On Point: 36. Sentencing

State v. Lawrence P. Peters, 2001 WI 74, 244 Wis. 2d 470, 628 N.W.2d 797, reversing, 2000 WI App 154, 237 Wis. 2d 741, 615 N.W.2d 655
For Peters: Jane K. Smith

Issue: Whether Peters may, at his OAR-5th sentencing, collaterally attack his OAR-2d conviction, on the ground of denial of counsel.

Holding:

¶4 We view this case as falling within the right-to-counsel exception to the general rule against collateral attacks on prior convictions.

State v. Jeremy J. Hanson, 2001 WI 70, 244 Wis. 2d 405, 628 N.W.2d 759, reversing unpublished decision of court of appeals
For Hanson: James B. Connell

Issue: Whether a guilty or no contest plea waives the right to challenge the defendant’s status as an habitual traffic offender, and the right to challenge the HTO sentencing penalty as unauthorized.

Holding:

¶21. Section 973.13 requires Wisconsin courts to declare a sentence void ‘[i]n any case where the court imposes a maximum penalty in excess of that authorized by law.’

State v. Paul L. Wolfe, 2001 WI App 66, 242 Wis. 2d 426, 625 N.W.2d 655
For Wolfe: Gary Seeling

Issue: “The basic question before us is whether a court, in a multiple count conviction where one sentence is imposed and another stayed, must apply sentence credit to the conviction of the first imposed sentence,” ¶1.

Holding:

¶1. … We hold that it must under the rule of State v.

State v. James A. Torpen, 2001 WI App 273, PFR filed 11/13/01
For Torpen: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether a court has authority to order, as restitutive conditions of probation, payment of obligations from prior, unrelated criminal cases.

Holding:

¶14. Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.20, a circuit court may order the payment of restitution to victims of crimes for which the defendant is being sentenced,

State v. Chad J. Knoll, 2000 WI App 135, 237 Wis.2d 384, 614 N.W.2d 20
For Knoll: Ralph Kalal

Issue: Whether passenger Foust, injured in the crash of a car whose driver (Knoll) was drunk, was party to the crime of drunk driving and therefore not a “victim” for purposes of restitution.

Holding:

¶11           Because Knoll has not established either that Foust undertook conduct to aid Knoll in operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated or that Foust intended his conduct to help Knoll drive while impaired,

State v. Troy B. Baker, 2001 WI App 100, 243 Wis. 2d 77, 626 N.W.2d 862

Issue: Whether the trial court had authority to order that restitution be withheld from prison wages.

Holding: Because a restitution order contained in a judgment of conviction is an “obligation reduced to judgment,” a trial court has authority under § 303.01(8)(b) to order disbursement of restitution from prison wages. ¶17.

State v. Garren G. Gribble, 2001 WI App 227, PFR filed
For Gribble: Charles B. Vetzner, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether, on a conviction for homicide of a child, the child’s mother and aunt could be considered victims within the meaning of § 973.20(1r) so as to support restitution for their counseling costs.

Holding: “Victim” in § 973.20(1r) is assigned the meaning of “victim”

State v. Troy B. Baker, 2001 WI App 100, 243 Wis. 2d 77, 626 N.W.2d 862
For Baker: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether the county DHS, which paid out testing expenses for a sexual assault victim, may be considered for restitution purposes an “insurer, surety or other person who has compensated [the] victim.”

Holding: Because § 973.20(5)(d) permits restitution to a third party,

State v. Gabriel L. Ortiz, 2001 WI App 215
For Ortiz: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether restitution may be ordered under § 973.20 for overtime police costs.

Holding:

¶20. The collective effect of Schmaling and Howard-Hastings is the following. A governmental entity can, in the appropriate case, be a victim entitled to restitution. (Howard-Hastings).

State v. Stanley A. Samuel, 2001 WI App 25, 240 Wis. 2d 756, 623 N.W.2d 565, affirmed, other grounds, 2002 WI 34
For Samuel: Robert R. Henak

Issue: Whether the defendant waived objection to the sentencing court’s reliance on information sealed from the defendant’s inspection.

Holding:

¶42 We accept the State’s waiver argument. First, just because the trial court was in its “imposing sentence”