On Point: B. Construction

State v. Ernesto E. Lazo Villamil, 2016 WI App 61, petitions for review and cross-review granted 1/9/2017, affirmed 2017 WI 74, ; case activity (including briefs)

Lazo Villamil was convicted and sentenced for operating after revocation and causing death under § 343.44, one of the provisions of which says that the offense is both a misdemeanor and a felony. He claims that convicting and sentencing him for the felony rather the misdemeanor violated the rule of lenity and his rights to due process and equal protection. The court of appeals disagrees, but grants resentencing due to the circuit court’s failure to consider certain sentencing factors..

Voisine v. United States, USSC No. 14-10154, 2016 WL 3461559, 579 U.S. ___ (June 27, 2016), affirming United States v. Voisine, 778 F.3d 176 (1st Cir. 2015); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Federal law prohibits any person convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” from possessing a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). That phrase is defined to include any misdemeanor committed against a domestic relation that necessarily involves the “use … of physical force.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A). Resolving a question that United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1414 n.8 (2014), left unanswered, the Court, by a 5-to-2 vote, holds that misdemeanor assault convictions for reckless conduct (as contrasted to knowing or intentional conduct) trigger the statutory firearms ban.

McDonnell v. United States, USSC No. 15-474, 2016 WL 3461561 (June 27, 2016), reversing United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478 (4th Cir. 2015); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

While he was governor of Virginia, Bob McDonnell, along with his wife, accepted gifts and favors worth about $175,000 from a businessman who was trying to get the state medical schools to run studies on a nutritional supplement his company had developed. As discussed in our post on the cert grant, a jury convicted McDonnell of various honest services fraud and extortion counts in relation to various actions he undertook related to the supplement, including arranging and attending meetings with other government officials about the supplement and hosting a private lunch with the businessman at which checks were given to university researchers.

Luna Torres v. Lynch, USSC No. 14-1096, 2016 WL 2903424 (May 19, 2016), affirming Torres v. Holder, 764 F.3d 152 (2nd Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

The definition of “aggravated felony” under federal immigration law, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), has 21 subsections covering dozens of different crimes. Many of the subsections refer to offenses “described in” particular federal statutes, all of which include the interstate commerce element necessary for federal criminal jurisdiction. A catch-all at the end of the statute says that “aggravated felony” includes “an offense described in this paragraph whether in violation of Federal or State law….” This decision says that a state offense that lacks an interstate commerce element, but corresponds in all other ways to a listed federal offense, is an aggravated felony.

St. Croix County Department of Health and Human Services v. Michael D. & Juanita A., 2016 WI 35, 05/12/2016, reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity

Waukesha County v. Steven H., 2000 WI 28, 233 Wis. 2d 344, 607 N.W.2d 607, finds itself roundly praised and deeply buried by our high court.

Lester Ray Nichols v. United States, USSC No. 15-5238, 2016 WL 1278473, (April 4, 2016), reversing United States v. Nichols, 775 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

In a unanimous opinion of limited impact, the Supreme Court holds that a prior version of SORNA did not require a registered sex offender to notify his state registration authority before moving out of the country.

State v. John Steven Duewell, 2015AP43-44-CR, 3/23/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In a decision that seems to conflict directly with State v. Torbeck, 2012 WI App 106, 344 Wis. 2d 299, 821 N.W.2d 414, see our post here, the court of appeals holds that carburetor cleaner is an intoxicant under Wisconsin’s OWI statute, Wis. Stat. §346.63(1)(a)(2011-2012).

Lockhart v. United States, USSC No. 14-8358, 2016 WL 782862  (March 1, 2016); affirming United States v. Lockhart, 749 F.3d 148 (2nd Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2), a defendant convicted of possessing child pornography must be given a prison term of at least ten years if the defendant “has a prior conviction … under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward.” Federal courts had disagreed about whether a conviction for “aggravated sexual abuse” or “sexual abuse” had to “involv[e] a minor or ward,” or whether the “minor or ward” language applied only to convictions for “abusive sexual conduct.” The Supreme Court holds, 6 to 2, that the phrase “involving a minor or ward” modifies only “abusive sexual conduct.”

Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (composed by On Point)

Does the state statute preempting certain local firearm regulations, § 66.0409(2), apply to the Madison Transit and Parking Commission’s rule prohibiting weapons on city buses?

State v. Daniel S. Iverson, 2015 WI 101, 11/25/2015, reversing a 1-judge court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Do cigarette butts decompose? Do they “result[]…from community activities”? Those are just two of the burning questions left unanswered (smoldering?) after this blaze of statutory construction.