On Point: D. Type of punishment

State v. C.G., 2021 WI App 11; petition for review granted 4/27; case activity

Ella–a pseudonym–was adjudicated delinquent for a sexual assault committed when she was 15. Ella’s legal name is masculine in association; during her juvenile disposition she was transitioning to a female identity. In this appeal she challenges the circuit court’s refusal to stay sex offender registration under Cesar G., and also submits that the registry’s prohibition on changing her legal name violates her First Amendment right to express her identity. The court of appeals upholds the circuit court’s discretionary decision on the former claim; on the latter it offers three blithe paragraphs of discussion before casually announcing–in a decision that is set to be published, and thus binding–that requiring a transgender woman to use a man’s name implicates no First Amendment concerns whatsoever.

State v. Todd N. Triebold, 2021 WI App 13; case activity (including briefs)

Triebold was convicted of child sexual assault in Wisconsin and subject to lifetime sex offender registration. He moved to Minnesota and notified the Wisconsin DOC of his address. But he moved again and failed to notify either Wisconsin or Minnesota of his change in address. He was separately convicted of violating the sex offender registration laws of Minnesota and Wisconsin. This appeal concerns his challenges to his Wisconsin conviction. The court’s decision is recommended for publication.

State v. Anthony M. Schmidt, 2020AP616-CR, petition for bypass granted 12/28/20; case activity

1. Does Wis. Stat. §973.042 (the child pornography surcharge statute) permit the circuit court to impose a child pornography surcharge for an offense that is “read in” for sentencing purposes?
2. Is the child pornography surcharge a punishment that must be explained during a plea colloquy? If so, was Schmidt entitled to a hearing on his claim that the plea colloquy was deficient in this case?

State v. Jack B. Gramza, 2020 WI App 81; case activity (including briefs)

If an inmate serving the initial confinement (IC) portion of a bifurcated sentence completes the Substance Abuse Program (SAP), § 302.05(3)(c)2. mandates that the sentencing court “shall” modify the inmate’s sentence by converting the remaining period of IC to extended supervision (ES) so that the inmate is released from confinement to ES. The court of appeals holds this mandate doesn’t apply to an inmate who is serving a mandatory minimum term of IC for an OWI offense if the inmate hasn’t yet served the mandatory minimum term.

State v. Tory J. Agnew, 2019AP1785-CR, District 4, 7/30/20 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The court of appeals affirms the structure of a bifurcated sentence for an unclassified felony to which a sentence enhancer applied, even though the sentence imposed runs afoul of the statutes and prior case law.

State v. William Francis Kuehn, 2018AP2355, 7/28/20, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Kuehn pleaded to 5 counts of possession of child pornography; 10 more were dismissed and read-in. The court of appeals rejects Kuehn’s three challenges to his conviction and sentence. It holds trial counsel wasn’t deficient in deciding a third-party-perpetrator (Denny) defense wasn’t viable at trial. It says the circuit court properly assessed the $500 per-image surcharge for the 10 images that made up the read-ins. And, it finds not overbroad the circuit court’s imposition of an ES condition that Kuehn have no contact with his girlfriend.

State v. Ryan M. Muth, 2020 WI 65, reversing a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Muth drove while intoxicated and caused the death of T.K. About a month later T.K.’s adult children reached a settlement with Muth’s insurer under which the children received the maximum payout under Muth’s policy as settlement for all claims against Muth. (¶3). Or so Muth thought. A majority of the supreme court holds that, because Muth was later convicted of homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle, he can also be ordered to pay more money to the children as restitution under § 973.20.

State v. Troy R. Lasecki, 2020 WI App 36; case activity (including briefs)

Wonders never cease. The State charged Lasecki with 2 counts of failure to return security deposits to tenants in violation of Wis. Admin Code. §ATCP 134.06(2) and §§100.20(2) and 100.26(3)(2013-3104). Lasecki proceeded pro se at trial, and a jury convicted  on both counts. His appeal drew amicus briefs from the Apartment Ass’n for Southeastern Wisconsin, the Univ. of Wis. Law School and from the Attorney General  about whether the statute and code criminalized the failure to return rent. Answer: “yes.” but Lasecki won anyway because the jury instructions were erroneous and the court erred in ordering restitution above the victim’s pecuniary losses.

State v. Michael S. Coleman, 2019AP1999-CR, District 4, 1/30/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Coleman appealed the restitution ordered for the damage he did to a squad car by striking his head against the cage inside and kicking the door. (¶2). But his challenges are forfeited for failure to raise them in the circuit court.

State v. Ryan M. Muth, 2019AP875-CR, petition for review of per curiam opinion granted 12/11/19; case activity (including briefs)

Issues presented (based on petition and  cross-petition for review):

1. Wisconsin’s marital property statutes provide that income accrued during marriage belongs to both spouses. Wisconsin’s restitution statute permits crime victims to recover “income lost” from the “filing of charges or cooperating in the investigation and prosecution of the crime.” Where a crime causes a person’s death, can the deceased person’s adult children recover their spouse’s lost income  as restitution?

2. Where crime victims accept a civil settlement for lost wages and expenses, and the victims also seek restitution for lost wages and expenses, and where the defendant asserts “accord and sanctification,” does the defendant have to produce “extrinsic evidence” showing that the wages and expenses the victim received in the civil settlement are the same wages and expenses the victim seeks as criminal restitution?