On Point blog, page 30 of 96
Habeas relief granted because penalty enhancement statute is unconstitutionally vague
Walker Whatley v. Dushan Zatecky, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-2534, 2016 WL 4269805, 8/15/16
The maximum penalty for Whatley’s drug possession conviction was dramatically increased—from 2-to-8 years to 20-to-50 years—under a now-repealed Indiana penalty enhancer for drug offenses committed within 1,000 feet of a “youth program center,” defined as a “building or structure that on a regular basis provides recreational, vocational, academic, social, or other programs” for youth. (Sound familiar? Sure it does: see §§ 961.01(22) and 961.49(1m)(b)5.) On habeas review, the Seventh Circuit holds that the statute’s failure to provide an objective standard for determining what “regular” means makes the statute unconstitutionally vague, so Whatley is entitled to resentencing under the non-enhanced penalty scheme.
Defendant required to pay restitution for damage he didn’t directly cause
State v. Terry C. Craig, Jr., 2016AP177-CR, District 4, 8/11/16 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Craig struck and shattered the left tail light on an old car but he did not put a baseball-sized hole or a 2 inch crack on the left of it. That was preexisting damage. The circuit court ordered him to pay restitution for it any way, and the court of appeals affirmed.
Court of appeals instructs defense on grammar and punctuation, proper interpretation of 939.617 depends on it
State v. Markus S. Holcomb, 2016 WI App 70; case activity (including briefs)
“While sentence diagramming may be the bane of fifth graders everywhere, it is the trick of the trade in statutory construction.” Slip op. ¶9. “Punctuation too is important. . . . It can be the difference between ‘Let’s eat, Grandma!’ and ‘Let’s eat Grandma!'” ¶12. So begins today’s lesson on the proper way to read §939.617, which provides minimum sentences for certain child sex offenses.
Sentencing courts need not “parrot typical buzz words seen in sentencing transcripts;” implicit rationale is enough
State v. Danny F. Anton, 2015AP2336-CR, District 1, 8/2/16; (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
This decision openly thumbs its nose at Gallion. Between it and SCOW’s recent decision in State v. Salas Gayton you have to wonder whether Gallion has been overruled sub silentio.
Time spent confined for traffic offense sentence is excluded from 5-year repeater period
State v. Jason R. Cooper, 2016 WI App 63; case activity (including briefs)
While a conviction for a motor vehicle offense can’t be used to establish a defendant’s repeater status under § 939.62, time a defendant spent in custody serving a sentence for a motor vehicle is still excluded when computing whether any prior convictions for non-motor vehicle offenses occurred within five years of the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced.
Judge’s inaccurate, ex parte internet research results in new sentencing hearing
State v. Patricia A. Enriquez, 2015AP1850-CR, District 2, 7/27/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
After Enriquez made a statement at her sentencing for delivering nonnarcotic controlled substances, the sentencing judge presented the parties with information he had uncovered based on his own internet searches. He claimed the information showed that Enriquez’s misrepresented facts about her nursing license status in Texas and Illinois. Finding that Enriquez’s character for honesty was “miserable” based in part on this ex parte research, the judge sentenced her to consecutive terms of sixty-six months’ imprisonment, far beyond what the state had recommended. But the information the judge dredged up was inaccurate, and because the court relied on that misinformation in sentencing her, Enriquez is entitled to be resentenced.
Judge’s “improper extraneous comments” require new sentencing hearing
United States v. Billy J. Robinson, Jr., 7th Circuit Court of Appeal Case No. 15-2019, 2016 WL 3947808, 7/22/16
A federal district judge’s sentencing comments “strayed so far from the record” that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals “cannot trace the (legitimate) reasons for Robinson’s sentence” and therefore Robinson is entitled to resentencing.
Commissioner’s proposed findings on restitution don’t get de novo review by circuit court
State v. Pagenkopf, 2015AP1855-CR, 7/21/16, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Per §973.20(13)(c)4, a court commissioner held a hearing and submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law recommending that Pagenkopf pay $19,274.69 in restitution. Pagenkopf sought de novo review via §757.69(8), which provides that a “decision” by a court commissioner shall be reviewed by the circuit court upon the motion of any party. According to the court of appeals, §757.69(8) does not apply to a commissioner’s restitution findings.
Arrest, conviction of unconscious driver upheld
State v. Mark G. McCaskill, 2015AP1487-CR, District 4, 7/21/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
McCaskill’s challenges to his arrest and conviction for operating with a prohibited alcohol content don’t persuade the court of appeals.
Statute creating both misdemeanor and felony offense isn’t subject to rule of lenity, doesn’t violate due process or equal protection
State v. Ernesto E. Lazo Villamil, 2016 WI App 61, petitions for review and cross-review granted 1/9/2017, affirmed 2017 WI 74, ; case activity (including briefs)
Lazo Villamil was convicted and sentenced for operating after revocation and causing death under § 343.44, one of the provisions of which says that the offense is both a misdemeanor and a felony. He claims that convicting and sentencing him for the felony rather the misdemeanor violated the rule of lenity and his rights to due process and equal protection. The court of appeals disagrees, but grants resentencing due to the circuit court’s failure to consider certain sentencing factors..