On Point blog, page 46 of 97
Does SCOTUS decision holding that sentencing a juvenile to life without parole is unconstitional apply retroactively?
The Sentencing Law and Policy blog (an affiliate of the law professor blogs network) tees up the issue nicely. Their post is pasted in below.
When and how will SCOTUS take up Miller retroactivity issues?
The question in the title of this post is promoted by this local piece reporting on reactions to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision last week (reported here) that its state teens given mandatory LWOP before the US Supreme Court’s Miller ruling should not get any retroactive benefit from that decision.
Sentencing — consideration of dismissed charge. Resisting/obstructing, § 946.41 — sufficiency of evidence.
State v. Earnest Lee Nicholson, 2013AP722-CR, District 1, 10/29/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Nicholson was arrested for felony battery of his girlfriend, Marnice Franklin, but the battery charge was dismissed after Franklin failed to appear to testify at trial; Nicholson was also charged with resisting an officer, and that charge proceeded to trial and a guilty verdict. (¶¶2-4). At sentencing on the resisting charge the judge made extensive remarks concerning the alleged battery,
Freddie Lee Hall v. Florida, USSC No. 12-10882, cert. granted 10/21/13
Whether the Florida scheme for identifying mentally retarded defendants in capital cases violates Atkins v. Virginia.
Lower court opinion: Hall v. State, 109 So.3d 704 (Fla. 2012)
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), held that it is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment to execute a person who is found to be mentally retarded.
Benjamin Robers v. United States, USSC No. 12-9012, cert. granted 10/21/13
Whether a defendant-who has fraudulently obtained a loan and thus owes restitution for the loan under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(1)(B) returns “any part” of the loan money by giving the lenders the collateral that secures the money?
Lower court opinion: United States v. Robers, 698 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 2012)
In this case the Court will resolve a circuit split about the calculation of restitution under 18 U.S.C.
Court of appeals affirms sentence aimed at holding defendant for trial in different county; accuses counsel of lacking candor
State v. Rodney Vincent McToy, 2013AP832-CR, District 1, 10/15/13, (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
McToy pled guilty to two charges of misdemeanor bail jumping stemming from a domestic dispute with Ms. H. The parties briefed a straightforward Gallion issue: Did the Milwaukee County Circuit Court erroneously exercise its discretion when it failed to provide a “rational and explainable basis” for the sentence it imposed—200 days in jail for one count and 2 years probation for the other?
Circuit court properly exercised discretion in denying “new factor” time cut request
State v. David J. Lawrence, 2013AP796, District 4, 10/10/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court knew of Lawrence’s mental health diagnoses at sentencing, but after sentencing Lawrence was hospitalized after a psychological breakdown. (¶¶3-4). He requested sentence modification, arguing the court was not aware of all his diagnoses or his medication regimen. (¶5). Assuming that information was a “new factor,” the circuit court gave a reasoned explanation for why it declined to modify the sentence,
Court’s deviation from the exact language of immigration warning in § 971.08(1)(c) doesn’t entitle defendant to plea withdrawal
State v. Ali Mursal, 2013 WI App 125; case activity
Before accepting a defendant’s guilty or no contest plea the court is required to advise the defendant there may be immigration consequences. Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c). While that statute prescribes a text for the required warning—complete with quotation marks—the court of appeals holds in this case that a judge’s failure to repeat that language verbatim is not by itself grounds for plea withdrawal.
State loses restitution appeal; proof of damages and nexus to crime is just too skimpy
State v. Deris Huley, 2013AP682, 9/26/13 (1-judge ineligible for publication); case activity
It’s not often the court of appeals rules against the State.
Huley pled no contest to a misdemeanor hit and run of an attended vehicle, as a repeater. See §346.74(5)(a). The State sought restitution in the amount of $4,064.83 for the victim’s personal injuries. Noting that “restitution is the rule and not the exception” and that “the victim need only show that the defendant’s actions were the precipitating cause of the injury and that [the injury] was the natural consequence of the actions,” the court of appeals nevertheless affirmed the denial of restitution.
Lack of colloquy regarding waiver of counsel in prior OWI case does not make prima facie showing for collateral attack
State v. Glen G. Bowe, 2013AP238-CR, District 3, 9/17/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The lack of any colloquy regarding Bowe’s waiver of his right to counsel when he pled in his prior OWI case does not by itself make the prima facie showing necessary for a collateral attack on the prior conviction because State v. Ernst,
Ineffective assistance of counsel — failure to demand speedy trial, communicate with defendant, and impeach the victim. Sentencing — unduly harsh sentence.
State v. Jerry Lee Carson, 2012AP2616-CR, District 1, 9/17/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Ineffective assistance of trial counsel
Carson, convicted of second degree recklessly endangering safety, claimed his trial lawyer was ineffective on various grounds. The court of appeals holds counsel was not ineffective for failing to:
- Demand a speedy trial. Carson was not prejudiced by the delay beyond the statutory speedy trial deadlines.