On Point: 6. Restitution

State v. C.J.L.,  2024AP1917, 7/3/25, District IV (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity

C.J.L. contests part of the restitution ordered in his juvenile case related to a theft and break in at a dance studio–restitution for a surveillance subscription purchased after the theft, and for damages to the studio’s dance floor. Because the juvenile statute, Wis. Stat. § 938.34(5)(a), permits restitution for physical injury to a person or damage to property only, the COA agrees with C.J.L. and reverses the restitution order.

State v. Daecorion J. Robinson, 2022AP2087-CR, 5/28/25, District I (not recommended for publication); case activity

In a rare “causal nexus” win, 2 judges in D1 agree that the circuit court’s order was infirm. Under the text of the restitution statute, Robinson’s aiding a felon does not make him liable for the consequences of that felon’s underlying criminal conduct.

State v. Eric J. Joling, 2023AP1023-CR, 12/11/24, District II (recommended for publication); case activity

Federal law prohibits subjecting social security disability insurance payments (SSDI) to “execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process.”  42 U.S.C. § 407(a).  In a decision recommended for publication, the Court of Appeals held that a circuit court may nevertheless use a defendant’s SSDI payments to calculate the ability to pay restitution. 

State v. Lynetta Lake, 2024AP115-CR, 11/12/24, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Lake pleaded guilty to negligent operation of a motor vehicle and hit and run of an attended vehicle. Following a hearing, the circuit court ordered restitution. Lake filed a postconviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to call two witnesses during the restitution hearing.

State v. Paul R. Noble, 2023AP1444-CR, 4/24/24, District II (one-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity

While Noble’s arguments on appeal appear to have substantial merit, the court of appeals declines to address the merits because the state abandoned the appeal and thereby conceded that “Noble’s arguments are correct.”

State v. M.L.J.N.L., 2021AP1437, 2/28/24, District IV (recommended for publication); case activity

In one of our first published decisions to address the impact of Marsy’s Law, COA accepts the agreed-upon position of both parties that Marsy’s Law does not alter the framework for assessing requests for juvenile restitution under § 938.34(5)(a). 

State v. J.A.J., 2022AP2066, 11/14/23, District I (ineligible for publication); case activity

In a noteworthy juvenile appeal, COA rejects a novel argument highlighting the dysfunctional nature of our juvenile justice system as caused by the “closure” of Lincoln Hills.

State v. Jeffrey W. Butler, 2021AP2212-CR, 1/11/23, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

At Butler’s restitution hearing, the circuit court expressed frustration and disappointment that neither party presented any documentation regarding a disputed restitution claim. The court stated, “I have nothing other than testimony saying [the victim’s] done all this stuff and Googled it and she doesn’t bring in any receipts.” The court continued: “Nothing, I have nothing…[s]o the court is left with, based on testimony, what’s a reasonable amount of restitution…” The court then concluded, “I’ll put $500 toward clothing.” Butler appealed and the court of appeals affirms, holding that the victim’s testimony alone is sufficient to support the restitution award.

State v. Mark J. Gahart, 2022 WI App 61; case activity (including briefs)

The court of appeals holds that driving while intoxicated with a minor passenger is not a victimless crime: the minor passenger is a victim for purposes of the restitution statute.

State ex rel. DeLorean Bryson v. Kevin Carr, 2022 WI App 34; case activity (including briefs)

A few months ago the court of appeals decided Ortiz v. Carr, holding (with a number of important caveats) that DOC may not take a greater percentage of an inmate’s wages for restitution than the circuit court has ordered–if the circuit court has ordered a specific percentage. Here, the court applies similar logic to obligations other than restitution. It holds that DOC has the authority to set a percentage rate for the crime lab surcharge and the DNA surcharge, but that the circuit court has the authority to set a different rate for collection of court fees. It does not decide who has authority over the victim-witness surcharge, because DOC did not appeal the circuit court’s determination of that question (which was that DOC has the authority to set the percentage, but that its new policy of taking 50 percent violates the administrative rules it earlier promulgated).