On Point: Important Posts

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State v. Thornon F. Talley, 2017 WI 21, 3/9/17, affirming an unpublished summary court of appeals order; case activity (including briefs)

Thornon Talley, who is committed as a sexually violent person under Wis. Stat. ch. 980, filed a petition for discharge from that commitment in 2012. The circuit court denied the petition without a hearing. The supreme court now unanimously upholds that denial, essentially because Talley did not show any meaningful change in his condition since his previous discharge trial (also in 2012).

State v. Diamond J. Arberry, 2017 WI App 26, petition for review granted 6/16/17, affirmed, 2018 WI 7 ; case activity (including briefs)

Because a circuit court must decide whether to grant expungement under § 973.015 “at the sentencing proceeding,” State v. Matasek, 2014 WI 27, ¶45, 353 Wis. 2d 601, 846 N.W.2d 811, the court doesn’t have authority to consider expungement when it asked to do so in a defendant’s postconviction motion.

Miguel Angel Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, USSC No. 15-606, 2017 WL 855760 (March 6, 2017), reversing Peña-Rodriguez v. People, 350 P.3d 287 (Colo. 2015); Scotusblog page

Every state and federal jurisdiction has some version of the “no-impeachment rule,” which, after a verdict is received, bars an aggrieved party from presenting testimony by jurors regarding the jury’s deliberations. SCOTUS has twice upheld such rules against constitutional challenge, while allowing that there could be certain cases in which refusing to permit such testimony would be too harmful to justice. The court now decides that the no-impeachment rule must give way to the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury where “a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant.”

Last summer, SCOW held that, if used properly, a circuit court’s consideration of a COMPAS risk assessment at sentencing does not violate due process. See State v. Loomis and our post. Loomis filed a petition for writ of certiorari which presents this question for review:

State courts increasingly are relying on risk assessment instruments at sentencing. When the risk assessment instrument used is proprietary, as the Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (“COMPAS”) software is, defendants have very little information about how the risk is analyzed. Is it a violation of a defendant’s constitutional right to due process for a trial court to rely on such risk assessment results at sentencing:

a.  because the proprietary nature of COMPAS prevents a defendant from challenging the accuracy and scientific validity of the risk assessment; and

b.  because COMPAS assessments take gender and race into account in formulating the risk assessment?

SCOTUS ordered the State of Wisconsin to respond to the petition, which according to this study, happens in maybe 2-3% of cases. But today SCOTUS took an even more unusual step by issuing a “CVSG”–a call for the views of the acting U.S. Solicitor General, even though the United States is not a party to Loomis v. Wisconsin.

Since July 1, 2016, circuit court clerks have been permitted to transmit documents and records electronically to the court of appeals. When that occurs, the court of appeals paginates the documents in the appellate record. Sometimes a document is shared among multiple appeals. Originally the system was designed to paginate a document permanently–one time. Therefore, in consolidated and companion cases, documents used in multiple circuit court records had incorrect pagination.

Travis Beckless v. United States, USSC No. 15-8544, 2017 WL 855781 (March 6, 2017), affirming Beckles v. United States, 616 Fed. Appx. 415 (11th Cir. 2015) (unpublished); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

The Supreme Court holds that provisions in the federal advisory sentencing guidelines are not subject to vagueness challenges under the Due Process Clause.

Michael Damon Rippo v. Renee Baker, Warden, USSC No. 16-6316, 2017 WL 855913 (March 6, 2017) (per curiam), reversing and remanding Rippo v. State, 368 P.3d 729 (Nev. 2016); Scotusblog page

In this per curiam decision, the Supreme Court holds the lower court erred in demanding a defendant show actual bias to satisfy his claim that his due process right to an impartial judge was violated.

State v. David W. Howes, 2017 WI 18, on certification from the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

The supreme court granted certification in this case to decide an important question: Does Wisconsin’s implied consent statute create a categorical “consent” exception to the warrant requirement as to unconscious drivers, thus allowing police to collect blood without having to get a warrant or establish exigent circumstances or some other exception? But the court doesn’t answer that question, leaving the law in a muddle. On top of that, the court reverses the circuit court’s suppression order, though without a majority agreement as to why the blood draw was legal, and with some justices invoking a theory the state didn’t argue in the circuit court.

State v. Jeffrey C. Denny, 2017 WI 17, reversing a published court of appeals decision; 2015AP202-CR, 2/28/2017; case activity (including briefs)

In State v. Moran, 2005 WI 115, 284 Wis. 2d 24, 700 N.W.2d 884, the supreme court unanimously held that Wis. Stat. § 974.07, the postconviction DNA testing statute, provides two routes for a convicted defendant seeking exoneration: a defendant satisfying certain basic criteria may pay for his own testing of physical evidence; one making a stronger showing of potential significance may secure such testing at public expense. The court now closes off the first, self-paid route.