On Point: 36. Sentencing

State v. Tracy Laver Hailes, 2021AP1339-CR, 5/9/23, District 1, (recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In a decision recommended for publication, the court of appeals holds that under §973.01(2)(c) a circuit court may apply either §939.62(1) (governing habitual criminality) or §961.48 (governing second or subsequent offenses) to enhance a penalty, but it may not apply both. While the circuit court erroneously applied both enhancers in this case, the court of appeals nevertheless denied Hailes’s claims for plea withdrawal, sentence modification, and resentencing.

State v. James J. Socha, 2021AP1083-CR & 2021AP2116-CR, District 1, 4/25/23 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs): 2021AP1083-CR; 2021AP2116-CR

The fact that some of Socha’s prior OWI offenses have been lawfully vacated since he was sentenced may constitute a new factor justifying sentence modification, so the circuit courts erred in denying Socha’s motions for sentence modification without a hearing.

State v. Isaac M. Gabler, 2022AP995-CR, District 2, 04/19/23 (one-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Gabler pled no contest to violating a temporary restraining order (TRO). The circuit court placed him on probation and denied his request to be eligible for expungement after determining that the public should be able to see that Gabler violated a TRO. Thereafter, the circuit court granted Gabler’s § 806.07 motion to vacate the underlying harassment injunction in part because the TRO upon which it was based was invalid. Nevertheless, the court affirms the circuit court’s denial of Gabler’s postconviction motion to reopen his sentencing hearing on the issue of expungement because “there was a temporary restraining order in place and that order had been violated.” (Opinion, ¶17).

State v. Jenny E. Clark, 2022AP495-CR, District 4, 3/23/23 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Clark’s Minnesota administrative suspension for operating with a prohibited alcohol concentration counts as a prior OWI conviction under State v. Carter, 2010 WI 132, 330 Wis. 2d 1, 794 N.W.2d 213.

State v. Amber C. Debree, 2022AP1311-CR, 02/08/23, District II (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Debree’s disorderly conduct conviction stemmed from a physical altercation she had with her husband immediately after Debree learned he had impregnated her adult daughter. The sentencing court placed Debree on probation for two years after it questioned whether Debree was “truly accepting responsibility for her actions” and expressed concern about her criminal record. In response to the concerns about her criminal record, Debree moved the court to modify her sentence based on her history of being abused by her husband, which provided additional context to her actions in this case and some explanation for her criminal record. Ultimately, the court of appeals affirms the circuit court’s denial of her new factor claim because Debree could not show that her claimed new factor was “unknowingly overlooked by all of the parties.” (Opinion, ¶8).

State v. Lynne M. Shirikian, 2023 WI App 13; case activity (including briefs)

Shirikian pleaded to OWI as a fifth offense. Back in 2019, the legislature amended the statutes to create a both a presumptive and a mandatory minimum sentence for OWI 5th and OWI 6th. See 2019 Wis. Act 106; Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)5. The presumptive minimum requires at least 18 months of initial confinement, but the statute lets a court go lower if it finds doing so in the best interest of the community and not harmful to the public. The court of appeals now holds that even if a court decides to give less than 18 months IC, it’s still obligated to impose a bifurcated sentence. Since bifurcated sentences necessarily involve at least a year of IC, see Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b), that year is the true mandatory minimum. Further, the court holds, a sentencing judge can’t avoid this minimum by imposing and staying a prison sentence and ordering of probation. Because the judge here did order probation, the court of appeals remands with directions that the lower court impose a legal sentence.

State v. Jeffrey W. Butler, 2021AP2212-CR, 1/11/23, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

At Butler’s restitution hearing, the circuit court expressed frustration and disappointment that neither party presented any documentation regarding a disputed restitution claim. The court stated, “I have nothing other than testimony saying [the victim’s] done all this stuff and Googled it and she doesn’t bring in any receipts.” The court continued: “Nothing, I have nothing…[s]o the court is left with, based on testimony, what’s a reasonable amount of restitution…” The court then concluded, “I’ll put $500 toward clothing.” Butler appealed and the court of appeals affirms, holding that the victim’s testimony alone is sufficient to support the restitution award.

State v. Junior L. Williams-Holmes, petition for review of a published court of appeals decision granted 11/16/22; case activity (including PFR, PFR response, and briefs)

Issue presented (from the defendant’s PFR)

Can a circuit court use its statutory authority to modify conditions of probation and extended supervision to regulate the day-to-day affairs of individuals on supervision, contrary to statutes conferring on the Department of Corrections the exclusive authority to administer probation?

State v. Mark J. Gahart, 2022 WI App 61; case activity (including briefs)

The court of appeals holds that driving while intoxicated with a minor passenger is not a victimless crime: the minor passenger is a victim for purposes of the restitution statute.

State v. Dreama F. Harvey, 2022 WI App 60; case activity (including briefs)

A jury convicted Harvey of reckless homicide by the delivery of heroin. On appeal, she notes that the jury instructions would have permitted conviction on the theory that she either aided and abetted another supplier or was part of the chain of distribution–that is, that she supplied the person who actually sold the heroin to the decedent. But there was no evidence she’d done any of those things: if she’d committed the crime, all the evidence showed that it was by selling the heroin directly to the buyer, who ingested it and died. The verdict forms were general: the jury was asked only to determine guilt or innocence, not whether Harvey was the principal, an aider, or a higher-up in the chain. So, Harvey says, we can’t know whether the jury convicted her based on one of the other two theories for which there was no evidence, and her conviction must be reversed.