.45.
Restitution – Settlement Agreement
State v. Theresa E. Palubicki, No. 2010AP555-CR, District 3
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Palubicki: Michael D. Petersen; BiC; Resp.; Reply
The burden of proving setoff rests with the defendant. Although Palubicki reached a settlement agreement with the hit-and-run victim, she did not meet her burden of proving that the agreement covered lost wages, therefore she is liable for them in restitution.
State v. Marquis N. Singleton, No. 2009AP002089-CR, District I, 6/23/10
court of appeals decision; pro se; Resp. Br.
Sentence Modification – DNA Surcharge
¶2 Singleton was sentenced on July 24, 2002, and the circuit court ordered, as a condition of his bifurcated sentence, that Singleton provide a DNA sample and pay the applicable surcharge.[1] Singleton’s sole challenge is made via a motion to modify his sentence under Wis. Stat. § 973.19 (2007-08), and is addressed only to the adequacy of the court’s explanation for imposition of the surcharge under Cherry,
Restitution: Federal Sentencing Court Authority to Order, After 90-Day Deadline, Where Only Amount Has Been Left Open
Dolan v. United States, USSC No. 09-367, 6/14/10
This case concerns the remedy for missing a statutory deadline. The statute in question focuses upon mandatory restitution for victims of crimes. It provides that “the court shall set a date for the final determination of the victim’s losses, not to exceed 90 days after sentencing.” 18 U. S. C. §3664(d)(5). We hold that a sentencing court that misses the 90-day deadline nonetheless retains the power to order restitution—at least where,
State v. Norbert Aaron Mathis, 2008AP2616-CRNM, Certification
Order for DNA sample and surcharge
Click here for certification order
For Mathis: Donna Odrzywolski
We [District IV] certify this appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court pursuant to Wis. Stat. Rule 809.61 (2007-08), to resolve a conflict among the districts of the court of appeals that has arisen as a result of our decision in State v. Cherry, 2008 WI App 80, ¶¶8-9, 312 Wis.