On Point blog, page 5 of 9

COA rejects ineffective of assistance of trial counsel claim due to appellate lawyer’s failure to develop argument on prejudice

State v. D.C., 2016AP2229-2230, District 1, 11/30/17 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

During the grounds phase of her TPR proceeding, D.C.’s lawyer asked the trial court to: (1) instruct the jury that she was prohibited from having visitation with her children for a period of time, and (2) give curative instructions that it was impossible for her to perform a condition for return of her kids and to assume parental responsibility due to her incarceration.  The court planned to rule on these requests just before trial, but, oops, that did not happen.

Read full article >

Court of appeals says conclusory ineffective assistance of counsel claim properly denied without a hearing

Dane County DHS v. N.C., 2017AP788, District 4, 9/21/17, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

N.C. filed a postdisposition motion challenging the circuit court’s termination of her parental rights to M.M. She argued, among other things, that her trial lawyer was ineffective in failing to have the termination order entered as voluntary, rather than involuntary.

Read full article >

Court of appeals rejects challenges to expert opinion and “failure to assume parental responsibility” instruction in TPR appeal

State v. S.D., 2016AP1701-1702, 7/5/17, District 1, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This TPR appeal raises a number of interesting issues ranging from a Daubert challenge to the State’s psychologist and “parenting capacity assessment” to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failure to raise an “unconstitutional as applied” challenge to the standard jury instruction on “failure to assume parental responsibility.”

Read full article >

Admission to TPR grounds was knowing and voluntary

State v. M.G., 2016AP1197, District 1, 7/5/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

M.G. moved to withdraw his no contest plea to the petition to terminate his parental rights based on CHIPS grounds. He alleged the plea colloquy was deficient regarding his waiver of the right to trial because his lawyer and the judge referred to his having a “second” trial regarding disposition, and that he was confused by these statements. (¶15). The court of appeals finds no deficiency in the plea colloquy and therefore no basis for plea withdrawal.

Read full article >

Court of appeals affirms trial court’s “no ineffective assistance of counsel” finding in TPR case

State v. D.W., 2016AP1827, 4/11/17, District 1,(1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The briefs in this TPR case are confidential, so we only know what the court of appeals’ opinion tells us about the case. D.W. apparently alleged ineffective assistance of counsel based upon his trial lawyer’s failure to call witnesses and failure to move to have his son’s (A.W.’s) placement changed to a family member. He also argued that his plea was defective. The court of appeals decision is long on facts, short on law, and essentially rubber stamps the Machner court’s findings without analysis.

Read full article >

Trial court factual findings doom TPR appeal

Kenosha County DHS v. C.D.K., 2015AP2179, 3/30/17, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

C.D.K. entered a plea to grounds for termination of her parental rights, and eventually, they were terminated. She claims on appeal that her trial counsel failed to advise her competently about the decision to admit grounds, and that she did not understand certain information, rendering her admission not knowing, intelligent and voluntary.

Read full article >

Court of appeals affirms default finding on grounds for termination of parental rights

State v. A.W., 2016AP121 through 125, 12/8/16, District 1 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

When A.W. did not appear for her pretrial and was not reachable by phone, the court entered a default finding as to grounds for a TPR. She moved to vacate that finding, but then withdrew her motion. On appeal, she argued that (1) trial counsel was ineffective for advising her to withdraw the motion to vacate, and (2) the circuit court should have vacated the default so that she could address false information admitted in her case. The court of appeals refused to address the 2nd argument for reasons that penalized A.W. for mistakes her appellate lawyer allegedly made.

Read full article >

TPR “bonding” evidence not prejudicial; court didn’t have to consider relationship with great-grandmother

Portage County DHHS v. D.B., 2016AP1233 & 1234, 11/17/16, District 4 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

D.B. raises challenges to both the disposition and grounds phases of the hearing that resulted in the termination of her rights to her two children. The court of appeals rejects both.

Read full article >

Two-day wait for TPR default not required where counsel continues

State v. J.B., 2016AP483, 484 & 485, 10/4/2016, District 1 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

2013 Wis. Act 337 created Wis. Stat. § 48.23(2)(b)3., which permits a TPR court in some circumstances to find that a parent who has defaulted as to grounds by failing to appear has also waived his or her right to counsel. The statute then imposes a two-day waiting period before the court proceeds to disposition. But what if the court finds a parent in default but does not find counsel waived?

Read full article >

Parent’s admissions to TPR grounds were knowing and voluntary

State v. A.L., 2015AP858 through 2015AP861, District 1, 8/5/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

A.L. challenges her admissions that there were grounds to terminate her parental rights to her four children. The court of appeals holds her admissions were knowing and voluntary. The court also holds that calling A.L. as a witness at the trial of the father of one of the children without her lawyer being present doesn’t require reversal of her termination orders.

Read full article >