On Point blog, page 2 of 4
SCOW: waiver in any county means adult jurisdiction in every county
State v. Matthew Hinkle, 2019 WI 96, 11/12/19, affirming a published court of appeals decision, 2017AP1416, case activity (including briefs)
We’ve posted on this case twice before, first on the published court of appeals decision and then on the supreme court’s grant of the petition for review. The question is easily posed: the statute says that a juvenile is subject to automatic adult court jurisdiction if “the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under [chs. 48 and 948] has waived its jurisdiction over the juvenile for a previous violation” and the previous case is either pending or ended in conviction. Does “the court” in that phrase mean any juvenile court in the state (so that waiver in any county would forever precluded juvenile jurisdiction in every county), or does it mean the specific juvenile court in the county where criminal charges are contemplated (so that each county would have a chance to make the waiver decision in its own courts)?
A riding lawn mower is a “motor vehicle” for purposes of OWI statute
State v. Keith H. Shoeder, 2019 WI App 60; case activity (including briefs)
So if you’re going to drink and drive your riding mower, stay on your lawn.
SCOTUS: Illegal gun possession requires defendant’s knowledge of fact that makes it illegal
Rehaif v. United States, USSC No. 17-9560, 2019 WL 2552487, June 21, 2019, reversing 888 F.3d 1138 (11th Cir. 2018); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)
Federal law bans certain classes of people from possessing guns, and provides stiff penalties (up to ten years in prison if there are no enhancers) if they do. One of those classes consists of people who are aliens illegally in the country. Rehaif was illegally in the country and possessed firearms. The trial court instructed the jury that it could convict him only if he “knowingly” possessed a gun, but refused to instruct it that he also had to know he was illegally in the country. He was convicted, and the Court now holds this was error: the mens rea in the illegal gun possession statute applies both the the possession and to the status that makes the possession illegal.
COA holds, over dissent, that juvenile court’s waiver into adult court binds all future courts
State v. Matthew C. Hinkle, 2018 WI App 67, petition for review granted 4/9/19; affirmed 11/12/19; case activity (including briefs)
Hinkle, a 16-year-old boy, was charged as a juvenile in two different counties for a car theft and police chase. In Milwaukee County, the juvenile court waived him into adult court. So, did the Fond du Lac court have to treat him as an adult too?
Identity theft doesn’t require some extra act of “representing” in addition to “use” of identifying documents
State v. Christopher A. Mason, 2018 WI App 57; case activity (including briefs)
Applying its newly minted decision in State v. Stewart, 2018 WI App 41, the court of appeals holds that the “representing” element of identity theft under § 943.201 can be proven with the same evidence that proves the defendant “used” the identifying information or documents.
The statutes authorize fines for 7th and greater OWI offenses
State v. Michel L. Wortman, 2017 WI App 61; case activity (including briefs)
A glitch in the OWI penalty statute appears to suggest that OWI 7th and greater offenses don’t allow for a fine, but only for the imposition of the forfeiture provided for first-offense OWI. The court of appeals concludes otherwise. The court also rejects Wortman’s claim that he was under arrest when a sheriff’s deputy transported him back to the scene of the accident he was in.
SCOW to take up new ch. 980 discharge trial standard
State v. David Hager, 2015AP330, and State v. Howard Carter, 2015AP1311, petitions for review granted 5/15/17, reversed 4/19/18; review of published court of appeals decisions (Hager) (Carter); case activity (Hager) (Carter) (including briefs)
We’ve posted on these cases a few times. The first time was when the court of appeals certified them (together) to the supreme court. The supreme court refused that certification, so the court of appeals decided them (separately), as we discussed here and here.
SCOW: Madison can’t ban weapons on city buses; statutes don’t mean what they say
Wisconsin Carry, Inc. v. City of Madison, 2017 WI 19, 3/7/17, reversing a published court of appeals opinion, 2015WI App 74, case activity (including briefs)
Justice Kelly’s maiden majority opinion opens with a 4-page discussion of a subject both parties disavowed–the Second Amendment right to bear arms. According to the briefs, this case posed only an issue of statutory interpretation–essentially, whether §66.0409, which governs the “local regulation of weapons,” preempts a City of Madison Transit and Parking Commission rule that prohibits people from carrying weapons, including guns, on City buses.
By the end of the primer on the 2nd Amendment, you can predict the result: A 5-2 opinion reversing a unanimous court of appeals decision holding that §66.0409(2)’s plain language applies to a “political subsdivision’s” “ordinances” or “resolutions” not to a Transit Commission “rule” banning weapons. But you might not predict that the majority opinion would dial back the conservative “strict constructionist” approach to statutory interpretation adopted in State ex rel Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane County. Henceforth, a statute’s text should be no obstacle to the interpretation you desire.
SCOW: no 980 discharge trial for inconsequential behavioral changes
State v. Thornon F. Talley, 2017 WI 21, 3/9/17, affirming an unpublished summary court of appeals order; case activity (including briefs)
Thornon Talley, who is committed as a sexually violent person under Wis. Stat. ch. 980, filed a petition for discharge from that commitment in 2012. The circuit court denied the petition without a hearing. The supreme court now unanimously upholds that denial, essentially because Talley did not show any meaningful change in his condition since his previous discharge trial (also in 2012).
Defense win: amendment to 980 discharge standard doesn’t authorize “weighing”
State v. David Hager, Jr., 2017 WI App 8, petition for review granted 5/15/17; reversed 4/19/18; case activity (including briefs)
This is the first (likely) published case to construe the 2013 amendments to the ch. 980 discharge petition standard. The court of appeals holds that while the legislature required a committed person seeking a discharge trial to meet a higher burden of production, it did not permit courts to deny a trial based on an assessment that the evidence as a whole favors the state.