On Point: 36. Sentencing

McKinney v. Arizona, USSC No. 18-1109, certiorari granted 6/10/19; affirmed 2/25/20

Questions presented:

1. Whether the Arizona Supreme Court was required to apply current law when weighing mitigating and aggravating evidence to determine whether a death sentence is warranted

2. Whether the correction of error under Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), requires resentencing.

Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, USSC No. 18-7739, cert granted 5/30/19

Question presented:

Whether a formal objection after pronouncement of sentence is necessary to invoke appellate reasonableness review of the length of a defendant’s sentence.

State v. Carrie E. Counihan, 2017AP2265-CR, petition for review granted 5/14/19, and State v. Donavinn Coffee, 2017AP2292-CR, petition for review granted 5/14/19; case activity (Counihan; Coffee)

Issues:

Does a defendant forfeit his right to challenge a judge’s consideration of information at sentencing by failing to object to the information at the time of sentencing?

If trial counsel does not object to the court’s consideration of the information and the defendant alleges postconviction that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object, what is the standard for determining whether trial counsel’s failure was prejudicial?

Looks like NYU Professor Ann Washington has done the hard work for you. Her new article, How to Argue With an Algorithm: Lessons from the Compass-ProPublica Debate, strives to inform courtroom arguments over the integrity of algorithms used to predict risk during the sentencing process.

MULS Professor Michael O’Hear has a new article out: Managing the Risk of Violent Recidivism: Lessons from Legal Responses to Sexual Offenses. See the abstract below, and click here for the article.

State v. Caleb J. Hawley, 2018AP1601-CR, District 4, 3/28/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The judge who sentenced Hawley after revocation of probation stayed the sentence and ordered it to start some 14 months down the road, when Hawley would finished serving the 18 months of conditional jail time ordered in a different case. That stay was illegal, and the remedy is resentencing—not, as Hawley argues, credit for the time he was in custody since the day of his sentencing after revocation.

State v. Martez C. Fennell, 2017AP2480-CR, District 1, 3/26/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Fennell unsuccessfully challenges his convictions for armed robbery and operating a vehicle without the owner’s consent, arguing that the charges are multiplicitous and that trial counsel should have subpoenaed a witness who would have impeached the victim’s identification of him.

State v. Richard H. Harrison Jr., , 2017AP2440-2441-CR, 3/21/19, District 4, (not recommended for publication); Review Granted 8/14/19, reversed, 2020 WI 35; case activity (including briefs)

This post requires some concentration. Harrison was sentenced to 3 years IC (Initial Confinement) and 3 years ES (Extended Supervision) in a 2007 case and a 2008 case. In an unrelated 2010 case he was sentenced to 13 years IC and 7 years ES. And in a 2011 case he received 30 years IC and 10 years ES. The 2010 and 2011 sentences ran consecutive to all other sentences.  Harrison served the IC parts of his 2007 and 2008 cases and started serving his IC in the 2010 case when–lucky him–both his 2010 and his 2011 convictions were vacated. By this point all he had to serve was the ES of his 2007 and 2008 cases.

Randall Mathena, Warden v. Lee Boyd Malvo, USSC No. 18-217, certiorari granted 3/18/19

Question presented:

Montgomery v. Alabama, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016)), held that the new constitutional rule announced in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. Did the the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals err in concluding that Montgomery could be interpreted as modifying and substantively expanding the Miller rule itself, when the issue presented in Montgomery was only the retroactivity of that rule?

Kahler v. Kansas, USSC No. 18-6135, certiorari granted 3/18/19

Question presented:

Do the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments permit a state to abolish the insanity defense?