On Point blog, page 7 of 19
Reasonable Suspicion – Traffic Stop
County of Sheboygan v. Kenneth E. Mauser, 2011AP2153, District 2, 2/29/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Mauser: Chad A. Lanning; case activity
Failure to dim high-beam headlights, along with weaving within and outside the traffic lane, provided grounds for a traffic stop.
¶10 The circuit court properly looked to the totality of the circumstances and found the stop reasonable. The circuit court did not rely exclusively on either the high-beam headlight use or the weaving;
Traffic stop – tail lamp violation
State v. Antonio D. Brown, 2013 WI App 17, petition for review granted 10/15/13; case activity
Police lacked probable cause to stop Brown for a defective tail lamp, § 347.13, based on one unlit bulb (out of four) in the tail lamp assembly:
¶19 The parties agree with the circuit court’s finding that the police officers stopped the vehicle because “the middle” rear tail light on the driver’s side of the vehicle was unlit.
Traffic Stop – Duration
State v. Heather M. Kolman, 2011AP1917-CR, District 4, 1/12/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Kolman: John C. Orth; case activity
Scope of a concededly proper traffic stop (for defective brake light) wasn’t unlawfully expanded by testing Kolman for signs of intoxication (reciting alphabet; “mini” HGN test).
¶15 Most relevant here, and as discussed further below, a lawful seizure “becomes unreasonable when the incremental liberty intrusion resulting from the investigation supersedes the public interest served by the investigation.” Arias,
Reasonable Suspicion – Traffic Stop
State v. Nathaniel B. Kind, 2011AP1875-CR, District 4, 12/29/11
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Kind: Ryan McNamara; case activity
A traffic stop for impaired driving supported by officer’s observation that Kind’s vehicle crossed fog line twice, without explicable cause such as debris on road.
¶15 While any one of these facts, standing alone, might be insufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion, “such facts accumulate,
Miranda – Custody
State v. Douglas J. Richer, 2011AP1197-CR, District 3, 12/20/11
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Richer: Matthew F. Anich, Tyler William Wickman; case activity
Richer wasn’t in custody (to a degree associated with formal arrest) so as to require Miranda warnings:
¶15 Here, Richer’s argument focuses only on the time period before Mathison placed him under arrest for operating while intoxicated. He lists several factors he contends show he was “in custody” for purposes of Miranda.
Friday Night Links
- Deirdre D. Brown, “One Strike and You’re Out: Padilla Advisement About Public Housing Eligibility” (“Attorneys must begin to recognize that there already exist an ethical and moral duty to advise clients of the collateral consequence of the loss of public housing eligibility and that this duty to advise meets the Sixth Amendment requirement for effective assistance to counsel.”)
- David S.
Traffic Stop – Reasonable Suspicion
State v. Todd A. Schreiber, 2011AP1191-CR, District 1, 12/13/11
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Schreiber: Dustin C. Haskell, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; case activity
Lane deviations provided reasonable suspicion for traffic stop.
¶9 In applying these standards, we agree with the circuit court that Grunwald had sufficient reasonable suspicion to stop Schreiber. Grunwald testified that he had five years of experience patrolling roads,
Terry Stop
State v. Demonte D. Miller, 2011AP1069-CR, District 1, 12/6/11
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Miller: Hannah Blair Schieber, Ellen Henak, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; case activity
Temporary stop of Miller not supported by reasonable suspicion under the following facts: Miller was part of “a quiet candlelight vigil for Miller’s best friend, who had been killed the night before”; as officers passed by,
Posting Hiatus
Posting will be light to non-existent till approximately November 16. Some links in the meantime:
Michael O’Hear, “Supreme Court Review: Overarching Themes”
Richard D. Friedman, “Coping with the Melendez-Diaz line”
Washington supreme court: county noise ordinance unconstitutional (maj. op.; diss1; diss2)
Margaret Flynt, “The Baader-Meinhof Phenomenon”
Pre-Miranda Silence
State v. Frank Plum, 2011AP956-CR, District 3, 11/1/11
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Plum: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity
The officer who stopped Plum for suspected drunk driving testified that Plum refused to answer questions about the type or amount of medication he had consumed: this amounted to an impermissible comment on Plum’s right to silence, notwithstanding that questioning occurred before custodial interrogation (thus,