On Point blog, page 17 of 58
Consent to voluntary TPR was valid
C.W. v. M.M., 2021AP330 & 2021AP331, District 3, 7/21/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
M.M.’s consent to voluntary termination of parental rights was valid and can’t be withdrawn.
Defense win: Continuing denial of physical placement ground unconstitutional as applied in case involving indigent parent
B.W. v. S.H., 2021AP43 & 2021AP44, District 3, 6/29/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Under the facts of this case, terminating S.H.’s parental rights on continuing denial of physical placement grounds under § 48.415(4) violated his right to substantive due process because his indigency precluded him for seeking changes in the physical placement order.
Missing one court date justified default TPR judgment
State v. M.R.K., 2021AP141, District 1, 6/22/21 (one-judge decision; not recommended for publication); case activity
The Latin word grex means “flock,” “herd,” or “group,” and is the root of several English words. Gregarious originally meant “tending to live in a flock, herd, or community rather than alone” but has become a synonym for “sociable.” Egregious literally meant “out of the herd” in Latin — something that stands apart. Its first meaning in English was consequently “outstanding” or “remarkable for good quality,” but over time that changed to become “very bad and easily noticed” or “flagrant.”
Merriam-Webster’s Words at Play. See also Sentry Ins. v. Davis, 2001 WI App 203, ¶21 n.8, 247 Wis. 2d 501, 634 N.W.2d 553 (“Egregious” is “extraordinary in some bad way, glaring, flagrant[.]” (citation omitted)). In Wisconsin TPR cases, it means “missing a single court date.”
SCOW holds dismissal of TPR doesn’t automatically preclude malicious prosecution action
Cheyne Monroe v. Chad Chase, 2021 WI 66, 6/22/21, on certification from the court of appeals and reversing a circuit court judgment; case activity (including briefs)
One of the elements of a claim for malicious prosecution is that the baseless prior action must have terminated in favor of the party asserting malicious prosecution. The supreme court holds this element may be met even when the party accused of malicious prosecution voluntarily dismissed the allegedly baseless proceeding before it was decided on the merits.
SCOW holds 2018 amendment to TPR statute applies to 2016 case
Eau Claire County DHS v. S.E., 2021 WI 56, affirming a published court of appeals opinion, 2019AP894, 6/10/21, case activity
In a 4-3 decision, SCOW holds that a 2018 amendment to the TPR statute, which imposed a more exacting timeframe for parents to preserve their parental rights, applied to a CHIPS order entered in 2016 when the statutory timeframe was more lenient. So much for the plain language of the statute and due process.
SCOW clarifies law regarding substitution of judges in civil cases
State v. Tavodess Matthews, 2021 WI 42, reversing a published court of appeals opinion, 2020 WI App 33, 5/14/21, case activity (including briefs)
Section 801.58(1) allows a party to a civil case to request a new judge if, among other things, he files a written substitution request before “the hearing of any preliminary contested matter.” Matthews’ case concerns a substitution request made after the circuit court granted a motion to adjourn a Chapter 980 probable cause hearing regarding sexually violent persons. But since Chapter 980 commitments are civil proceedings, this unanimous SCOW opinion, which reverses a published court of appeals’ opinion, is an important clarification of the law governing all civil cases.
Court’s failure to expressly find parent “unfit” didn’t invalidate TPR order
Sheboygan County DH&HS v. S.K., 2021AP158, District 2, 5/12/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Though § 48.424(4) says that if grounds for termination of parental rights are found, “the court shall find the parent unfit,” the circuit court’s failure to utter those words doesn’t make the TPR order invalid.
Circuit court properly exercised discretion in terminating parental rights
State v. V.S., 2021AP136, District 1, 4/6/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The record shows the circuit court considered all of the § 48.426(3) factors relevant to determining the best interests of the child and properly applied them to the facts in deciding whether to terminate V.S.’s parental rights to D.D.S.
Psychologist’s testimony was relevant to issues at TPR disposition phase
Jackson County DHS v. M.M.B., 2021AP98 & 2021AP99, District 4, 4/1/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
M.M.B. stipulated that there were grounds for terminating her parental rights to her two children, but argued at the disposition phase that termination wasn’t in the best interest of the children. At that hearing, the County presented the testimony of a psychologist who had assessed M.M.B.’s “psychosocial functioning, including issues related to parenting and substance abuse.” M.M.B. objected, arguing the psychologist’s evaluation was not contemporaneous to the dispositional hearing, but had been conducted two years earlier, and thus wasn’t relevant to the issue of the children’s best interests. (¶¶3-6). The circuit court didn’t err in admitting this testimony.
In TPR, court of appeals rejects challenges to default on grounds and exercise of discretion in disposition
State v. A.M.-C., 2021AP94 & 2021AP95, 3/30/21, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The state petitioned to terminate A.M.-C.’s rights to two of her children on failure-to-assume and continuing-CHIPS grounds. After being told (apparently via interpreter, as Spanish is her first language) that she had to attend all hearings, A.M.-C. moved to New York City. The circuit court rejected her request to attend by telephone, found her in default, and after prove-up, found her unfit. It later found termination of her rights to be in the children’s best interest.