On Point: 40. TPRs

State v. B.H., 2016AP892-893, District 1, 12/28/16 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication)

B.H.’s twins were taken from her due to a report of violence between her and their father. The trial court found that she had failed to meet the conditions for their return and to assume parental responsibility. B.H. argues that those findings rest upon inadmissible hearsay in the form of testimony from the foster mother and from a social worker and in the form of a letter from the Bureau. B.H. asserts that trial counsel’s failure to object to this evidence amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.

T.M.H. v. A.N.W., 2016AP1981, District 4, 12/29/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The biological father of J.H. petitioned to terminate the parental rights of the biological mother, A.W. The circuit court granted the petition, but only after concluding it could order continued visitation between J.H. and his maternal great-grandmother, with whom J.H. had an important relationship. It turns out the circuit court did not have that authority. Because the circuit court said it “absolutely, positively” would not terminate A.W.’s rights unless it could order continued visitation by the great-grandmother, the termination order is reversed.

Jefferson County DHS v. C.C., 2016AP1983, District 4, 12/21/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court properly granted summary judgment on the petition terminating C.C.’s parental rights despite C.C.’s claims that the circuit court violated the mandatory notice provision under § 802.08(2) and that a genuine issue of material fact exists on the issue of grounds for termination.

State v. A.W., 2016AP121 through 125, 12/8/16, District 1 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

When A.W. did not appear for her pretrial and was not reachable by phone, the court entered a default finding as to grounds for a TPR. She moved to vacate that finding, but then withdrew her motion. On appeal, she argued that (1) trial counsel was ineffective for advising her to withdraw the motion to vacate, and (2) the circuit court should have vacated the default so that she could address false information admitted in her case. The court of appeals refused to address the 2nd argument for reasons that penalized A.W. for mistakes her appellate lawyer allegedly made.

State v. T.R.D., 2016AP1413, District 1, 11/29/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

T.R.D. challenges the circuit court’s conclusions that she was an unfit parent and that it was in the best interests of her child for T.R.D.’s parental rights to be terminated. The court of appeals rejects the challenges.

Portage County DHHS v. D.B., 2016AP1233 & 1234, 11/17/16, District 4 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

D.B. raises challenges to both the disposition and grounds phases of the hearing that resulted in the termination of her rights to her two children. The court of appeals rejects both.

Dane County DHS v. S.C., 2016AP1787, 11/17/16, District 4 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

S.C. appeals the termination of her parental rights to her daughter D.C. She pled to a continuing CHIPS ground; she challenges only the circuit court’s discretionary conclusion, at the dispositional phase, that termination was in D.C.’s best interest.

State v. J.B., 2016AP483, 484 & 485, 10/4/2016, District 1 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

2013 Wis. Act 337 created Wis. Stat. § 48.23(2)(b)3., which permits a TPR court in some circumstances to find that a parent who has defaulted as to grounds by failing to appear has also waived his or her right to counsel. The statute then imposes a two-day waiting period before the court proceeds to disposition. But what if the court finds a parent in default but does not find counsel waived?

Dane County DHS v. C.N., 2016AP1472-1473, District 4, 9/29/16 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

C.N. argued that in considering the best of her children the circuit court placed too much weight on her lengthy separation from her children and not enough weight on the progress she had made toward meeting the conditions of return. Unfortunately, the standard of review–whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion–doomed her appeal.

R.J.M. v. M.R.H., 2016AP1307, 9/22/2016, District 4 (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity

M.R.H. appeals the termination of his parental rights to his son, arguing that the jury during the grounds phase should not have heard (1) that he had previously been willing to voluntarily terminate his rights or (2) that his son wanted to be adopted by his stepfather. The court of appeals calls this evidence “problematic” but holds its admission harmless.