On Point: 36. Sentencing

State v. Zachary S. Friedlander, 2017AP1337, petition granted 7/10/2018; review of an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (from petition for review):

When, as here, an offender is mistakenly released from prison or jail, is the offender “in custody” under § 973.155(1) and Magnuson such that sentence credit should be granted for this time spent at liberty?

State v. Patrick H. Dalton, 2018 WI 85, 7/3/18, reversing in part and remanding an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

The supreme court holds there were exigent circumstances that allowed police to draw blood from Dalton without a warrant after he refused to consent to a blood draw. But a majority of the court also holds that the sentencing judge erred by explicitly imposing a harsher sentence on Dalton because he refused to consent to the blood draw.

State v. Dion Lashay Byrd, 2017AP1968, 6/26/18, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Byrd was convicted of making a bomb threat to the Fox 6 TV station in Milwaukee. He claims the sentencing court relied on two improper factors in imposing the maximum sentence for this Class I felony. First, he says the court coerced him into making self-incriminating statements during his sentencing allocution–statements that could not be used against him at sentencing under the Fifth Amendment. Second, he contends the court should not have based its sentencing decision on its stated dissatisfaction with the statutory maximum.

State ex rel. Drazen Markovic v. Jon E. Litscher, 2018 WI App 44; case activity (including briefs)

The Department of Corrections has the authority to take certain funds from an inmate’s account to pay the restitution ordered in a case even though the inmate has finished serving the sentence in that case.

Tyson Timbs v. Indiana, USSC 17-1091, certiorari granted 6/18/18

Question presented:

Whether the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause is incorporated against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment.

State v. Anthony R. Pico, 2018 WI 66, 6/15/18, affirming a split, unpublished court of appeals opinion, 2015AP1799-Cr, case activity (including briefs)

This split decision clarifies important aspects of ineffective assistance of counsel law, sentencing law, and appellate procedure. In addition, Justice Abrahamson’s dissent includes a word of caution for lawyers representing clients who have experienced brain trauma that may affect their mental capacity.

State v. Justin A. Braunschweig, 2017AP1261-CR, petition for review of an unpublished court of appeals decision granted 6/11/18; case activity (including briefs)

Braunschweig was convicted of first-offense OWI causing injury, but that conviction was expunged. So, when he picked up another OWI, was it a first or a second?

State v. Michael L. Cox, 2018 WI 67, 6/15/18, on certification from the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

For years the DNA surcharge statute said that a court “shall” impose a surcharge on certain felony sex offenses and “may” impose a surcharge on any other felony offense. See § 973.046 (1g) and (1r) (2011-12). That changed in 2013 Wis. Act 20, §§ 2353 and 2354, which amended the statute to say a court “shall” impose a surcharge for all criminal convictions, including misdemeanors, committed on or after January 1, 2014. A unanimous supreme court holds that in making this change the legislature intended to eliminate a circuit court’s discretion to waive the surcharge by requiring the surcharge to be imposed in every case.

State v. Timothy L. Landry, 2017AP1739-CR, 6/6/18, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Landry pled to 2 counts of 4th-degree sexual assault and was ordered to comply with §973.048(1m)(a), Wisconsin’s sex offender registry. On appeal, he argued that the trial court had not made the necessary findings or explained its decision adequately a la Gallion. He lost.

State v. Anthony Iven Jones, A/K/A Hashim Hasan, 2017AP364, 6/5/18, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A jury found Jones guilty of bail jumping. one of his bond conditions had been that he stay 500 feet away from his former wife. He made a threatening phone call to her and was discovered by a police officer to be “approximately 92 feet away” from her house. He first claims there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction, but the court does not agree, based on the essential facts just noted. (¶12).