On Point: 36. Sentencing

State v. Jordan Alexander Lickes, 2021 WI 60, affirming a published court of appeals opinion, 2019AP1272-CR, 6/15/21, case activity (including briefs)

In State v. Ozuna, SCOW held that a young offender’s violation of any court-imposed conditions of probation renders expungement unavailable. Here, Lickes argued that: (1) the same rule does not apply to conditions imposed by the DOC, and (2) the circuit court has the discretion to find that an offender has satisfied the DOC’s conditions even if he has violated one or more of them and especially when, as in this case, the DOC itself requests expungement. In a split decision, SCOW rejects both arguments, making expungement a pipe dream for most young offenders.

State v. Keandrae J. Reed, 2020AP1921-CR, District 1, 6/2/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

After being convicted of misdemeanor theft, Reed was placed on probation and given the chance for expungement. While he successfully discharged from probation, he isn’t entitled to expungement because he didn’t do enough to pay restitution to have “successfully completed” his sentence as required by § 973.015(1m)(b).

State v. Scott William Forrett, 2021 WI App 31, petition for review granted, 9/14/21, affirmed, 2022 WI 37; case activity (including briefs)

Wisconsin permits a driver’s prior refusal to submit to a warrantless blood test as a criminal penalty enhancer for a subsequent OWI. In an open and shut opinion that is recommended for publication, the court of appeals just declared that statutory scheme unconstitutional based on Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016), and State v. Dalton, 2018 WI 85, 383 Wis. 2d 147, 914 N.W.2d 120.

State v. Teresa L. Clark, 2020AP1058-CR, bypass granted 4/27/21; case activity

Issue: (adapted from State’s COA brief):

When the State uses a prior OWI conviction to enhance the charge and sentence for a subsequent OWI offense, a defendant may collaterally attack the prior conviction. If the defendant proves that her right to counsel was violated in the prior case, the conviction may not be used to enhance the charge and sentence in the new case. Does the burden shift to the State when there is no transcript available to show that the circuit court violated the defendant’s right to counsel?

State v. C.G., 2018AP2205, review granted 4/27/21; case activity

Issues presented:

Does Wis. Stat. § 301.45, the statute governing juvenile sex offender registration, unconstitutionally infringe on Ella’s First Amendment right to freedom of speech by preventing her from legally changing her name to reflect her gender identity?

Does requiring Ella to register under Wis. Stat. § 301.45 amount to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment?

Jones v. Mississippi, USSC No. 18-1259, 2021 WL 1566605, April 22, 2021; Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

“In a case involving [sentencing] an individual who was under 18 when he or she committed a homicide [to life without parole], a State’s discretionary sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient.” (Slip op. at 5) (emphasis added).

County of Green Lake v. Lori Melchert, 2020AP473, District 2, 2/24/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Melchert’s challenge to a prior OWI that was improperly treated as a first offense comes way too late under City of Eau Claire v. Booth, 2016 WI 65, 370 Wis. 2d 595, 882 N.W.2d 738, and City of Cedarburg v. Hansen, 2020 WI 11, 390 Wis. 2d 109, 938 N.W.2d 463.

State v. Timothy D. Wright, 2020AP1578, 2/25/2021, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Wright worked at Christmas Mountain. Over the course of a couple of months he allegedly directed several racist and threatening rants at colleagues, including threats to kill some of them. A supervisor eventually called the police, and Wright was fired and charged with four counts of disorderly conduct. He eventually pleaded to two with the other two read in. The circuit court ordered Wright to pay $14,755 in restitution to the corporation that owns Christmas Mountain at $100 per month. Wright argues this was improper for three reasons: because the corporation was not statutorily a “victim” of his conduct; because the claimed damages–the cost to hire armed guards after he was fired–were not “special damages … which could be recovered in a civil action”; and because the circuit court failed to consider his inability to pay.

State v. Michael A. Rakel, 2017AP2519, 2/17/21, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Michael Rakel was convicted of the 1st degree reckless homicide of Andre Taylor, who had a teenage daughter. Taylor was under a court order to pay child support to her. The court of appeals held that Rakel must now pay restitution in an amount equal to Taylor’s child support obligation.  However, the record was unclear about whether the mother of Taylor’s daughter was eligible to receive the restitution payment for the daughter. The court of appeals remanded the case for further proceedings on that issue.

State v. James A. Jones, 2021 WI App 15; case activity (including briefs)

Sometimes friends or relatives post bail so that a loved one charged with a crime can be released. This published decision holds that when charges are dismissed and read in at sentencing, and the court doesn’t order restitution on those charges, the bond money must be returned to the payors. This rule applies even to global plea deals where the defendant pleads “no contest” to and is ordered to pay restitution on some charges, but other charges are dismissed and read in without a restitution order.