On Point: Important Posts

Timbs v. Indiana, USSC No. 17-1091, February 20, 2019, reversing State v. Timbs, 84 N.E.3d 1179 (Ind. 2017); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

“The question presented: Is the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause an ‘incorporated’ protection applicable to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause?” The answer: Yes.

Garza v. Idaho, USSC No. 17-1026, reversing Garza v. State, 405 P.3d 576 (Idaho 2017);  Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

This case involved two plea agreements that included clauses stating that Garza waived his right to appeal. After sentencing, Garza told his lawyer that he wanted to appeal, but his lawyer refused due to the plea agreement. Garza filed claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Siding with Garza, SCOTUS held that counsel performed deficiently and that “prejudiced is presumed” because the failure to file a notice of appeal deprived Garza of an appeal altogether. Opinion at 1. 

Brown County Human Services v. B.P and T.F., 2019 WI App 18; case activity

T.F. argued that when the Department seeks to terminate parental rights on the grounds of abandonment in a case where the child is out of the home and a CHIPS order is in place, it must proceed under §48.415(1)(a)2., rather than (a)3. T.F. also argued that allowing the Department to proceed under (a)3 would result in an Equal Protection violation. The court of appeals rejected these arguments but held that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment with respect to T.F. because material facts were in dispute over whether she had good cause for abandoning her daughter, Allie.

State v. Kelly James Kloss, 2019 WI App 13, petition and cross petition for review granted, 6/11/19, petitions dismissed as improvidently granted, 3/6/20; case activity (including briefs)

Bad news first: Addressing an issue of first impression, the court of appeals held that Wisconsin now recognizes the crime of solicitation of 1st degree reckless injury. Good news: Solicitation of 1st degree recklessly endangering safety is a lesser included offense of solicitation of 1st degree reckless injury, which means that convicting a defendant of both violates multiplicity principles and Double Jeopardy. Defense wins!

Timothy W. Miller v. Angela L. Carroll, 2019 WI App 10, petition for review granted, 8/14/19, affirmed, 2020 WI 56; case activity (including briefs)

After a contested hearing between Miller and Carroll about custody and physical placement of their child, and before issuing a decision, the circuit judge accepted a Facebook “friend” request from Carroll. Miller argued the circuit court demonstrated objective bias by doing so. The court of appeals agrees.

State v. Esmeralda Rivera-Hernandez, 2018AP311-312-CR, 2/20/19, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

DAs have almost limitless discretion in deciding whether to initiate a prosecution. But their discretion to terminate a prosecution is subject to independent review by the circuit court, which must consider the public’s interest in: (1) the proper enforcement of its laws, and (2) deferring to the prosecutor’s legitimate discretion.  See State v. Kenyon, 85 Wis. 2d 36, 45, 270 N.W.2d 170 (1978). In this case, the court of appeals holds the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it considered (1) but not (2).

State v. Jeninga, 2019 WI App 14; case activity (including briefs)

Jeninga asserted that he would not have pled guilty to a weak child sexual assault charge if his trial counsel had filed an obvious motion to suppress child porn on his cell phone. Trial counsel, who missed the suppression issue, testified that the child porn caused to her to advise Jeninga to plead guilty, and he followed her advice. The court of appeals says trial counsel’s testimony was not enough to prove prejudice. Jeninga had to testify himself.

State v. C.L.K., 2019 WI 14, reversing an unpublished court of appeals opinion; 2/19/19; case activity (including briefs)

The State of Wisconsin petitioned the Milwaukee County Circuit Court to terminate C.L.K.’s parental rights, following which the matter went to trial in due course. After the State rested, the circuit court immediately  decided that Mr. K. was an unfit parent. That is, the circuit court decided the matter before giving Mr. K. an opportunity to present his case. The State concedes this was error, but says it is susceptible to a “harmless-error” review. It is not. We hold that denying a defendant the opportunity to present his case-in-chief is a structural error, the consequence of which is an automatic new trial. Opinion, ¶1.

City of Cedarburg v. Ries B. Hansen, 2018AP1129, petition for bypass granted 2/12/19; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (from petition for bypass):

City of Eau Claire v. Booth, 2016 WI 65, ¶1, 370 Wis. 2d 595, 882 N.W.2d 738 held that when a circuit court handles a 1st offense OWI that is mischarged due to an unknown prior offense, it is a defect in the circuit court’s competency but not the circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, a defendant must timely object to the circuit court’s lack of competency or the objection is forfeited. Is the same true when the mischarged OWI is in municipal court?

State v. Stephan I. Roberson, 2017AP1894-CR, petition for review of per curiam opinion granted 2/12/19; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (from the petition for review):

Whether a pretrial out-of-court identification using a single photo is a showup and thus inadmissible at trial unless the State proves necessity under the totality of the circumstances?