On Point: 36. Sentencing

State v. Jordan Alexander Lickes, review of a published court of appeals decision granted 11/18/20; case activity (including briefs)

Issues presented (from the PfR):

Does the expungement statute’s requirement that a probationer have “satisfied the conditions of probation” also mean that the probationer must perfectly comply at all times with each and every rule of probation set by the probation agent?

When a circuit court chooses to hold a hearing and exercise discretion to determine whether a probationer who violated a rule set by his agent has nevertheless “satisfied the conditions of probation” so as to qualify for expungement, should the appellate court review the circuit court’s decision for an erroneous exercise of discretion?

When a circuit court makes factual findings concerning whether a probationer violated a condition of probation rendering him ineligible for expungement, must the appellate court uphold the finding in the absence of clear error?

State v. Jack B. Gramza, 2020 WI App 81; case activity (including briefs)

If an inmate serving the initial confinement (IC) portion of a bifurcated sentence completes the Substance Abuse Program (SAP), § 302.05(3)(c)2. mandates that the sentencing court “shall” modify the inmate’s sentence by converting the remaining period of IC to extended supervision (ES) so that the inmate is released from confinement to ES. The court of appeals holds this mandate doesn’t apply to an inmate who is serving a mandatory minimum term of IC for an OWI offense if the inmate hasn’t yet served the mandatory minimum term.

State v. Jack Ray Zimmerman, Jr., 2020AP475, District 2, 11/4/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

….not “lifetime since January 1, 1989.”

State v. Peter J. King, 2020 WI App 66;  case activity (including briefs)

Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S Ct. 1730 (2017) struck down a law making it a felony for a registered sex offender to use any social networking site that permits minors to become members or to create personal web page. The statute was so broad that it violated the 1st Amendment. See our post here. In this case, the court of appeals holds that Packingham’s reasoning does not apply to court-ordered conditions of extended supervision that sharply restrict a defendant’s access to the internet. 

State v. Tory J. Agnew, 2019AP1785-CR, District 4, 7/30/20 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The court of appeals affirms the structure of a bifurcated sentence for an unclassified felony to which a sentence enhancer applied, even though the sentence imposed runs afoul of the statutes and prior case law.

State v. William Francis Kuehn, 2018AP2355, 7/28/20, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Kuehn pleaded to 5 counts of possession of child pornography; 10 more were dismissed and read-in. The court of appeals rejects Kuehn’s three challenges to his conviction and sentence. It holds trial counsel wasn’t deficient in deciding a third-party-perpetrator (Denny) defense wasn’t viable at trial. It says the circuit court properly assessed the $500 per-image surcharge for the 10 images that made up the read-ins. And, it finds not overbroad the circuit court’s imposition of an ES condition that Kuehn have no contact with his girlfriend.

State v. Bobby L. McNeil, 2019AP467-CR & 2019468-CR, District 1, 7/21/10 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

McNeil was convicted of drug offenses, obstructing, and bail jumping after a trial in two consolidated cases. His challenges to the joinder of the cases and to various evidentiary issues are rejected, but he prevails on the challenge to his sentence because the circuit court relied on inaccurate information at sentencing.

State v. Ryan M. Muth, 2020 WI 65, reversing a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Muth drove while intoxicated and caused the death of T.K. About a month later T.K.’s adult children reached a settlement with Muth’s insurer under which the children received the maximum payout under Muth’s policy as settlement for all claims against Muth. (¶3). Or so Muth thought. A majority of the supreme court holds that, because Muth was later convicted of homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle, he can also be ordered to pay more money to the children as restitution under § 973.20.

State v. Alfonzo C. Loayza, 2018AP2066-CR, petition for review of a per curiam opinion granted 6/16/20; case activity

Issue (from the State’s petition for review):

It is well established that a DOT record is competent proof of a defendant’s prior conviction and can therefore be used to enhance the defendant’s sentence. It is also  well established  that a defendant may challenge the existence of a  conviction listed on a DOT record. But currently, there is no accepted procedure for how a defendant should challenge the existence of a conviction listed in a DOT record and what burden he must satisfy to make a DOT record so unreliable that it no longer qualifies as competent proof of the conviction.

Do the lack of a judgment of conviction for a prior offense and other documents that “support the inference” that the conviction does not exist render a Wisconsin DOT driving record that lists the conviction so unreliable that it is no longer competent proof of the conviction?

State v. Troy R. Lasecki, 2020 WI App 36; case activity (including briefs)

Wonders never cease. The State charged Lasecki with 2 counts of failure to return security deposits to tenants in violation of Wis. Admin Code. §ATCP 134.06(2) and §§100.20(2) and 100.26(3)(2013-3104). Lasecki proceeded pro se at trial, and a jury convicted  on both counts. His appeal drew amicus briefs from the Apartment Ass’n for Southeastern Wisconsin, the Univ. of Wis. Law School and from the Attorney General  about whether the statute and code criminalized the failure to return rent. Answer: “yes.” but Lasecki won anyway because the jury instructions were erroneous and the court erred in ordering restitution above the victim’s pecuniary losses.