On Point: 36. Sentencing

State v. Clayton W. Williams, 2014 WI 64, 7/15/14, reversing a published court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Prosser; case activity

This opinion addresses § 346.65(2)(am)6. as it applied to OWI 7th, 8th, and 9th offenses committed between July 1, 2010, when the statute first took effect, and April 10, 2014, when it was amended by 2014 Wis. Act 224. During that time period, the statute provided that the offense was a Class G felony, and that “[t]he confinement portion of a bifurcated sentence imposed on the person under [§] 973.01 shall be not less than 3 years.” The supreme court concludes this language is ambiguous because it could be read either to require a court to impose a bifurcated sentence or, instead, to permit a court to order probation with or without imposition of a bifurcated sentence, but that the legislative history makes it clear the language requires courts to impose a bifurcated sentence with a mandatory minimum three-year period of initial confinement.

State v. Andre Durand Reggs, 2013AP2367-CR, District 4, 7/3/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Applying State v. Ernst, 2005 WI 107, 283 Wis. 2d 300, 699 N.W.2d 92, the circuit court properly concluded that Reggs failed to make a prima facie showing that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive the right to counsel for an earlier OWI conviction.

State v. Bryanntton A. Brown, 2013AP1332-CR, District 1, 6/24/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to present certain evidence that the complainant in Brown’s child sexual assault prosecution may have obtained her sexual knowledge from watching TV and movies and talking to her older sister. Nor was trial counsel ineffective for not taking steps to mitigate the impact of a letter Brown purportedly wrote to Carson, a fellow jail inmate, in which Brown admitted the charges. Finally, the circuit court didn’t erroneously exercise its sentencing discretion.

State v. Eric T. Alston, 2013AP1833-CR & 2013AP1834-CR, District 4, 4/19/16 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2013AP1833-CR; 2013AP1834-CR

Bifurcated sentences that were first modified under the now-superseded, unpublished ruling in State v. Gerondale have to be modified again because they violate the rule that the confinement portion of a bifurcated sentence can’t exceed 75% of the total sentence.

On review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity

Issues (composed by On Point)

When, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.015, a sentencing court orders the expunction of a defendant’s record upon successful completion of his sentence, does expunction occur automatically upon the circuit court clerk’s receipt of the defendant’s certificate of discharge or must the defendant file a petition for expunction?

If the defendant must petition the circuit court for expunction, then: (a) is there a deadline by which he must file it, and (b) who is required to forward the certificate of discharge to the circuit court—the defendant or the Department of Corrections (or other detaining authority)?

If a defendant successfully completes his sentence or probation, thereby earning expunction, may the circuit court revoke the grant of expunction based upon the defendant’s post-discharge conduct?

On review of an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity

Issue (composed by On Point)

Did the inclusion in the PSI of statements Alexander made to his probation agent, and the trial court’s consideration of the statements at sentencing, violate Alexander’s right against self-incrimination?

State v. Jacqueline Robinson, 2014 WI 35, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity

From the majority opinion, this looks like an open and shut case. When sentencing Robinson, the trial judge said he misunderstood the sentence she had received in another matter. One day later, he recalled the case and increased the sentence. No double jeopardy violation here, says the majority, Robinson could not yet have had a legitimate expectation of finality in her sentence. The 28-page concurrence and 20-page dissent suggest this case isn’t so simple.

State v. Adam W. Miller, 2013AP2218; 6/5/14; District 4 (not recommended for publication); case activity

The court of appeals holds that a circuit court may apply the § 939.62(1)(c) penalty enhancer to increase Miller’s term of initial confinement beyond the maximum prescribed by law without first imposing the maximum term of imprisonment, as in the maximums for both initial confinement and extended supervision.

State v. Patrick L. Hibl, 2013AP2723-CR, District 2, 6/4/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Rejecting challenges to a restitution order, the court of appeals holds that the evidence in the record established a nexus between the crime Hibl was convicted of and the victim’s loss and that the circuit court took account of his ability to pay.

Freddie Lee Hall v. Florida, USSC No. 12-10882, May 27, 2014, reversing Hall v. State, 109 So. 3d 704 (Fla. 2012); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Because “intellectual disability is a condition, not a number,” and an IQ score is an approximation, not a final and infallible assessment of intellectual functioning, the Supreme Court invalidates Florida’s bright-line rule that a defendant is not intellectually disabled—and thus may be executed—if he has never scored below 70 on an IQ test.