On Point blog, page 15 of 26
Stipulation to grounds for TPR was entered freely, voluntarily, intelligently
State v. D.T., 2016AP1488, 2/21/17, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
D.T. sought to withdraw her stipulation that the court had grounds to terminate her parental rights. She said the court made conflicting statements during its colloquy with her, such as “it’s never too late to meet the conditions of return.” The court of appeals noted that the circuit court later clarified this remark by stressing that the focus of the subsequent dispositional hearing would be on the child’s best interests.
Erroneous admission of social worker’s expert testimony on ultimate issue was harmless
Dane County D.H.S. v. J.B., 2016AP2422, District 4, 2/16/17 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
To terminate parental rights based on the “continuing CHIPS” ground, the jury had find that there was a substantial likelihood that JB would not meet the conditions for the safe return of her child within 9 months of the hearing. §48.415(2)(a). The circuit court admitted a social worker’s expert testimony on this issue, apparently without following §907.02 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmacueticals. The court of appeals assumed error but declared it harmless.
Circuit court can’t stay order terminating parental rights
State v. D.P.V., 2016AP2037, District 1, 2/14/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
A circuit court does not have the authority to stay an order terminating parental rights.
Stipulation to grounds for TPR was knowing, intelligent, voluntary
State v. P.T., 2016AP1460, 1/24/17, District 1 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity
P.T. challenged a circuit court decision terminating his parental rights to his son on 2 grounds: (1) his stipulation to ground for termination was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary under Bangert, and (2) the postdisposition court should not have reviewed the transcript of the stipulation colloquy when deciding issue (1). He lost on both counts.
Parent knew plea to TPR grounds would mean unfitness finding
State v. L. H.-H., 2016AP917, 1/18/17, District 1 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
L.H.H. seeks to withdraw his plea to the single T.P.R. ground of failure to assume parental responsibility. He contends he did not understand that a plea would result in a finding that he was an unfit parent; the court of appeals upholds the circuit court’s finding that he did.
Summary judgment in TPR case affirmed
Jefferson County DHS v. C.C., 2016AP1983, District 4, 12/21/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court properly granted summary judgment on the petition terminating C.C.’s parental rights despite C.C.’s claims that the circuit court violated the mandatory notice provision under § 802.08(2) and that a genuine issue of material fact exists on the issue of grounds for termination.
Court of appeals affirms default finding on grounds for termination of parental rights
State v. A.W., 2016AP121 through 125, 12/8/16, District 1 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity
When A.W. did not appear for her pretrial and was not reachable by phone, the court entered a default finding as to grounds for a TPR. She moved to vacate that finding, but then withdrew her motion. On appeal, she argued that (1) trial counsel was ineffective for advising her to withdraw the motion to vacate, and (2) the circuit court should have vacated the default so that she could address false information admitted in her case. The court of appeals refused to address the 2nd argument for reasons that penalized A.W. for mistakes her appellate lawyer allegedly made.
TPR “bonding” evidence not prejudicial; court didn’t have to consider relationship with great-grandmother
Portage County DHHS v. D.B., 2016AP1233 & 1234, 11/17/16, District 4 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
D.B. raises challenges to both the disposition and grounds phases of the hearing that resulted in the termination of her rights to her two children. The court of appeals rejects both.
Two-day wait for TPR default not required where counsel continues
State v. J.B., 2016AP483, 484 & 485, 10/4/2016, District 1 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
2013 Wis. Act 337 created Wis. Stat. § 48.23(2)(b)3., which permits a TPR court in some circumstances to find that a parent who has defaulted as to grounds by failing to appear has also waived his or her right to counsel. The statute then imposes a two-day waiting period before the court proceeds to disposition. But what if the court finds a parent in default but does not find counsel waived?
Admission of child’s desire for TPR and father’s prior willingness harmless
R.J.M. v. M.R.H., 2016AP1307, 9/22/2016, District 4 (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity
M.R.H. appeals the termination of his parental rights to his son, arguing that the jury during the grounds phase should not have heard (1) that he had previously been willing to voluntarily terminate his rights or (2) that his son wanted to be adopted by his stepfather. The court of appeals calls this evidence “problematic” but holds its admission harmless.