On Point blog, page 26 of 96
SCOTUS: How does a defendant recover costs, fees and restitution after his conviction is reversed?
Nelson v. Colorado, USSC No. 15-526, (April 20, 2017), reversing and remanding Colorado v. Nelson, 364 P.3d 866 (2015); SCOTUSblog page (inlcuding links to briefs and commentary).
This decision establishes that a State cannot force an exonerated defendant to file a civil suit and prove his innocence by clear and convincing evidence in order to recover costs, fees, and restitution he paid upon conviction.
More concerns about using Artificial Intelligence to sentence defendants
This week Wired ran an op-ed arguing that courts should stop using algorithms to set bail and sentence defendants until some ground rules are set. Yes, it discusses Compas and State v. Loomis. But beyond that it describes what could happen if courts move from using simple algorithms to using deep learning algorithms known as neural networks to sentence someone. Here is an excerpt from the article:
Consider a scenario in which the defense attorney calls a developer of a neural-network-based risk assessment tool to the witness stand to challenge the “high risk” score that could affect her client’s sentence.
Resentencing required where judge relied on erroneous information, erroneously exercised discretion
State v. Thomas G. St. Peter, 2016AP683-CR, District 1, 4/18/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
St. Peter is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the judge violated his due process rights when it relied on inaccurate information to jump the parties’ joint recommendation for time served and impose more jail time. State v. Tiepelman, 2006 WI 66, 291 Wis. 2d 179, 717 N.W.2d 1 (sentencing based on inaccurate information violates due process). Not only that, but the judge erroneously exercised his sentencing discretion by failing to link the relevant facts and factors of the case to the standard sentencing objectives. —And you thought an erroneous exercise of sentencing discretion was as mythical a beast as a unicorn!
State v. Michael L. Washington, 2016AP238-CR, petition for review granted 4/10/17
Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
Issue:
Whether a defendant may, by voluntary absence or other conduct, waive the statutory right to be present at trial before the trial has begun?
Inmate loses challenge to how DOC used his prison funds to pay costs, restitution
Cle A. Gray, Jr. v. Robert Humphries, 2016AP584-CR, 4/6/17, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including state’s brief)
Gray sought to prevent the Department of Corrections from taking certain money from his prison accounts to pay the costs and restitution Gray had been ordered to pay, but the court of appeals holds DOC’s collection actions were valid under the judgment of conviction and relevant statutes.
Denial of claims for ineffective assistance of counsel, violation of ex post facto clause, and resentencing affirmed
State v. David L. Johnson, 2015AP2605-CR, 4/4/17, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
A jury found Johnson guilty of aggravated battery and false imprisonment but acquitted him of sexual assault and strangulation. The court imposed 2 consecutive 6-year sentences. Johnson appealed and argued that the postconviction court erred in denying his claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel without a hearing, imposing a DNA surcharge in violation of the ex post facto clause, and in denying resentencing.
Collateral attack on prior moot where sentence long over
State v. Peter J. Long, 2016AP729, 3/28/17, District 1 (one-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity (including state’s brief)
Peter Long filed a Wis. Stat. § 974.06 arguing that his sentence for OWI-4th should be commuted or modified to the maximum sentence for an OWI-3rd, because one of his priors was uncounseled.
A puzzling decision on collateral attack pleading requirements
State v. Matthew A. Seward, 2016AP1248-CR, 3/22/17, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
This is a permissive appeal. Matthew Seward is charged with OWI-3rd; he seeks reversal of the circuit court’s denial of his collateral attack on his OWI-2nd conviction.
Is simply mentioning a defendant’s young age enough to satisfy Miller v. Alabama?
McKinley Kelly v. Richard Brown, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 17-1244, 3/16/17
Two judges on the Seventh Circuit apparently think so, based on their rejection of Kelly’s motion to file a second federal habeas petition so he can challenge his sentence under Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (mandatory life sentence for juvenile offenders is unconstitutional).
No IAC for implying prior OWIs; stipulation to three priors valid; no issue preclusion on number of priors
State v. Bruce T. Henningfield, 2015AP1824-CR, 3/15/17 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Bruce Henningfield was convicted by a jury of OWI and PAC counts, and was sentenced on the OWI as a tenth or subsequent offense. He raises three issues related to his prior convictions; the court rejects them all.