On Point: B. Constitutional rights

Walworth Co. DHHS v. Andrea L.O., 2008 WI 46, on Certification

Issue/Holding: Stipulation to a TPR elements did not constitute withdrawal of the demand for a jury trial, where the element was submitted to, and found by, the jury under the instructions and special verdict form, ¶¶18-24.

The court approvingly analogizes to State v. Charles J. Benoit, 229 Wis.2d 630, 600 N.W.2d 193 (Ct.

Manitowoc County HSD v. Allen J., 2008 WI App 137

Issue/Holding:

¶1 Allen J. appeals from orders terminating his parental rights to his children, Brandon [1] and Stephanie J. He argues that he was deprived of his right to a jury trial because the court, rather than the jury, answered one of the verdict questions on an element of parental unfitness. Allen’s counsel had stipulated that the element was satisfied,

State v. Shirley E., 2006 WI 129, affirming 2006 WI App 55

 Issue: “(W)hether a circuit court may deny a parent in a termination of parental rights proceeding the statutory right to counsel when the parent has appeared in the proceeding but failed to personally attend a hearing in contravention of a court order and is found in default as a sanction for disobeying the court order.” (¶2)

Holding:

¶41 We do not accept the State’s position for three reasons.

State v. Shirley E., 2006 WI 129, affirming 2006 WI App 55

¶57      The State also argues that Shirley E., a parent over 18 years of age, has waived her right to counsel by not appearing personally. We can quickly dismiss this argument. Wisconsin Stat. § 48.23(2) explicitly requires that any waiver of counsel must be knowing and voluntary. As we determined in M.W.

Dane County DHS v. Susan P.S., 2006 WI App 100, PFR filed 5/15/06

Issue/Holding: Holding the dispositional hearing beyond the 45-day time limit set by § 48.424(4) did not deprive the trial court of competency to proceed, where good cause existed for continuance under § 48.315(2), namely that the respondent’s attorney was going to be out of town during a portion of the limitation period, and the trial court expressly found good cause to schedule the hearing after counsel’s return,

Dane County DHS v. Susan P.S., 2006 WI App 100, PFR filed 5/15/06 (published)

Issue/Holding1: The same “self-representation competency standards developed in … criminal cases” applies to TPRs, ¶¶9-16.

Standards summarized, ¶¶17-23. Though much of this recitation is fairly abstract, the following embellishment of Pickens v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 549, 292 N.W.2d 601 (1980) may be of interest, ¶20 n.

State v. Lavelle W., 2005 WI App 266

Issue/Holding:

¶2        Birth-parents “have constitutionally protected rights to raise their children as they see fit, and these rights may only be circumscribed if the government proves that there is a ‘powerful countervailing interest.’” Richard D. v. Rebecca G., 228 Wis. 2d 658, 661, 599 N.W.2d 90, 92 (Ct. App. 1999) (quoted sources and one internal quotation mark omitted).

State v. Lavelle W., 2005 WI App 266

Issue: Whether the right of a parent imprisoned  in the federal system to “meaningfully participate” in a TPR proceeding was violated when he was not physically produced in court but, instead, was limited to telephonic participation.

Holding: Where various mechanisms could have been utilized to produce the father yet weren’t attempted, and the telephone hook-up was, under the circumstances,

Brown County v. Shannon R., 2005 WI 160, reversing unpublished opinion

Issue: Whether the circuit court erroneously exercised discretion in precluding expert testimony on the issue of whether the TPR respondent is likely to be able to meet the conditions for return of her children.

Holding:

¶71      The State’s interest in terminating parental rights promptly does not outweigh the requirements of fundamental fairness and Shannon R.’s constitutionally protected due process right to be heard in a meaningful manner.

Dane Co. DHS v. P.P., 2005 WI 32, affirming unpublished decision

Issue: Whether § 48.424(4) (2001-02) on its face violates substantive due process, in failing to require an individualized determination of unfitness as a precondition for termination of parental rights.

Holding: A parent has a fundamental liberty interest at stake in parenting his or her children, and thus the TPR scheme must be narrowly tailored to advance the State’s interest in interfering with that right,