On Point: Important Posts

Welch v. United States, USSC No. 15-6418, 2016 WL 1551144 (April 18, 2016), vacating and remanding an unpublished order of the 11th Circuit; Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Associate Federal Defender Shelley Fite has kindly agreed to provide her take on the high court’s latest:

Federal defenders and procedure wonks naturally appreciate Welch v. United States, in which the (7–1) Supreme Court held that Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), applies retroactively to cases on collateral review.  But (read on!) the case does have some application for state practitioners—at least those who do post-conviction work.

State v. Gary F. Lemberger, 2015AP1452-CR, 4/14/2016, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 10/11/2016, affirmed, 2017 WI 39; case activity (including briefs)

A breathalyzer test is a Fourth Amendment search, and state case law holds that the state may not invite a jury to view a defendant’s refusal to consent to a search as evidence of guilt. So, can a prosecutor argue that a defendant’s refusal to take a breathalyzer shows his guilt? Don’t look to this case for an answer.

State v. Andrew G. Chitwood, 2016 WI App 36; case activity (including briefs)

In theory, Wisconsin’s new test for the admissibility of expert testimony “is flexible but has teeth.” State v. Giese, ¶19. In practice, it’s flexible and has dentures. Literally every Daubert challenge litigated on appeal since Wis. Stat. §907.02 became effective has failed. The court of appeals has held that expert testimony regarding the retrograde extrapolation of a person’s blood alcohol concentration passes Daubert (See Giese). So does a doctor’s testimony based solely on his personal experience with prenatal and delivery case (see Seifert). So does a social worker’s testimony based solely on her observations of behavior in child abuse victims (see Smith). And now with Chitwood so does expert testimony by a drug recognition evaluator.

United States v. Lonnie Whitaker, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Nos. 14-3290 & 14-3506, 4/12/16

Taking a drug-sniffing dog into the locked, second-floor hallway of an apartment building where there were at least six to eight apartments without first obtaining a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment under Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013), and Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).

State v. Michael A. Durham, 2015AP1978-CR, 4/12/2016, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Police were dispatched in response to a 6:30 p.m. phone call from a neighbor about unintelligible yelling and “banging” that shook the walls of Durham’s residence. (¶2). After knocking and ringing the doorbell and receiving no response, police simply entered the house, guns drawn, and proceeded toward the stairs, where they encountered Durham. (¶¶3-5). The officers ordered Durham to show his hands, he didn’t, and they tasered him. (¶6). He was charged with resisting an officer, unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence obtained via the warrantless search of his home, and was convicted at trial. (¶1). The court of appeals here reverses the conviction because the suppression motion should have been granted.

Voces De La Frontera, Inc. v. David A. Clarke, Jr., 2016 WI App 39, petition for review granted 6/15/16, reversed, 2017 WI 16; case activity (including briefs)

Voces De La Frontera submitted an open records request for all immigration detainer forms that Sheriff David Clarke received during a 15-month period. Clarke supplied the forms but redacted 5 categories of information from them, including the person’s nationality and immigration status. So Voces sought, and received, a circuit court writ of mandamus ordering Clarke to produce the records. The court of appeals here affirms that writ.

State v. Jimmie Lee Smith, 2016 WI 23, 4/7/16, reversing a published court of appeals decision, majority opinion by Roggensack, concurrence by Ziegler, dissent by Abrahamson (joined by A.W. Bradley); case activity (including briefs)

You can’t accuse the majority of mere error correction in this decision. Although the State never asked SCOW to rewrite the “clearly erroneous” standard of review and nobody briefed or orally argued the issue (see Ziegler’s concurrence and Abrahamson’s dissent), the majority seized the opportunity to make a tough standard even tougher. Unless SCOTUS steps in, it’s going to be virtually impossible to  challenge circuit court competency findings as well as other circuit court decisions governed by the “clearly erroneous” standard of review.

On review of a court of appeals certification; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (from certification)

This appeal presents a single recurring issue: whether provisions in Wisconsin’s implied consent law authorizing a warrantless blood draw from an unconscious suspect violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. More specifically, the issue is whether the “implied consent,” deemed to have occurred before a defendant is a suspect, is voluntary consent for purposes of the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.

On review of a court of appeals certification; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (from certification):

Does it violate a defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution for the State to introduce at trial a toxicology report identifying certain drugs in a deceased victim’s system and/or testimony of a medical examiner basing his/her cause-of-death opinion in part on the information set forth in such a report, if the author of the report does not testify and is not otherwise made available for examination by the defendant?

Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Issues:

In State v. Leitner, 2002 WI 77, 253 Wis. 2d 449, 646 N.W.2d 341, this Court held that circuit courts may not consider an expunged record of conviction, but may consider the facts underlying an expunged record of conviction at sentencing. Did the circuit court violate Leitner when it considered at sentencing that Mr. Allen had an expunged conviction and served a term of probation?

Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to object to the references to Mr. Allen’s expunged conviction in the pre-sentence investigation and at sentencing?