On Point: 40. TPRs

State v. Tavodess Matthews, 2021 WI 42, reversing a published court of appeals opinion, 2020 WI App 33, 5/14/21, case activity (including briefs)

Section 801.58(1) allows a party to a civil case to request a new judge if, among other things, he files a written substitution request before “the hearing of any preliminary contested matter.” Matthews’ case concerns a substitution request made after the circuit court granted a motion to adjourn a Chapter 980 probable cause hearing regarding sexually violent persons. But since Chapter 980 commitments are civil proceedings, this unanimous SCOW opinion, which reverses a published court of appeals’ opinion, is an important clarification of the law governing all civil cases.

Sheboygan County DH&HS v. S.K., 2021AP158, District 2, 5/12/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Though § 48.424(4) says that if grounds for termination of parental rights are found, “the court shall find the parent unfit,” the circuit court’s failure to utter those words doesn’t make the TPR order invalid.

State v. V.S., 2021AP136, District 1, 4/6/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The record shows the circuit court considered all of the § 48.426(3) factors relevant to determining the best interests of the child and properly applied them to the facts in deciding whether to terminate V.S.’s parental rights to D.D.S.

Jackson County DHS v. M.M.B., 2021AP98 & 2021AP99, District 4, 4/1/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

M.M.B. stipulated that there were grounds for terminating her parental rights to her two children, but argued at the disposition phase that termination wasn’t in the best interest of the children. At that hearing, the County presented the testimony of a psychologist who had assessed M.M.B.’s “psychosocial functioning, including issues related to parenting and substance abuse.” M.M.B. objected, arguing the psychologist’s evaluation was not contemporaneous to the dispositional hearing, but had been conducted two years earlier, and thus wasn’t relevant to the issue of the children’s best interests. (¶¶3-6). The circuit court didn’t err in admitting this testimony.

State v. A.M.-C., 2021AP94 & 2021AP95, 3/30/21, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The state petitioned to terminate A.M.-C.’s rights to two of her children on failure-to-assume and continuing-CHIPS grounds. After being told (apparently via interpreter, as Spanish is her first language) that she had to attend all hearings, A.M.-C. moved to New York City. The circuit court rejected her request to attend by telephone, found her in default, and after prove-up, found her unfit. It later found termination of her rights to be in the children’s best interest.

S.K. v. S.S., 2020AP277, District 3, 2/26/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (briefs not made available)

S.S. (or “Susan,” to use the court’s pseudonym) isn’t entitled to a new TPR grounds trial based on her trial attorney’s failure to object to the admission of testimony she argues was irrelevant “other-acts” evidence. Even if trial counsel was deficient for failing to object (and the court doesn’t necessarily agree that’s the case (¶16 n.4),

State v. V.R., 2020AP798 & 2020799, 1/26/21, Distrct 1 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

This is an appeal from an order terminating V.R.’s parental rights. The court of appeals rejected a no-merit report because the record revealed that neither defense counsel nor the circuit court had discussed the meaning of a “substantial parental relationship” with V.R. before she pled no contest to failure to assume parental responsibility. On remand, V.R moved to withdraw her no contest plea and filed an affidavit. She lost her motion and now her appeal because she did not appear at the plea withdrawal hearing.

State v. J.T., 2020AP1151, 1/5/21, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

E.W. was placed in foster care shortly after birth. Her dad, J.T., was incarcerated then. He remained so a year later when the State filed a TPR petition against him on the grounds that he failed to establish a substantial relationship with E.W. and failed to exercise significant responsibility for her. According to the State, J.T. failed to attend E.W.’s medical appointments and participate in decisions about her education. He pled no contest, and the circuit court terminated his parental rights.

Barron County DHS v. M.S., 2020AP1257, District 3, 12/17/20, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

If we were quarantining in Vegas, we’d bet this case is heading to SCOW.  The briefs are confidential but the main issues appear to be: whether the summary judgment deadline in §802.08(1) governs TPR cases; whether a court may extend that deadline for good cause; and how those rules apply to the facts of this case. The COA sows confusion by stating that it has conducted “independent research” suggesting that, despite SCOW precedent and the parties’ agreement, §802.08(1) doesn’t actually apply. It then applies §802.08(1).

Eau Claire County DHS v. S.E., 2019AP894, review of a published opinion granted 10/21/20, case activity.

When the court orders a child in need of protection or services (“CHIPS”) placed outside the family home, a parent’s rights may be terminated if he or she fails to meet the conditions for the child’s return in the timeframe set out by statute. Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a). In April 2018, the legislature shortened this timeframe. Under either version, the CHIPS order placing the child outside the home must include “notice” of “any grounds for termination of parental rights[.]” Wis. Stat. §§ 48.415(2)(a) and
48.356.

Issues for Review:

Whether as a matter of statutory construction the new, shorter timeframe begins with the initial CHIPS order, even if it predates the change in the statute and thus does not include notice of the shorter timeframe.

Whether starting the shorter timeframe with a CHIPS order that predates the statutory change violates a parent’s due process rights.