On Point: 6. New factor

State v. James A. Carroll, Jr., 2021AP375, 8/26/21, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Carroll was charged with second-degree sexual assault; he ultimately took a deal and pleaded to fourth-degree. The circuit court required him to register as a sex offender for 15 years after the end of his supervision. The court of appeals rejects Carroll’s claims that his counsel’s deficiencies led to the plea, and that new factors justified modifying his sentence to remove the registration requirement.

State v. Gerald D. Taylor, 2019AP1244-CR, District 1, 12/15/20, (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In 1999, a court imposed two, consecutive, 30-year indeterminate sentences on Taylor for child sexual assault. Accounting for the parole system in place, the court told Taylor he would be eligible for parole after serving one-quarter (15 years) of his sentence, and he could end up serving two-thirds (40 years), which is when he would reach his mandatory release date. Taylor moved for a sentence modification because the court didn’t realize his sentence had a presumptive release date (not a mandatory release) which results in a lengthier confinement.

State v. Peter J. King, 2020 WI App 66;  case activity (including briefs)

Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S Ct. 1730 (2017) struck down a law making it a felony for a registered sex offender to use any social networking site that permits minors to become members or to create personal web page. The statute was so broad that it violated the 1st Amendment. See our post here. In this case, the court of appeals holds that Packingham’s reasoning does not apply to court-ordered conditions of extended supervision that sharply restrict a defendant’s access to the internet. 

State v. Dustin M. Yanda, 2018AP412-CR, District 3, 6/18/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In State v. Harbor, 2011 WI 28, 333 Wis. 2d 53, 797 N.W.2d 828, the supreme court held that a defendant seeking a “new factor” sentence modification doesn’t need to prove that the new factor “frustrates the purpose” of the original sentence. However, Harbor doesn’t preclude the sentencing court from considering whether the purpose of the sentence is frustrated in deciding whether to modify a sentence once the court has concluded the defendant has proven a new factor.

State v. Shawn A. Hodgkins, 2017AP1799-CR, District 2, 12/12/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including respondent’s brief)

Hodgkins objected to DOC collecting costs from him while he was in prison because the circuit court ordered the costs to be collected while he was on a term of consecutive probation. He also sought a “new factor” sentence modification. Alas, it was all in vain.

State v. Darrick L. Bennett, 2016AP2209-CR, 9/18/18, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Bennett was charged with 1st degree intentional homicide, but pled guilty to 1st degree reckless homicide. In a decision turning on facts specific to this case, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision denying (a) plea withdrawal without a hearing, (b) sentence modification based on a new factors, and (c) postconviction discovery of evidence that might have affected his sentence.

State v. Terrell Antwain Kelly, 2017AP1584, 7/31/18, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Kelly was charged with both a long-ago second-degree sexual assault of a child and several domestic violence counts (the victim was the same). The state offered him a choice between two plea deals: one in which he would plead to the sexual assault with the DV counts dismissed and read in, and one in which he would plead to the DV counts with the sexual assault dismissed and read in.

State v. Robert P. Vesper, 2018 WI App 31; case activity (including briefs)

Vesper complains that when he was sentenced for his 7th OWI offense the judge didn’t give a separate explanation for why it was imposing a fine in addition to prison time. Over a dissent, the court of appeals concludes the judge said enough to satisfy the (not at all exacting) standard of review for exercise of sentencing discretion. The court also rejects Vesper’s claim that the judge didn’t assess his ability to pay the fine.

State v. Bruce D. Johnson, 2017AP834-CR, District 3, 3/6/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Even if the sentencing court erroneously thought the sentence he was imposing on Johnson would be served in the jail rather than prison, that mistake doesn’t provide grounds for a sentence modification or resentencing.

State v. Java I. Orr, 2016AP2009, 7/5/17, District 1, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Orr raises and loses 3 issues relating to the sentence credit that he received in this case. He argues that (1) he should have been allowed withdraw his plea because trial counsel gave him incorrect infromation regarding the sentence credit he would receive; (2) the actual amount of sentence credit he received is a new factor warranting modification of his sentence; and (3) the trial court sentenced based on inaccurate sentence credit information.