On Point: 1. Applicability of

State v. Tracy Laver Hailes, 2021AP1339-CR, 5/9/23, District 1, (recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In a decision recommended for publication, the court of appeals holds that under §973.01(2)(c) a circuit court may apply either §939.62(1) (governing habitual criminality) or §961.48 (governing second or subsequent offenses) to enhance a penalty, but it may not apply both. While the circuit court erroneously applied both enhancers in this case, the court of appeals nevertheless denied Hailes’s claims for plea withdrawal, sentence modification, and resentencing.

State v. James J. Socha, 2021AP1083-CR & 2021AP2116-CR, District 1, 4/25/23 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs): 2021AP1083-CR; 2021AP2116-CR

The fact that some of Socha’s prior OWI offenses have been lawfully vacated since he was sentenced may constitute a new factor justifying sentence modification, so the circuit courts erred in denying Socha’s motions for sentence modification without a hearing.

State v. Corey Rector, 2020AP1213, certification filed 11/24/21; granted 2/16/22; affirmed 5/23/23; District 2; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (from the certification):

Whether the plain meaning of “separate occasions” in the sex-offender-registration statute means that the two convictions must have occurred at different times in two separate proceedings so that the qualifying convictions occurred sometime before a defendant is convicted in the current case. Stated otherwise, can the qualifying convictions occur simultaneously, as they did in this case, and as Wittrock and Hopkins held?

State v. Charles L. Neill, IV, 2020 WI 15, 2/14/20, reversing a published decision of the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

In this decision the supreme court explains how to calculate the minimum fine for an OWI when the fine is subject to multiple enhancer provisions. The supreme court’s calculation is better for defendants than the one arrived at by the court of appeals, though not the more favorable one advanced by Neill.

State v. Marvin Frank Robinson, 2019AP105-106-CR; 9/24/19; District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Robinson pled to misdemeanor battery with domestic abuse assessements and to knowingly violating a temporary restraining order in one case. He also pled to misdemeanor bail jumping (violation of the TRO) and other crimes in a second case.  On appeal, he challenged trial court’s application of the domestic abuse modifier and its imposition of the domestic abuse surcharge, but the court of appeals affirmed.

State v. Terrance Lavone Egerson, 2016AP1045-CR, District 1, 2/27/18 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Egerson moved to withdraw his pleas, alleging his trial lawyer was ineffective for failing to challenge the domestic abuse repeater enhancers appended to the charges Egerson faced. According to Egerson, those enhancers never applied, so he was overcharged and led to believe his sentencing exposure was greater than it was. The court of appeals holds trial counsel wasn’t deficient because the complaints supported charging them and, in any event, Egerson hasn’t shown prejudice.

State v. Justin A. Braunschweig, 2017AP1261-CR, 2/1/8, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); petition for review granted 6/11/18, affirmed, 2018 WI 113;  case activity (including briefs)

Let’s hope expunction has not worn out its welcome at SCOW because this decision could use review and possibly reversal. The State charged Braunschweig (no “er”) with OWI and PAC 2nd and submitted a certified DOT record to prove that he was convicted of an OWI 1st in 2011–a conviction that had been expunged. On appeal he argues that an expunged conviction cannot serve as a predicate for an OWI 2nd. It should be considered a status element that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The court of appeals disagrees, and the upshot is that someone charged with OWI cannot claim the primary benefit conferred by §973.015–i.e. a fresh start. Is that what the Wisconsin legislature intended?

State v. Jason R. Cooper, 2016 WI App 63; case activity (including briefs)

While a conviction for a motor vehicle offense can’t be used to establish a defendant’s repeater status under § 939.62, time a defendant spent in custody serving a sentence for a motor vehicle is still excluded when computing whether any prior convictions for non-motor vehicle offenses occurred within five years of the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced.

Questions presented:

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) found the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(B)(ii)(defining “violent felony”) unconstitutionally vague. That clause is identical to the residual cause in the career-offender provision of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2)(defining “crime of violence”)

(1) Whether Johnson v. United States applies retroactively to collateral cases challenging federal sentences enhanced under the residual clause in United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) § 4B1.2(a)(2) (defining “crime of violence”);

(2) whether Johnson‘s constitutional holding applies to the residual clause in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2), thereby rendering challenges to sentences enhanced under it cognizable on collateral review; and

(3) whether mere possession of a sawed-off shotgun, an offense listed as a “crime of violence” only in commentary to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, remains a “crime of violence” after Johnson.

Richard Mathis v. United States, USSC No. 15-6092, 2016 WL 343440, 579 U.S. ___ (June 23, 2016), reversing United States v. Mathis, 786 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir. 2015); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

In this decision the Court, by a 5-to-3 vote, reaffirms its long-standing rule that the “categorical approach,” which focuses on the elements of an offense, is to be used in determining whether a prior conviction enhances a federal offender’s sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act. It also rejects the Government’s argument for an exception to that approach when the defendant is convicted under a statute that lists multiple, alternative factual means of satisfying one of the elements of the offense. While the decision obviously affects federal criminal practice, it may also affect a recent decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court.