On Point blog, page 47 of 81

SCOW alters test for whether state “suppressed” evidence under Brady v. Maryland

State v. Gary Lee Wayerski, 2019 WI 11, affirming and modifying an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

The supreme court overrules Wisconsin’s longstanding test for deciding whether the state has “suppressed” favorable evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), saying the test is unsupported by and contrary to Brady and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions applying Brady.

Read full article >

January 2019 publication list

On January 31, 2019, the court of appeals ordered the publication of the following criminal law related decisions:

State v. Autumn Marie Love Lopez & Amy J. Rodriquez, 2019 WI App 2 (retail theft charges can be aggregated under § 971.36)

State v. Alexander M. Schultz, 2019 WI App 3 (addressing double jeopardy challenges to successive prosecution when the charging language of the prior prosecution is ambiguous)

State v.

Read full article >

Defense win! Driving near scene of crime does not create reasonable suspicion for stop

State v. Brady R. Adams, 2018AP174-CR, 1/15/19, District 3 (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Noting that no Wisconsin precedent addresses the issue in this case, the court of appeals follows United States v. Bohman, 683 F.3d 861 (7th Cir. 2012) and holds that the suspicion of illegal activity in a place is not enough to transfer that suspicion to anyone who leaves that place such as would justify an investigatory detention.

Read full article >

SCOW to decide whether circuit court must inform defendant of each constitutional right waived by a guilty plea

State v. Javien Cajujuan Pegeese, 2017AP741-CR, petition for review of a per curiam opinion granted 1/15/19; affirmed 5/31/19; case activity (including briefs)

Issue:

Whether the circuit court’s failure to personally insure that the defendant understood each constitutional right waived by his guilty plea entitled him to a Bangert evidentiary hearing to determine whether his plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

Read full article >

SCOW to address admissibility of deceased’s hearsay statements, whether Miranda warnings are required at John Doe hearings

State v. Peter J. Hanson, 2016AP2058-CR, petition for review of per curiam opinion granted 1/15/19; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (from the petition for review):

Whether the admission of hearsay statements of a defendant’s deceased wife inculpating him in murder violates his right to confrontation?

Whether trial counsel is ineffective in failing to move to suppress inculpatory statements that the defendant made at a John Doe hearing where he was in custody and not properly Mirandized?

Read full article >

SCOTUS to decide (in a Wisconsin case!) whether “implied consent” is constitutional consent

Gerald Mitchell v. Wisconsin, USSC No. 18-6210, certiorari granted 1/11/19

Question presented:

Whether a statute authorizing a blood draw from an unconscious motorist provides an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.

Read full article >

Seventh circuit, en banc, says denial of counsel wasn’t “complete” when lawyer was permitted in the room but not allowed to speak or assist

Scott Schmidt v. Brian Foster, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 17-1727, 12/20/18, reversing panel decision of 5/29/18

Schmidt, as we discussed in our post on the Seventh Circuit’s (now reversed) habeas grant, was summoned into chambers and questioned by the judge about the testimony he wanted to give in his defense. His lawyer was allowed to be there but was forbidden, outside of a brief limited consultation, to participate. A majority of the en banc court, over sharp dissent, now says that even though that was pretty clearly unconstitutional, Schmidt’s conviction stands because of the AEDPA standard.

Read full article >

SCOW: Expunged conviction counts as prior under § 343.307

State v. Justin A. Braunschweig, 2018 WI 113, 12/21/18, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Braunschweig was convicted in 2011 of causing injury by intoxicated operation of a vehicle. The conviction was expunged under § 973.015. In 2016 he was charged with operating while intoxicated and with a prohibited alcohol content, both as a second offense because of the 2011 conviction. The supreme court rejects his claim that the expunged conviction can’t be a predicate offense under § 343.307(1).

Read full article >

Federal district court grants habeas; vacates SCOW Padilla decision

Hatem M. Shata v. Denise Symdon, No. 16-CV-574 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 12, 2018)

Shata’s case was one of two our supreme court decided on the same day–both held counsel not ineffective for failing to give accurate advice on immigration consequences. You can see our prior post for the facts and our analysis of those decisions. Basically, counsel told Shata that pleading to the charged drug count would carry a “strong chance” of deporation, when in fact deportation was mandatory. Unlike our supreme court, the federal court now says that this wasn’t good enough–and further, that the supreme court’s conclusion that it was good enough was an unreasonable application of the law that SCOTUS clearly established in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).

Read full article >

SCOW to review issues relating to line-ups, right to self-representation

State v. Nelson Garcia, Jr., 2016AP1276-CR, petition for review of an unpublished court of appeals decision granted 12/12/18; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (from the petition for review)

  1. Does the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attach upon the finding of probable cause and setting of bail by a court commissioner?
  2. Was the line-up impermissibly suggestive because it violated the Department of Justice’s Model Policy and Procedure for Eyewitness Identification and the viewing witnesses failed to follow the standard instructions given to them?
  3. Can a trial court at a pre-trial hearing decide that a defendant has waived the right to self-representation because the court believes the defendant will engage in disruptive behavior in front of the jury? If so, does the defendant have a right to redeem himself?
Read full article >