On Point: B. Construction

State v. A.A., 2020 WI App 11; case activity

Wisconsin Stat. § 938.355(6)(d)1. sets a maximum length of “not more than 10 days” for a custody sanction that a circuit court may impose on a juvenile who has violated a dispositional order. Is that 10 calendar days? Or, as the state argues, does “day” mean 24 consecutive hours, so that the maximum sanction is 10 consecutive 24-hour periods? It’s a calendar day, essentially, holds the court of appeals.

State v. Matthew Hinkle, 2019 WI 96, 11/12/19, affirming a published court of appeals decision, 2017AP1416, case activity (including briefs)

We’ve posted on this case twice before, first on the published court of appeals decision and then on the supreme court’s grant of the petition for review. The question is easily posed: the statute says that a juvenile is subject to automatic adult court jurisdiction if “the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under [chs. 48 and 948] has waived its jurisdiction over the juvenile for a previous violation” and the previous case is either pending or ended in conviction. Does “the court” in that phrase mean any juvenile court in the state (so that waiver in any county would forever precluded juvenile jurisdiction in every county), or does it mean the specific juvenile court in the county where criminal charges are contemplated (so that each county would have a chance to make the waiver decision in its own courts)?

State v. Keith H. Shoeder, 2019 WI App 60; case activity (including briefs)

So if you’re going to drink and drive your riding mower, stay on your lawn.

State v. Medford B. Matthews, III, 2019 WI App 44; case activity (including briefs) It’s a crime in Wisconsin to have sex with a person under 18. Specifically, it’s a misdemeanor, if that person is 16 or older—like the 17-and-a-half-year-old alleged victim here. But, it’s tough to have sex without (1) being in a private […]

Rehaif v. United States, USSC No. 17-9560, 2019 WL 2552487, June 21, 2019, reversing 888 F.3d 1138 (11th Cir. 2018); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Federal law bans certain classes of people from possessing guns, and provides stiff penalties (up to ten years in prison if there are no enhancers) if they do. One of those classes consists of people who are aliens illegally in the country. Rehaif was illegally in the country and possessed firearms. The trial court instructed the jury that it could convict him only if he “knowingly” possessed a gun, but refused to instruct it that he also had to know he was illegally in the country. He was convicted, and the Court now holds this was error: the mens rea in the illegal gun possession statute applies both the the possession and to the status that makes the possession illegal.

State v. Matthew C. Hinkle, 2018 WI App 67, petition for review granted 4/9/19; affirmed 11/12/19; case activity (including briefs)

Hinkle, a 16-year-old boy, was charged as a juvenile in two different counties for a car theft and police chase.  In Milwaukee County, the juvenile court waived him into adult court. So, did the Fond du Lac court have to treat him as an adult too?

State v. Christopher A. Mason, 2018 WI App 57; case activity (including briefs)

Applying its newly minted decision in State v. Stewart, 2018 WI App 41, the court of appeals holds that the “representing” element of identity theft under § 943.201 can be proven with the same evidence that proves the defendant “used” the identifying information or documents.

State v. Michel L. Wortman, 2017 WI App 61; case activity (including briefs)

A glitch in the OWI penalty statute appears to suggest that OWI 7th and greater offenses don’t allow for a fine, but only for the imposition of the forfeiture provided for first-offense OWI. The court of appeals concludes otherwise. The court also rejects Wortman’s claim that he was under arrest when a sheriff’s deputy transported him back to the scene of the accident he was in.

State v. Ernesto E. Lazo Villamil, 2017 WI 74, 7/6/17, affirming a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

A few years ago the legislature set out to create a graduated penalty scheme for operating after revocation offenses, but it bungled the job and ended up creating misdemeanor and felony penalties for the offense of causing death while knowingly operating after revocation. The supreme court rebuffs Villamil’s claims that under the rule of lenity only the misdemeanor penalty can be imposed or, in the alternative, that creating two very different penalties for the same crime violates due process and equal protection. The court agrees with his request for resentencing, however, because the circuit court failed to consider the statutorily mandated sentencing factors.

State v. Lazaro Ozuna, 2017 WI 64, 6/22/17, affirming an unpublished court of appeals opinion; case activity (including briefs)

Lazaro Ozuna, a teenager, pled to two misdemeanors and got probation. The court also ordered that the convictions be expunged on successful completion of probation under Wis. Stat. § 973.015. Ozuna got through probation and was discharged, but he picked up an underage drinking ticket along the way–a violation of the no-drink condition of his probation but obviously not a terribly serious one. So, did he “successfully complete” his probation so as to be entitled to expunction?