On Point blog, page 4 of 95
COA holds mandatory minimum for OWI 5 or 6 doesn’t allow for probation
State v. Lynne M. Shirikian, 2023 WI App 13; case activity (including briefs)
Shirikian pleaded to OWI as a fifth offense. Back in 2019, the legislature amended the statutes to create a both a presumptive and a mandatory minimum sentence for OWI 5th and OWI 6th. See 2019 Wis. Act 106; Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)5. The presumptive minimum requires at least 18 months of initial confinement, but the statute lets a court go lower if it finds doing so in the best interest of the community and not harmful to the public. The court of appeals now holds that even if a court decides to give less than 18 months IC, it’s still obligated to impose a bifurcated sentence. Since bifurcated sentences necessarily involve at least a year of IC, see Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b), that year is the true mandatory minimum. Further, the court holds, a sentencing judge can’t avoid this minimum by imposing and staying a prison sentence and ordering of probation. Because the judge here did order probation, the court of appeals remands with directions that the lower court impose a legal sentence.
COA upholds $500 restitution award based solely on victim’s unsupported testimony
State v. Jeffrey W. Butler, 2021AP2212-CR, 1/11/23, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
At Butler’s restitution hearing, the circuit court expressed frustration and disappointment that neither party presented any documentation regarding a disputed restitution claim. The court stated, “I have nothing other than testimony saying [the victim’s] done all this stuff and Googled it and she doesn’t bring in any receipts.” The court continued: “Nothing, I have nothing…[s]o the court is left with, based on testimony, what’s a reasonable amount of restitution…” The court then concluded, “I’ll put $500 toward clothing.” Butler appealed and the court of appeals affirms, holding that the victim’s testimony alone is sufficient to support the restitution award.
SCOW will review circuit court’s attempt to act like a DOC supervision agent
State v. Junior L. Williams-Holmes, petition for review of a published court of appeals decision granted 11/16/22; case activity (including PFR, PFR response, and briefs)
Issue presented (from the defendant’s PFR)
Can a circuit court use its statutory authority to modify conditions of probation and extended supervision to regulate the day-to-day affairs of individuals on supervision, contrary to statutes conferring on the Department of Corrections the exclusive authority to administer probation?
Minor passenger in car operated by intoxicated driver is a “victim” for purposes of restitution statute
State v. Mark J. Gahart, 2022 WI App 61; case activity (including briefs)
The court of appeals holds that driving while intoxicated with a minor passenger is not a victimless crime: the minor passenger is a victim for purposes of the restitution statute.
COA rejects challenges to jury instructions: one good route to conviction is enough
State v. Dreama F. Harvey, 2022 WI App 60; case activity (including briefs)
A jury convicted Harvey of reckless homicide by the delivery of heroin. On appeal, she notes that the jury instructions would have permitted conviction on the theory that she either aided and abetted another supplier or was part of the chain of distribution–that is, that she supplied the person who actually sold the heroin to the decedent. But there was no evidence she’d done any of those things: if she’d committed the crime, all the evidence showed that it was by selling the heroin directly to the buyer, who ingested it and died. The verdict forms were general: the jury was asked only to determine guilt or innocence, not whether Harvey was the principal, an aider, or a higher-up in the chain. So, Harvey says, we can’t know whether the jury convicted her based on one of the other two theories for which there was no evidence, and her conviction must be reversed.
Defendant waived right to appear in person; failed to show new factor for sentence modification
State v. Leroy Rice, Jr., 2022AP244-CR, 9/14/22, District 2, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Rice sought resentencing based on an inadequate waiver of his right to be physically present at his sentencing per §971.04(1)(g) and based on a new factor: the circuit court overlooked his substance abuse needs at the time of sentencing and thus failed to make him eligible for substance abuse programming (SAP). Successful completion of SAP would entitle him to early release. The court of appeals rejected both arguments.
Juvenile brain development research wasn’t a new factor justifying sentence modification
State v. Jonathan L. Liebzeit, 2021AP9-CR, District 3, 8/30/22 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
In 1997, a circuit judge sentenced Liebzeit to life without the possibility of parole for a homicide he committed at the age of 19. In 2019, after hearing a presentation at a judicial education seminar about juvenile brain development and shortly thereafter sentencing an 18-year-old for a crime, the judge decided to to contact Liebzeit’s lawyer to suggest a sentence modification may be appropriate based on the new factor of the brain development research. After defense counsel filed a sentence modification motion the court modified Liebzeit’s sentence to make him eligible for paroled after 25 years based on two new factors: 1) new scientific understanding of brain maturity in adolescents; and 2) Liebzeit’s brain damage from his inhalant use. (¶¶4-22). The court of appeals holds the circuit court erred because Liebzeit didn’t prove either new factor.
COA reverses successful collateral attack, remands for hearing in light of Clark
State v. Robert J. Baur, 2021AP55, 8/25/2022, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
An OWI defendant can attack prior convictions–thus seeking a lower offense number and lower associated penalty–only if he or she lacked counsel in that prior proceeding and did not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waive the right to counsel. Wisconsin courts have adopted a burden-shifting regime: if a defendant can show that the court in the prior proceeding didn’t do a proper colloquy on the counsel right, the state must then prove that the defendant nevertheless understood the right. But given that priors are often from quite a while ago, it often happens that no transcript of the prior hearing can be produced. What then?
COA denies writ of coram nobis seeking to vacate OWI based on Forrett
State v. Singh, 2021AP1111-CR, 8/18/22, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Singh challenges his 2005 conviction for OWI, first offense. He first asks for a writ of coram nobis vacating the conviction. Alternatively, he asks that his conviction be vacated or amended under State v. Forrett, 2022 WI 37, 401 Wis. 2d 678, 974 N.W.2d 422, which held that an OWI penalty cannot be increased because of a prior revocation stemming from a refusal to submit a warrantless blood draw.
SCOW okays sending message to Amish, notes sentencing law may need clarification
State v. Westley D. Whitaker, 2020AP29-CR, 2022WI 54, 7/5/22, affirming a publisher court of appeals opinion, 2021 WI App 17; case activity (including briefs)
As a teenager, Whitaker repeatedly sexually assaulted his sisters. Though aware of the assaults, neither his parents nor the Amish elders reported them to the authorities. Whitaker pleaded to one count of 1st-degree sexual assault of a child. On appeal, he argues that the circuit court improperly sentenced him by referencing his Amish faith and stating an intent to send a message to the Amish community. SCOW affirmed, but the majority and concurrences highlight concerns about how “improper sentencing factor” claims are evaluated.