On Point: H. Modification/Review

Last summer, SCOW held that, if used properly, a circuit court’s consideration of a COMPAS risk assessment at sentencing does not violate due process. See State v. Loomis and our post. Loomis filed a petition for writ of certiorari which presents this question for review:

State courts increasingly are relying on risk assessment instruments at sentencing. When the risk assessment instrument used is proprietary, as the Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (“COMPAS”) software is, defendants have very little information about how the risk is analyzed. Is it a violation of a defendant’s constitutional right to due process for a trial court to rely on such risk assessment results at sentencing:

a.  because the proprietary nature of COMPAS prevents a defendant from challenging the accuracy and scientific validity of the risk assessment; and

b.  because COMPAS assessments take gender and race into account in formulating the risk assessment?

SCOTUS ordered the State of Wisconsin to respond to the petition, which according to this study, happens in maybe 2-3% of cases. But today SCOTUS took an even more unusual step by issuing a “CVSG”–a call for the views of the acting U.S. Solicitor General, even though the United States is not a party to Loomis v. Wisconsin.

Buck v. Davis, USSC No. 15-8049, 2017 WL 685534 (February 22, 2017), reversing and remanding Buck v. Stephens, 623 Fed. Appx. 668 (5th Cir. 2015) (unpublished); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Buck was found guilty of capital murder. Under state law, the jury could impose a death sentence only if it found Buck was likely to commit acts of violence in the future. At sentencing Buck’s attorney called Walter Quijano, a psychologist, to give an opinion on that issue. Though the psychologist testified Buck probably would not engage in violent conduct, he also said that race is one factor in assessing a person’s propensity for violence and that Buck was statistically more likely to act violently because he is black. The jury sentenced Buck to death. The Supreme Court, by a 7-to-2 vote, holds Buck’s attorney was ineffective.

State v. Charles J. Hartleben, 2016AP1066-CR, District 3, 2/14/17 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A defendant is denied due process at sentencing where the author of his PSI is married to the DA who prosecuted him. State v. Suchocki. Ditto where a counselor who assessed the defendant for his PSI also treated his victim. State v. Stafford.  In these situations, bias on the part of the PSI writer or counselor is implied as a matter of law.  But here the court of appeals found no “implied bias” where the author of Hartleben’s PSI worked with probation agents who were Hartleben’s victims in an earlier case.

Here’s  an interesting new study on the consequences of courts imposing prison sentences that are much longer than a person’s natural lifespan.

Review of a court of appeals summary disposition; case activity (including briefs); petition for review

Issues (composed by On Point)

(1)  Could the defendant be convicted of two counts of hit and run with death resulting for a single act of leaving the scene of an accident that caused two deaths?

(2) Is the defendant’s sentence unduly harsh?

State v. Matthew Allen Lilek, 2014AP784-CR, 10/4/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Lilek’s trial counsel raised his competency to stand trial and the court-appointed expert found him incompetent and unlikely to become so. The state, dissatisfied with that result, requested another evaluation, and the court obliged. This new evaluation reached the opposite conclusion, and Lilek was eventually found competent. Is this OK?

State v. Patrick P. Haynes, 2015AP2176-CR, District 3, 8/16/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court didn’t erroneously exercise its sentencing discretion by exceeding the OWI guidelines when sentencing Haynes for OWI 3rd after his probation for the offense was revoked.

State v. Danny F. Anton, 2015AP2336-CR, District 1, 8/2/16; (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

This decision openly thumbs its nose at Gallion. Between it and SCOW’s recent decision in State v. Salas Gayton you have to wonder whether Gallion has been overruled sub silentio.

State v. Patricia A. Enriquez, 2015AP1850-CR, District 2, 7/27/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

After Enriquez made a statement at her sentencing for delivering nonnarcotic controlled substances, the sentencing judge presented the parties with information he had uncovered based on his own internet searches. He claimed the information showed that Enriquez’s misrepresented facts about her nursing license status in Texas and Illinois. Finding that Enriquez’s character for honesty was “miserable” based in part on this ex parte research, the judge sentenced her to consecutive terms of sixty-six months’ imprisonment, far beyond what the state had recommended. But the information the judge dredged up was inaccurate, and because the court relied on that misinformation in sentencing her, Enriquez is entitled to be resentenced.

United States v. Billy J. Robinson, Jr., 7th Circuit Court of Appeal Case No. 15-2019, 2016 WL 3947808, 7/22/16

A federal district judge’s sentencing comments “strayed so far from the record” that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals “cannot trace the (legitimate) reasons for Robinson’s sentence” and therefore Robinson is entitled to resentencing.