On Point: G. Disposition, Secs. 48.426-427

State v. D.W., 2021AP1290, District 1, 9/28/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court properly exercised its discretion in terminating D.W.’s parental rights because the court considered all the relevant factors under § 48.426(3) in reaching its decision.

State v. V.S., 2021AP136, District 1, 4/6/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The record shows the circuit court considered all of the § 48.426(3) factors relevant to determining the best interests of the child and properly applied them to the facts in deciding whether to terminate V.S.’s parental rights to D.D.S.

Jackson County DHS v. M.M.B., 2021AP98 & 2021AP99, District 4, 4/1/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

M.M.B. stipulated that there were grounds for terminating her parental rights to her two children, but argued at the disposition phase that termination wasn’t in the best interest of the children. At that hearing, the County presented the testimony of a psychologist who had assessed M.M.B.’s “psychosocial functioning, including issues related to parenting and substance abuse.” M.M.B. objected, arguing the psychologist’s evaluation was not contemporaneous to the dispositional hearing, but had been conducted two years earlier, and thus wasn’t relevant to the issue of the children’s best interests. (¶¶3-6). The circuit court didn’t err in admitting this testimony.

Waushara County DHS v. A.J.P., 2019AP2387, District 4, 4/13/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court properly exercised its discretion by considering all the factors under § 48.426(3) when it decided to terminate A.J.P.’s parental rights.

State v. D.I.H., 2019AP1874, District 1, 12/27/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

D.I.H. challenges the order terminating the parental rights of her mother and father, arguing the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in concluding that termination was in her best interests. The court of appeals affirms.

V.A. v. M.W.P., 2019AP1098, District 2, 11/20/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

V.A. petitioned to terminate the parental rights of her child’s father, M.W.P., who pled no contest to abandonment. M.V.P. argues the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in ordering termination because it failed to dismiss the proceeding or give sufficient weight to the fact that V.A.’s husband, M.A., confronted the child’s GAL about his recommendation against termination, telling the GAL he’d “have blood on his hands.” (¶¶3, 13). No erroneous exercise of discretion here, says the court of appeals.

State v. A.L.M., 2019AP1599, 2019AP1600, & 2019AP1601, District 1, 11/19/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

After A.L.M. pled no contest to failing to assume parental responsibility, the circuit court terminated his parental rights. The evidence was sufficient to support that conclusion.

Outagamie County DHHS v. R.P., 2019AP990 & 2019AP991, District 3, 10/1/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court properly exercised its discretion in terminating R.P.’s parental rights, and in particular didn’t err by not considering a guardianship instead of termination.

Walworth County DHS v. S.S.K., 2019AP782, 7/17/19, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

During the grounds phase of the Walworth County’s TPR case against S.S.K., she “admitted” the ground of continuing CHIPS; she didn’t plead “no contest.”  This distinction proved decisive to the court of appeals’ decision to affirm the termination of her parental rights to her daughter, A.S.L. 

State v. T.R.C., 2018AP820, 4/2/19, District 1 (1-judge opinion, eligible for publication); case activity

T.R.C. pled “no contest” to grounds for termination of her parental rights to D. On appeal she argued that her plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary, that her trial counsel was ineffective, and that the TPR order should be vacated in the interests of justice. The court of appeals affirmed.