On Point: 1. Mandatory minimum

Erlinger v. United States, USSC No. 23-370, June 21, 2024, vacating United States v. Erlinger, 77 F.4th 617 (7th Cir. 2023); Scotusblog page (with links to briefs and commentary)

Whether offenses committed on three “occasions different from one another” for purposes of federal Armed Career Criminal Act must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. John R. Brott, 2021AP2001, 8/30/23, District 2 (recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In 2016, the court of appeals held that a sentencing court must give effect to the mandatory minimum for possession of child pornography: a bifurcated sentence including three years of initial confinement. The statute’s language, the court said, precludes imposing and staying a prison sentence in favor of probation, or imposing less than three years of IC, unless an age-based statutory exception (where the defendant is no more than four years older than the child depicted) applies. State v. Holcomb, 2016 WI App 70, 371 Wis.2d 647, 886 N.W.2d 100.

State v. Lynne M. Shirikian, 2023 WI App 13; case activity (including briefs)

Shirikian pleaded to OWI as a fifth offense. Back in 2019, the legislature amended the statutes to create a both a presumptive and a mandatory minimum sentence for OWI 5th and OWI 6th. See 2019 Wis. Act 106; Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)5. The presumptive minimum requires at least 18 months of initial confinement, but the statute lets a court go lower if it finds doing so in the best interest of the community and not harmful to the public. The court of appeals now holds that even if a court decides to give less than 18 months IC, it’s still obligated to impose a bifurcated sentence. Since bifurcated sentences necessarily involve at least a year of IC, see Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b), that year is the true mandatory minimum. Further, the court holds, a sentencing judge can’t avoid this minimum by imposing and staying a prison sentence and ordering of probation. Because the judge here did order probation, the court of appeals remands with directions that the lower court impose a legal sentence.

State v. Michael James Brehm, 2020AP266, 6/29/21, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity

Brehm was arrested after a neighbor called 911 to report that he was firing a gun out his window into the air. Police recovered a gun and Brehm admitted to the shooting. He eventually pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm.

State v. Jack B. Gramza, 2020 WI App 81; case activity (including briefs)

If an inmate serving the initial confinement (IC) portion of a bifurcated sentence completes the Substance Abuse Program (SAP), § 302.05(3)(c)2. mandates that the sentencing court “shall” modify the inmate’s sentence by converting the remaining period of IC to extended supervision (ES) so that the inmate is released from confinement to ES. The court of appeals holds this mandate doesn’t apply to an inmate who is serving a mandatory minimum term of IC for an OWI offense if the inmate hasn’t yet served the mandatory minimum term.

Charging as Sentencing, a recent article by Professor Donald Dripps at the University of San Diego Law School, contends that they are. Consider the possibilities.

State v. Samuel Silverstein, 2017 WI App 64; case activity (including briefs)

Pursuant to a warrant, police searched Silverstein’s computer for child porn. The “informer” was Tumblr, which is required by federal law to report suspected child pornography to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. Silverstein challenged the warrant as well as the mandatory minimum sentence the trial court imposed per §939.617, which he contends is unconstitutionally vague.

State v. Markus S. Holcomb, 2016 WI App 70; case activity (including briefs)

“While sentence diagramming may be the bane of fifth graders everywhere, it is the trick of the trade in statutory construction.” Slip op. ¶9. “Punctuation too is important. . . . It can be the difference between ‘Let’s eat, Grandma!’ and ‘Let’s eat Grandma!'” ¶12. So begins today’s lesson on the proper way to read §939.617, which provides minimum sentences for certain child sex offenses.

State v. Antonio D. Barbeau, 2016 WI App 51; case activity (including briefs)

Barbeau killed his great-grandmother when he was 14 years old, and eventually pled no contest to first-degree intentional homicide, which carries an automatic life sentence. When imposing such a sentence, the court must make a decision as to extended supervision: it can either deny any possibility of ES, or it can set a date at which the person becomes eligible, though such date must occur after the person has served at least 20 years. Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1g).

State v. Clayton W. Williams, 2014 WI 64, 7/15/14, reversing a published court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Prosser; case activity

This opinion addresses § 346.65(2)(am)6. as it applied to OWI 7th, 8th, and 9th offenses committed between July 1, 2010, when the statute first took effect, and April 10, 2014, when it was amended by 2014 Wis. Act 224. During that time period, the statute provided that the offense was a Class G felony, and that “[t]he confinement portion of a bifurcated sentence imposed on the person under [§] 973.01 shall be not less than 3 years.” The supreme court concludes this language is ambiguous because it could be read either to require a court to impose a bifurcated sentence or, instead, to permit a court to order probation with or without imposition of a bifurcated sentence, but that the legislative history makes it clear the language requires courts to impose a bifurcated sentence with a mandatory minimum three-year period of initial confinement.