On Point: 36. Sentencing

State v. Dominic A. Caldiero, 2021AP1163-CR, District 4, 4/28/22 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

When he drove in 2019, Caldiero was still “subject to” a 2015 court order under § 343.301 (2013-14) restricting his operating privilege to cars with an ignition interlock device (IID) because the time period on that restriction does not begin to run till DOT issues him a driver’s license, and that hadn’t happened as of the date he was driving.

State v. Teresa L. Clark, 2022 WI 21, 4/20/22, reversing the circuit court on bypass, case activity (including briefs)

A defendant may collaterally attack a prior OWI conviction if she was not represented by counsel and did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive the right to counsel during that proceeding. Once she points to evidence of this claim, the burden shifts to State to prove a valid waiver. In a split opinion, SCOW now holds that if the transcript of the prior OWI hearing is unavailable, the burden doesn’t shift. The defendant must prove that her right to counsel was in fact violated–which is virtually impossible.

State v. Hajji Y. McReynolds, 2022 WI App 25; case activity (including briefs)

This decision addresses: 1) the propriety of successive postconviction motions; 2) a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to testimony vouching for the credibility of another witness and to improper character evidence; and 3) the novel issue of the sentencing judge’s use of a written rather than oral explanation of its sentencing rationale under § 973.017(10m)(b).

State v. Michael Lee Muehl, 2021AP1755-CR & 2021AP1758-CR, District 4, 3/31/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court sentenced Muehl to prison and made him eligible for the earned release programs. Turns out Muehl was ineligible for those programs, so he filed a motion to modify his sentence on the grounds that his ineligibility was a “new factor”—that is, a fact highly relevant to the imposition of sentence that was not known to the judge at the time of sentencing because it wasn’t in existence or was unknowingly overlooked. State v. Harbor, 2011 WI 28, ¶35, 333 Wis. 2d 53, 797 N.W.2d 828. (¶¶2-10). Although a defendant’s ineligibility for earned release programming   might be a new factor in some cases, it isn’t here because Muehl hasn’t established his ineligibility was “highly relevant” to the sentencing decision.

Victor Ortiz, Jr. v. Kevin A. Carr, 2022 WI App 16; case activity (including briefs)

Attorneys Jason Luczak and Jorge Fragoso of Gimbel, Reilly, Geurin & Brown generously took this case pro bono. And now Jorge offers this guest post on their defense win:

Prison inmate (and hero to institutionalized persons) Victor Ortiz filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking to limit the percentage of his income diverted for the payment of restitution. He won. The court of appeals ordered the Department of Corrections to limit its withholdings to 25% of Ortiz’s wages, half of what the Department sought.

On review of a court of appeals certification; affirmed 5/23/23; case activity (including briefs);

Issue:

Whether Wis. Stat. § 301.45(5)(b)1, which mandates lifetime sex-offender registration where a person has been convicted of a sex offense “on 2 or more separate occasions,” applies when a person’s only eligible convictions are entered on multiple guilty pleas in the same case.

State v. Octavia W. Dodson, 2022 WI 5, 2018AP1476, 1/26/22, affirming an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Dodson pleaded guilty to second-degree homicide. He’d shot and killed Freeman, who he (apparently erroneously) believed had earlier rear-ended his car. Dodson had pursued Freeman’s car and Freeman pulled over. Dodson said Freeman had run at him shouting racial epithets; that’s when Dodson shot him.

State v. Tanya M. Liedke, 2020AP33-CR, Distirct 2, 12/29/21 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court correctly concluded that Liedke wasn’t in custody for sentence credit purposes while she was on GPS monitoring in connection with the case on which she was sentenced. But she’s entitled to some credit for other time when she was in custody, and the circuit court was wrong to deny her request on the grounds that it was DOC’s responsibility to address her request.

State v. T.A., 2020AP1350, 12/28/21, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Tanner (16) had sex with a girl (16) after she told him to “stop.” The circuit court adjudicated him delinquent and imposed but stayed a requirement that he register as a sex offender. Subsequently, the court lifted the stay and ordered Tanner to register as a sex offender for 15 years.  The court of appeals here reverses the “lift of stay” and orders a new hearing because the circuit court relied on an inaccurate interpretation of Tanner’s J-SOAP-II score at the original hearing.

State v. Dallas R. Christel, 2020AP1127-1128-Cr, 12/8/21, District 2 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Christel argued that §940.235, which criminalizes strangulation and suffocation, (1) violates substantive due process on its face and as applied to him, (2) is overbroad, and (3) is void for vagueness. He also argued for a new-factor-based sentence modification on his bail-jumping convictions. The court of appeals torpedoed every claim.