On Point: OT 09

McDonald v. City of Chicago, USSC No. 08-1521, 6/28/10

Two years ago, in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. ___ (2008), we held that the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense, and we struck down a District of Columbia law that banned the possession of handguns in the home. The city of Chicago (City) and the village of Oak Park,

Magwood v. Patterson, USSC No. 09-158, 6/24/10

After a defendant has been resentenced in state court pursuant to relief granted on a federal habeas petition, a second federal habeas petition challenging the new sentence will be treated as a first petition (vs. a “2nd or successive” petition), even if raising grounds that could have been raised in the original petition.

We have described the phrase “second or successive” as a “term of art.” Id.,

City of Ontario v. Quon, USSC No. 08-1392, 6/17/10

Assuming without deciding that police officer Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages of his department-issued pager, the Court concludes that the warrantless review of Quon’s pager transcript was reasonable because it was motivated by a legitimate work-related purpose and was not excessive in scope.

The 4th amendment came into play because Quon’s employer was a government agency,

Dolan v. United States, USSC No. 09-367, 6/14/10

This case concerns the remedy for missing a statutory deadline. The statute in question focuses upon mandatory restitution for victims of crimes. It provides that “the court shall set a date for the final determination of the victim’s losses, not to exceed 90 days after sentencing.” 18 U. S. C. §3664(d)(5). We hold that a sentencing court that misses the 90-day deadline nonetheless retains the power to order restitution—at least where,

Holland v. Florida, USSC No. 09-5327, 6/14/10

Habeas – Filing Deadline – Equitable Tolling, Generally

The 1-year limitations period for filing an 18 U.S.C. §2254 habeas petition is subject to “equitable tolling”:

We have not decided whether AEDPA’s statutory limitations period may be tolled for equitable reasons. … Now, like all 11 Courts of Appeals that have considered the question, we hold that §2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases.

Barber v. Thomas, USSC No. 09-5201, 6/7/10

Credit for good behavior for a federal prisoner is awarded after, rather than before, the fact under 18 U. S. C. §3624(b)(1).

Of course, computation of federal sentence credit will ordinarily be a matter of indifference to the state practitioner, but the Court’s discussion of the rule of lenity may hold interest:

Fourth, petitioners ask us to invoke the rule of lenity and construe §3624 (2006 ed.) in their favor,

Berghuis v. Thompkins, USSC No. 08-1470, 6/1/10

Thompkins’ acknowledgment that he prayed for God’s forgiveness for the shooting was admissible as valid waiver of Miranda rights, despite being preceded by nearly 3 hours of silence during custodial interrogation. Rights must be invoked unequivocally, or not at all:

The Court has not yet stated whether an invocation of the right to remain silent can be ambiguous or equivocal, but there is no principled reason to adopt different standards for determining when an accused has invoked the Miranda right to remain silent and the Miranda right to counsel at issue in Davis.

Carr v. U.S., USSC No. 08-1301, 6/1/10

… the Act established a federal criminal offense covering, inter alia, any person who (1) “is required to register under [SORNA],” (2) “travels in interstate or foreign commerce,” and (3) “knowingly fails to register or update a registration.” 18 U. S. C. §2250(a). At issue in this case is whether §2250 applies to sex offenders whose interstate travel occurred prior to SORNA’s effective date and,

U.S. v. O’Brien, USSC No. 08-1569, 5/24/10

§ 924(c)(1)(B)(ii), which exposes a person convicted of possessing, using or carrying a machinegun during certain federal crimes to a mandatory minimum sentence of 30 years is an offense element subject to proof beyond reasonable doubt at trial rather than a penalty enhancer provable by mere preponderance of the evidence at sentencing.

The border between offense element and sentence enhancer remains indistinct at crucial junctures.

U.S. v. Marcus, USSC No. 08-1341, 5/24/10

… (A)n appellate court may,in its discretion, correct an error not raised at trial only where the appellant demonstrates that (1) there is an “error”; (2) the error is “clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute”; (3) the error “affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means” it “affected the outcome of the district court proceedings”; and (4) “the error seriously affect[s] the fairness,