On Point blog, page 3 of 95
Circuit court properly ordered defendant to pay extradition costs
State v. Jonathon S. Geiger, 2022AP1270-CR, District III, 7/11/23, not recommended for publication; case activity (briefs available)
Geiger argues the circuit court erroneously ordered him to pay extradition costs in connection with a sentencing after revocation hearing. COA rejects his statutory construction arguments and affirms.
Defense Win! COA holds that circuit court improperly required defendant to reimburse attorney fees related to dismissed case
State v. Aman Deep Singh, 2022AP1202-04, District I, 7/5/23, 1-judge decision ineligible for publication; case activity (including briefs)
In a somewhat messy pro se appeal, the court of appeals agrees that the circuit court improperly required Singh to reimburse attorney’s fees but rejects his remaining claims.
Defense Win! SCOW applies Floyd, reverses COA, reinstates grant of 433 days sentence credit
State v. Michael K. Fermanich, 2023 WI 48, 6/14/23, reversing a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
The key takeaway here is that five justices reaffirm and apply State v. Floyd, 2000 WI 14, 232 Wis. 2d 767, 606 N.W.2d 155, and hold that Fermanich is entitled to 433 days sentence credit for time he spent in custody in connection with Oneida County charges that were dismissed and read-in at his Langlade County sentencing. (Opinion, ¶2). A concurrence by Justice Dallet is worth reading as a preemptive response to the dissent’s answer to the question for which the court granted review: whether State v. Tuescher should be reexamined and limited to the unique circumstances present there. A dissent by Chief Justice Ziegler and R.G. Bradley would have overruled Floyd, denied Fermanich credit under Tuescher, and required him to return to custody for an additional 433 days. (See Op., ¶19, Dallet, concurring).
Officer’s testimony about ZAP STICK merely “expositional,” not subject to 907.02(1)’s heightened reliability standard
State v. Danny Arthur Wright, 2021AP1252-CR, District 3, 05/16/23 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The state charged Wright with first degree sexual assault with use of a dangerous weapon. The alleged dangerous weapon at issue was a ZAP STICK. Wright filed a motion in limine to bar the state from calling a Detective to offer expert opinion testimony under Wis. Stat. § 907.02(1) and Daubert. The circuit court permitted the testimony after the state cautioned that it would not ask the detective whether the ZAP STICK used in Wright’s case was a dangerous weapon under the relevant statute. The court of appeals affirms on essentially the same basis: the detective’s testimony was permissible “expositional” testimony under State v. Dobbs, 2020 WI 64, 392 Wis. 2d 505, 945 N.W.2d 609, and not subject to the heightened reliability standard for expert opinion testimony.
Defense win! Multiple convictions in same case on same date don’t require lifetime sex offender registration
State v. Corey T. Rector, 2023 WI 41, 5/23/23 affirming a case certified by the court of appeals, 2020AP1213; case activity (including briefs)
Rector pleaded to five counts of possessing child pornography in a single case. He’d never been convicted of anything before. The sentencing judge ordered that he be placed on the sex offender registry until 15 years after the end of his sentence or supervision. The Department of Corrections then wrote the judge to say that, in its view, any two or more convictions of registry-eligible sex offenses trigger mandatory registration for life. The judge stuck to his guns and reiterated the 15-year registry requirement. The state appealed, and the court of appeals certified the case. The state supreme court now holds, 4-3, that Rector is not required to register as a sex offender for the rest of his life.
Defense win! Courts can’t apply §939.62(1) and §961.48 enhancers at the same time
State v. Tracy Laver Hailes, 2021AP1339-CR, 5/9/23, District 1, (recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
In a decision recommended for publication, the court of appeals holds that under §973.01(2)(c) a circuit court may apply either §939.62(1) (governing habitual criminality) or §961.48 (governing second or subsequent offenses) to enhance a penalty, but it may not apply both. While the circuit court erroneously applied both enhancers in this case, the court of appeals nevertheless denied Hailes’s claims for plea withdrawal, sentence modification, and resentencing.
Defense win: Post-sentencing vacatur of prior OWIs may constitute a new factor justifying sentence modification
State v. James J. Socha, 2021AP1083-CR & 2021AP2116-CR, District 1, 4/25/23 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs): 2021AP1083-CR; 2021AP2116-CR
The fact that some of Socha’s prior OWI offenses have been lawfully vacated since he was sentenced may constitute a new factor justifying sentence modification, so the circuit courts erred in denying Socha’s motions for sentence modification without a hearing.
COA rejects claim that decision to deny expungement was based on inaccurate information
State v. Isaac M. Gabler, 2022AP995-CR, District 2, 04/19/23 (one-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
Gabler pled no contest to violating a temporary restraining order (TRO). The circuit court placed him on probation and denied his request to be eligible for expungement after determining that the public should be able to see that Gabler violated a TRO. Thereafter, the circuit court granted Gabler’s § 806.07 motion to vacate the underlying harassment injunction in part because the TRO upon which it was based was invalid. Nevertheless, the court affirms the circuit court’s denial of Gabler’s postconviction motion to reopen his sentencing hearing on the issue of expungement because “there was a temporary restraining order in place and that order had been violated.” (Opinion, ¶17).
Minnesota administrative suspension counts as prior OWI
State v. Jenny E. Clark, 2022AP495-CR, District 4, 3/23/23 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Clark’s Minnesota administrative suspension for operating with a prohibited alcohol concentration counts as a prior OWI conviction under State v. Carter, 2010 WI 132, 330 Wis. 2d 1, 794 N.W.2d 213.
COA critiques circuit court and state but affirms denial of “new factor” claim
State v. Amber C. Debree, 2022AP1311-CR, 02/08/23, District II (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Debree’s disorderly conduct conviction stemmed from a physical altercation she had with her husband immediately after Debree learned he had impregnated her adult daughter. The sentencing court placed Debree on probation for two years after it questioned whether Debree was “truly accepting responsibility for her actions” and expressed concern about her criminal record. In response to the concerns about her criminal record, Debree moved the court to modify her sentence based on her history of being abused by her husband, which provided additional context to her actions in this case and some explanation for her criminal record. Ultimately, the court of appeals affirms the circuit court’s denial of her new factor claim because Debree could not show that her claimed new factor was “unknowingly overlooked by all of the parties.” (Opinion, ¶8).