On Point blog, page 45 of 97
Ignition interlock must be ordered in first offense OWI when defendant has prior offense outside the 10 year counting period
Village of Grafton v. Eric L. Seatz, 2014 WI App 23; case activity
“The issue presented is straightforward: Must a court order the installation of an ignition interlock device when a defendant is convicted of first-offense operating while intoxicated (OWI) and also has a prior conviction for an OWI offense? The answer is yes.” (¶1).
Seatz was arrested for OWI. His blood alcohol content was .13.
Court of appeals orders trial court to explain its restitution decision (again)
State v. Thomas G. Felski, 2013AP1796-CR, District 2, 1/29/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
For a second time the court of appeals reverses a restitution order and remands the case for the circuit court to explain how it arrived at the restitution figure.
Felski was convicted of performing home improvement services without a contract. In his first appeal, the court of appeals upheld the determination that Felski was liable for restitution,
Resentencing required because PSI included defendant’s compelled statements to probation agent
State v. Danny Robert Alexander, 2013AP843-CR, District 1, 1/28/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted 6/12/14, reversed, 2015 WI 6; case activity
Alexander was on probation when he was charged with forgery. He pled to the forgery and a PSI was prepared. (¶2). Attached to the PSI were statements the defendant made to his probation agent about two other forgeries.
Resentencing judge was not vindictive, did not rely on inaccurate information, and did not impose excessive sentence
State v. Quincy Lashawn Baker, 2013AP242-CR, District 1, 1/28/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Baker was given a resentencing hearing based on inaccurate information about the maximum periods of confinement and supervision for the crime of conviction (felony murder). (¶¶4-5). At the resentencing hearing before a different judge, the state argued Baker’s profane outburst at the conclusion of his original sentencing hearing showed a lack of remorse.
Once again, court of appeals holds enhancer time may be used for extended supervision portion of an enhanced misdemeanor sentence
State v. Torrey L. Smith-Iwer, 2013AP1426-CR, District 1, 12/27/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Smith-Iwer was convicted of four misdemeanors as a repeat offender under § 939.62(1)(a) and given four consecutive two-year sentences, each consisting of one year of confinement and one year of extended supervision. He moved for postconviction relief, arguing the sentences were illegal under State v. Volk,
Use of counsel in prior cases defeats defendant’s claim that he didn’t knowingly waive his right to counsel in later case
State v. Scott J. Stelzer, 2013AP1555-CR, District 2, 12/27/13 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication), case activity
After being convicted of his 3rd OWI offense, Stelzer moved to exclude his 2nd OWI (which occurred in 1996) from the calculation of his prior convictions on the grounds that he was not represented by counsel when he pled guilty to it. Nor did he knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to counsel at that time.
Defendant must file a separate § 973.195 sentence adjustment petition for each sentence to be adjusted
State v. Jeffery Polar, Jr., 2014 WI App 15; case activity
The court of appeals holds that the plain language of § 973.195(1r)(a) requires a defendant serving multiple sentences to file a separate sentence adjustment petition for each individual sentence the defendant is seeking to adjust.
Polar’s governing sentences consisted of two consecutive terms, one with 7 years of confinement, the second for 3 years of confinement.
State v. Clayton W. Williams, 2011AP2868-CR, petition for review granted 11/21/13
Review of published court of appeals decision; case activity
Issue (composed by On Point)
Does § 346.65(2)(am)6., which provides that “the confinement portion of a bifurcated sentence imposed under s. 973.01 [for an OWI 7th, 8th, or 9th] shall be not less than 3 years,” require that a bifurcated sentence be imposed?
The court of appeals held that the statute requires a minimum period of confinement if a bifurcated sentence is imposed,
State v. Andrew J. Matasek, 2012AP1582, petition for review granted
Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity
Issue: Whether under § 973.015 the circuit court has the discretion to withhold its decision on expungement until after the defendant completes probation?
Wis. Stat. § 973.015 authorizes the circuit court to expunge the record of a defendant under the age of 25 in certain situations. Matasek says the statute gives the circuit court discretion to defer its expunction decision until after the offender successfully completes probation.
Huge restitution award upheld based on defendant’s chance of winning lottery
State v. Ericka S. Thomas, Appeal No. 2013AP341-CR; District 1; 11/13/13 (not recommended for publication); case activity
This is a split decision over the proper application of § 973.20, the restitution statute. The circuit court convicted Thomas of Medicaid fraud, sentenced her to imprisonment, and ordered her to pay $356, 366.33 (the total amount she and accomplices stole) in restitution. At sentencing, her lawyer described her “extremely limited earning ability,” a statement bolstered by her PSI.