On Point: 40. TPRs

State v. Gloria C., 2012AP1693 and 2012AP1694, District 1, 2/5/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the opinion testimony of the parent’s ongoing case manager, who said that based on the parent’s conduct in the preceding two years, she would not be able to meet the conditions necessary for the return of her children within nine months.

State v. Angie A., 2012AP2240, District 1, 2/20/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

The state properly brought TPR petition alleging grounds under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2) (continuing need of protection and services) and § 48.416(6) (failure to assume parental responsibility) instead of § 48.415(3) (continuing parental disability, a ground that specifically targets parents with a mental illness or developmental disability), because the state could and did make a reasonable effort to provide Angie A.

Pierce County v. Troy H., 2012AP2525 and 2012AP2526, District 3, 2/19/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court termination decision was the result of an erroneous exercise of discretion because the court failed to consider the statutory factors:

¶8        Troy asserts the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion because the record shows that the court did not consider any of the Wis.

State v. La’Drea L., 2012AP1984 and State v. Ricky B., 2012AP2027, District 1, 2/20/13; consolidated court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity: LaDrea L.; Ricky B.

The circuit court properly exercised its discretion when it determined termination was in the children’s best interests because it considered all of the statutory factors under Wis. Stat. § 48.426(3). The circuit court “did not say the precise words” of,

Racine County v. Renee D., 2012AP1974, District 2, 2/20/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Wis. Stat. § 48.415(5) is not unconstitutionally vague and does not violate due process

As applied to Renee D., the two elements for the “child abuse” ground under § 48.415(5) are: 1) the parent has shown a pattern of physical or sexual abuse that is a substantial threat to the health of the child who is the subject of the petition;

Racine County v. Latanya D.K., 2013 WI App 28; case activity

TPR – Waiver of jury trial need not be part of admission colloquy

¶2        Latanya’s major arguments raise an important question:  Must the court engage in a personal colloquy with a parent regarding his or her waiver of the right to a jury trial before accepting the parent’s admission that grounds for termination of parental rights exist?

La Crosse Co. DHS v. Kristle S., 2012AP2005, District 4, 11/21/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

The parent was given a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the social worker with respect to conditions for the children’s return, in that the trial court permitted extensive questioning on these issues before instructing counsel to pursue a different line of questioning:

¶17      Our review of the record also demonstrates that Kristle had a meaningful opportunity to impeach Simmons’ credibility.

Nicole P. v. Michael P., 2012AP780, District 3, 10/16/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Father’s motion to withdraw admission to grounds (based on asserted lack of understanding that: termination of parental rights required an unfitness determination; sole focus of dispositional hearing would be child’s best interests, with no concern for parent’s own interests; disposition could result in permanent extinction of all his parental rights),

Veronica K. v. Michael K., 2012AP197, District 1, 10/10/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Michael K., incarcerated at the time of this TPR trial, appeared by audio-video hookup. He argues that his due process right to meaningful participation, State v. Lavelle W., 2005 WI App 266, ¶2, 288 Wis. 2d 504, 708 N.W.2d 698, in light of his numerous contemporaneous complaints he couldn’t hear the proceedings. 

State v. Tenesha T., 2012AP1283, District 1, 9/5/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Parent’s right to be present during TPR trial wasn’t violated when court allowed 30 minutes of testimony during parent’s volunary absence:

¶16      Tenesha bases her argument on Shirley E., contending that a parent’s right to be present during termination proceedings is inherent in Shirley E.