On Point: 36. Sentencing

Question Presented (composed by Scotusblog): 

Whether the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 applies in an initial sentencing proceeding that takes place on or after the statute’s effective date if the offense occurred before that date.

Hill: Scotusblog page; consolidated with Dorsey (lower court decision: United States v. Fisher, 635 F.3d 336 (7th Cir. 2011))

The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010,

State v. Jeffrey Steinhorst, 2011AP1360-CR, District 4, 11/23/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Steinhorst: Steven Cohen; case activity

Steinhorst made a prima facie showing that he did not validly waive counsel in a prior OWI case; therefore, he is entitled to a hearing at which the State must prove proper waiver, by clear and convincing evidence, else the prior conviction may not be used to enhance his current case.

State v. Lavalle Rimmer, 2010AP2680-CR, District 1, 11/22/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Rimmer: Christian C. Starner; case activity

The sentencing court did not actually rely on concededly inaccurate information, therefore Rimmer isn’t entitled to resentencing.

Methodology for analyzing inaccurate-information issue recited, ¶¶11-16. Court suggests that something akin to explicit reference to inaccurate information required, ¶16.)

State v. Michael T. Ziller, 2011 WI App 164 (recommended for publication); for Ziller: Michael S. Holzman; case activity

¶11      On the basis of our review of the record in this case, we are satisfied that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in sentencing Ziller.  The circuit court considered the three primary sentencing factors and noted them on the record.  See State v. Gallion,

State v. Alok Kumar, 2010AP2703-CR, District 1, 11/8/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Kumar: Robin Shellow, Michael E. O’Rourke; case activity

Sentence to presumptive minimum (5 years confinement) for using a computer to facilitate a child sex crime, § 948.075(lr), is upheld as a proper exercise of discretion, against Kumar’s arguments that the sentencing court: didn’t permit him to show sentences imposed by other circuit courts in presumptive-minimum cases;

Miller: SCOTUSblog page; consolidated with Jackson: SCOTUSblog page

Question Presented (from SCOTUSblog):

Whether imposing a sentence of life without possibility of parole on an offender who was fourteen at the time he committed capital murder constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Sound at least vaguely familiar? It should: our supreme court resolved that very question last Term,

State v. Christina L. Contizano, 2011AP477-CR, District 4, 10/27/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Contizano: Robert C. Howard III; case activity

At Contizano’s sentencing for obstructing, based on lying to the police about her daughter’s location, the trial court didn’t erroneously exercise discretion in allowing Contizano’s ex-husband to advocate as a “victim” of the offense, in favor of a term of incarceration.

¶7        We conclude the court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it considered the Walworths’ statements at sentencing.  

State v. Toronee L. Kimbrough, 2010AP2676-CR, District 1, 10/25/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Kimbrough: Andrea Taylor Cornwall, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; case activity

The court rejects Kimbrough’s challenge to sentence, as based on 3 instances of alleged inaccuracies:

1. the sentencing court’s reliance on the co-defendant’s statements as suggestive of Kimbrough’s own failure to accept responsibility for the crime (Kimbrough doesn’t meet his burden of showing erroneous attribution to him of the co-defendant’s statements,

State v. Altonio Laroy Chaney, 2011AP207-CR, District 1, 10/25/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Chaney: Angela Conrad Kachelski; case activity; prior appeal: 2008AP395-CR

Chaney’s argument that an eyewitness had recanted his version of having seen Chaney sexually assault the victim didn’t satisfy the new factor test for sentence modification: the sentencing court didn’t focus on the claim that Chaney,

State v. Scott R. Long, 2011 WI App 146 (recommended for publication); for Long: Jeff T. Wilson; case activity

DNA surcharge, conditioned on Long not having previously provided sample or having paid surcharge, upheld as proper exercise of discretion:

¶8        Here, the circuit court ordered the DNA sample contingent on whether one had previously been provided.  If the sample had not previously been provided, the circuit court reasoned that the DNA surcharge was appropriate because “it would be for a sample provided in connection with this case.”  This explanation is consistent with the rationale of the circuit court which we affirmed in Jones.