On Point: H. Modification/Review

State v. Jose A. Trujillo, 2005 WI 45, affirming summary order of court of appeals
For Trujillo: Suzanne L. Hagopian, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether the TIS-II reduction of penalty, such that this TIS-I defendant was sentenced to confinement exceeding what would have been the TIS-II maximum, is a “new factor” supporting modification of sentence.
Holding:

¶21 We are not persuaded by Trujillo’s attempt to convince us to distinguish Hegwood and overrule Torres.

State v. John Doe, 2005 WI App 68
For John Doe: Amelia L. Bizzaro (the court file has been ordered sealed, and the caption amended “to shield the defendant’s identity”)

Issue/Holding: “(A) defendant’s substantial and important assistance to law enforcement after sentencing may constitute a new factor that the trial court can take into consideration when deciding whether modification of a sentence is warranted,” ¶1.

¶8.

State v. Frederick W. Prager, 2005 WI App 95
For Prager: Daniel P. Fay

Issue: Whether, six days after original sentencing and imposition of probation, the State’s proffered new factor (that defendant had quitclaimed the jointly owned farm to his wife) supported a modification to an active prison term.

Holding: Although the term of probation was premised in part on the economic hardship that defendant’s wife would suffer if he were sentenced to prison (¶¶4,

State v. John Doe, 2005 WI App 68
For John Doe: Amelia L. Bizzaro (the court file has been ordered sealed, and the caption amended “to shield the defendant’s identity”)

Issue/Holding:

¶6. Thus, sentence modification on the basis of a new factor is a two-step process. Id. First, the defendant must demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that there is a new factor justifying a motion for sentence modification. 

State v. James L. Montroy, 2005  WI App 230
For Montroy: Jay E. Heit; Stephanie L. Finn

Issue/Holding1: Though information before the sentencing court was indisputably inaccurate, the court took remedial action by ordering that this information be stricken, and thus Montroy can’t satisfy his burden of showing actual reliance on inaccurate information. ¶¶9-11. (State v. Anderson, 222 Wis. 2d 403,

State v. Edward W. Fisher, 2005 WI App 175
For Fisher: Eileen Miller Carter

Issue/Holding: 

¶16            Fisher’s contentions grossly misrepresent the record. Assuming the court’s oral ruling contained some ambiguity, the written judgment of conviction and the conditions of extended supervision are crystal clear with respect to what conduct the conditions cover. See Jackson v. Gray, 212 Wis. 2d 436,

State v. Lonnie C. Davis, 2005 WI App 98
For Davis: Pamela Moorshead

Issue/Holding:

¶24 Davis next contends that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion when it imposed consecutive sentences without an adequate explanation of why that was the minimum amount of time necessary.  We reject this claim.¶25      The trial court explained why the maximum term was required in this case.

…

¶26      … The court must provide an explanation for the general range of the sentence imposed,

State v. Brandon J. Matke, 2005 WI App 4, PFR filed 1/6/05
For Matke: James B. Connell

Issue/Holding:

¶17. Finally, Matke argues that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion when it ordered, without explanation, that Matke’s present sentence be consecutive to any other sentences he was then serving. …

¶18. The sole infirmity that Matke cites is the court’s failure to specifically relate any of the sentencing factors it discussed to its decision to order the present sentence consecutive to,

State v. James L. Montroy, 2005  WI App 230
For Montroy: Jay E. Heit; Stephanie L. Finn

Issue/Holding: Wisconsin discretionary guideline regime is not governed by the holdings of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), ¶¶20-24. The latter cases are implicated only when a fact is utilized to support a sentence beyond the statutory maximum;

State v. James L. Montroy, 2005  WI App 230
For Montroy: Jay E. Heit; Stephanie L. Finn

Issue/Holding:

¶13      Montroy also argues that the PSI improperly included two of his juvenile adjudications, when there was no evidence that he was represented by counsel. [5] The State concedes that the Department of Corrections guidelines mandate that unrepresented juvenile adjudications should not be included in a PSI.