On Point blog, page 75 of 95
Sentencing – Review – Consecutive Sentences
State v. Lonnie C. Davis, 2005 WI App 98
For Davis: Pamela Moorshead
Issue/Holding:
¶24 Davis next contends that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion when it imposed consecutive sentences without an adequate explanation of why that was the minimum amount of time necessary. We reject this claim.¶25 The trial court explained why the maximum term was required in this case.
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¶26 … The court must provide an explanation for the general range of the sentence imposed,
Sentencing Review – Consecutive Sentences – Unrelated Past Offenses
State v. Brandon J. Matke, 2005 WI App 4, PFR filed 1/6/05
For Matke: James B. Connell
Issue/Holding:
¶17. Finally, Matke argues that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion when it ordered, without explanation, that Matke’s present sentence be consecutive to any other sentences he was then serving. …
¶18. The sole infirmity that Matke cites is the court’s failure to specifically relate any of the sentencing factors it discussed to its decision to order the present sentence consecutive to,
Sentencing – Factors – Proof of, Generally
State v. James L. Montroy, 2005 WI App 230
For Montroy: Jay E. Heit; Stephanie L. Finn
Issue/Holding: Wisconsin discretionary guideline regime is not governed by the holdings of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), ¶¶20-24. The latter cases are implicated only when a fact is utilized to support a sentence beyond the statutory maximum;
Sentencing Factors – Prior Juvenile Adjudications (Where Unrepresented)
State v. James L. Montroy, 2005 WI App 230
For Montroy: Jay E. Heit; Stephanie L. Finn
Issue/Holding:
¶13 Montroy also argues that the PSI improperly included two of his juvenile adjudications, when there was no evidence that he was represented by counsel. [5] The State concedes that the Department of Corrections guidelines mandate that unrepresented juvenile adjudications should not be included in a PSI.
Sentencing Review – Factors – Public Protection
State v. Eduardo Jose Trigueros, 2005 WI App 112
For Trigueros: Eileen Miller Carter
Issue: Whether the trial court erroneously exercised sentencing discretion by placing too much weight on the need to protect the public, by placing defendant on probation with one year in the House of Correction, on possession with intent to deliver one gram or less of cocaine, where the State sought a sentence of 38 months including 14 months’ initial confinement.
Sentencing Review – Factors – Youthfulness of Defendant
State v. Lonnie C. Davis, 2005 WI App 98
For Davis: Pamela Moorshead
Issue: Whether the sentencing court erroneously exercised discretion by failing to consider the defendant’s youthfulness (14 years 9 months) at the time he committed the sexual assaults.
Holding:
¶16 A review of the sentencing transcript demonstrates that the trial court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it sentenced Davis ….
Sentencing Review – Factors – Probation
State v. Eduardo Jose Trigueros, 2005 WI App 112
For Trigueros: Eileen Miller Carter
Issue/Holding:
¶8 Second, Trigueros claims that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion because it did not consider probation as an option. Again, we disagree. In each case, the sentence imposed shall “call for the minimum amount of custody or confinement which is consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” McCleary,
§ 973.195, TIS Sentence Adjustment Petition – Exercise of Discretion
State v. David S. Stenklyft, 2005 WI 71, on bypass
For Stenklyft: Suzanne L. Hagopian, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding:
¶126 [T]he record of the proceedings must clearly demonstrate that the circuit court exercised its discretion and weighed the appropriate factors when the court reached its decision on sentence adjustment. An example of such balancing would be a record that showed that the circuit court considered the nature of the crime,
Separation of Powers Doctrine – Prosecutorial Veto and § 973.195, TIS Sentence Adjustment
State v. David S. Stenklyft, 2005 WI 71, on bypass
For Stenklyft: Suzanne L. Hagopian, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding: The prosecutorial veto written into the TIS sentence-adjustment provision, § 973.195, is unconstitutional:
¶83 … “[S]hall” is interpreted as directory, thereby giving a circuit court discretion to accept or reject an objection from a district attorney on a petition for sentence adjustment under Wis.
Sentence Modification/Review: Sentence Adjustment, § 973.195: Applicability to TIS-I
State v. James Hubert Tucker, Jr., 2005 WI 45, affirming summary order of court of appeals
For Tucker: Donald T. Lang, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding:
¶18 An analysis of 2001 Wis. Act 109 by the Legislative Reference Bureau clearly supports the conclusion that persons sentenced under TIS-I are able to utilize the procedure set forth in Wis. Stat. § 973.195 … .
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¶20 As discussed previously in Trujillo,