On Point: 10. Summary judgment

Kenosha County v. A.C.S., 2022AP1821-1825, 2/15/23, District 2 (one judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Here’s a fact pattern one hopes doesn’t come up too often. The county sought the termination of “Anna’s” parental rights to five children. It then moved for summary judgment on the grounds that she’d been convicted of a serious felony related to the death of another child. A hearing was set, but Anna’s counsel informed the court she’d be in trial in a homicide case. Expecting an adjournment–which both trial counsel and the court of appeals note is “common practice” in such a situation–the attorney told Anna the hearing would be put off. Counsel’s homicide trial then unexpectedly ended early, though she still had work to do to wrap it up. The TPR court apparently heard through the grapevine that the homicide trial was over. Without any successful contact–or much apparent effort to contact–Anna or her lawyer, the court held the scheduled hearing ex parte and, at the county’s request, granted summary judgment. Later, over Anna and her counsel’s protestations, the court terminated her rights.

Portage County DH & HS v. C.S., 2022AP1090, District 4, 02/23/2023, (one-judge decision, ineligible for publication) case activity

In what appears to be a first, the court of appeals addresses a grant of partial summary judgment against a parent specifically related to whether the county made a “reasonable effort” to provide services pursuant to a CHIPS order. See Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a). One caveat being that the issue arises within the context of a postdisposition claim of ineffective assistance after trial counsel failed to file any response or affidavit opposing the county’s motion for summary judgment. Nevertheless, the court affirms the summary judgment order and holds that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the county made a “reasonable effort” to provide services to C.S. that would have assisted him in meeting the conditions of return. (Opinion, ¶35).

Brown County DHHS v. T.R., 2022AP1094, District 3, 1/20/23 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

In a TPR proceeding a motion for summary judgment may be filed any time before trial, as prescribed in § 48.297(1) and (2), and is not governed by the time limit for summary judgment motions prescribed in § 802.08(1).

C.K. and A.K. v. K.L., 2022AP1289, District 4, 12/22/22 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court didn’t err in granting partial summary judgment on the termination of parental rights petition filed against K.L. by C.K. and A.K., the grandparents and guardians of K.L.’s daughter B.K., because there were no genuine issues of material facts as to whether K.L. established a good cause defense to the ground of abandonment alleged in the petition.

L.E.H. v. R.E.M., 2022AP713-715, 11/22/11, District 1; (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

“Luke” and “Rebecca” had 3 children together. After their relationship ended, Rebecca struggled with addiction and was charged with a number of crimes. Luke married and successfully petitioned to terminate Rebecca’s parental rights.  Rebecca appealed the TPR arguing the circuit court (1) improperly granted summary judgment on the grounds that she abandoned her children, and (2) created the appearance of bias during the disposition hearing.

State v. S.L.W., 2021AP1736 & 1737, 6/1/22, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

S.LW. appeals the termination of parental rights to her children. She argues her attorney failed to inform the jury of court-ordered services the Milwaukee County child-services agency didn’t provide. The court of appeals holds that if counsel performed deficiently in this regard, it didn’t affect the jury trial because the county did make a reasonable effort to provide the services, and because there was an independent ground for termination. (UPDATE: the original post said S.L.W. didn’t challenge this second ground on appeal; the comment below informs us that she did.)

Marathon County DHS v. S.K., 2021AP1124 & 2021AP1125, District 3, 11/18/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court granted partial summary judgment on the petitions to terminate the parental rights of S.K. (“Sarah”) for failure to assume parental responsibility of her two daughters. The court of appeals reverses, holding there are genuine issues of material fact that require a trial on the grounds for the petitions.

Barron County DHS v. M.S., 2020AP1257, District 3, 12/17/20, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

If we were quarantining in Vegas, we’d bet this case is heading to SCOW.  The briefs are confidential but the main issues appear to be: whether the summary judgment deadline in §802.08(1) governs TPR cases; whether a court may extend that deadline for good cause; and how those rules apply to the facts of this case. The COA sows confusion by stating that it has conducted “independent research” suggesting that, despite SCOW precedent and the parties’ agreement, §802.08(1) doesn’t actually apply. It then applies §802.08(1).

Racine County DHS v. W.L.J., 2020AP197-198, October 14, 2020, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Good news for defense lawyers in TPR cases. The court of appeals means business. This is the third time in less than a year that it has reversed a termination of parental rights order due to a circuit court error on the question of whether a parent “abandoned” his or her child.

Juneau County DHS v. C.C., 2020AP438, 6/4/20, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Courts don’t usually award summary judgment in TPR cases, especially not at the grounds phase where the question is whether the parent abandoned the child. The issue is generally too fact intensive. But here the circuit court found no genuine issue of fact regarding abandonment, and the court of appeals affirmed.