On Point blog, page 1 of 41
SCOTUS denies cert. while Justice Sotomayor encourages Court in a future case to correct lower courts’ improper standard for assessing prejudice for IAC claims based on Batson.
Clark v. Mississippi, USSC No. 25-6846, 6/8/2026, denying petition for certiorari; Scotusblog page (with links to briefs and commentary)
SCOTUS denied Tony Terrell Clark’s petition for a writ of certiorari from the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision affirming his conviction at a capital trial. Clark argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel during jury selection because his trial lawyer did not adequately raise a Batson challenge when the State struck black jurors at a rate five times more than white jurors. Justice Sotomayor joined the Court’s decision to deny certiorari because Clark did not argue his counsel’s performance was deficient, but explained in an accompanying statement why the Court needs to address the conflict among state and federal courts regarding the standard to evaluate prejudice for a Batson claim.
SCOTUS reverses and holds that appellate court erroneously considered newly-discovered evidence in ruling against defendant
Whitton v. Dixon, USSC No. 25-580, 6/1/2026, reversing a per curiam decision of the 11th Circuit, Scotusblog page (with links to briefs and commentary)
In an unusual defense win involving “peculiar” conduct by the Eleventh Circuit, SCOTUS wades through the thicket of habeas law and reverse and remands for further consideration of Whitton’s Giglio claim.
SCOTUS grants habeas relief to death row inmate because trial court did not determine whether state’s proffered race-neutral bases for excluding potential black jurors were pretextual
Pitchford v. Cain, USSC No. 24-7351, 5/28/2026, reversing 126 F. 4th 422 (5th Cir. 2025); Scotusblog page (with links to briefs and commentary)
Batson v. Kentucky held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits prosecutors from exercising peremptory challenges based on race. A three-step process is used to implement Batson. First, the defendant must make a prima facie case that a peremptory strike was based on race. If the defendant meets this burden, the state must provide a race-neutral reason for the challenged strike. The defendant may then rebut the prosecutor’s race-neutral reason by showing it was pretextual.
SCOTUS held, in a 5-4 decision, that the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably applied Batson when it affirmed the defendant’s conviction for murder after the trial court did not address whether the prosecutor’s proffered race-neutral bases for striking four of five potential black jurors were pretextual. The Court also found the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably determined the facts because it concluded the defendant waived his Batson challenge even though he was not provided an opportunity to rebut the state’s proffered race-neutral explanations and was later assured by the trial court that his Batson objection was preserved for the record.
SCOTUS issues per curiam opinion concluding officer had reasonable suspicion for seizure
D.C. v. R.W., USSC No. 25-248, 2/25/2025, reversing In re R.W., 334 A.3d 593 (D.C. 2025); Scotusblog page (with links to briefs)
SCOTUS reverses DC Court of Appeals decision that an officer stopped R.W. without reasonable suspicion and in violation of the Fourth Amendment based on the totality of the circumstances.
SCOTUS holds that trial court may limit discussion between defendant and counsel during overnight trial recess about defendant’s testimony for its own sake but not about issues incidental to testimony.
Villarreal v. Texas, USSC No. 24-557, 2/25/2025, affirming Villarreal v. State, 707 S.W.3d 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024) ; Scotusblog page (with links to briefs and commentary)
SCOTUS holds that testifying criminal defendant may be prohibited by trial court from conferring with defense counsel during an overnight recess about testimony for its own sake but not about matters incidental to testimony.
SCOTUS reverses decision granting new homicide trial and accepts cert. to review geofence warrants; while Justice Jackson dissents from shutting courthouse door to prison inmates.
In its January 2026 orders, SCOTUS reminds the Fourth Circuit about AEDPA deference in reversing decision ordering a new trial and grants certiorari to determine whether a geofence warrant violates the Fourth Amendment, while Justice Jackson dissents from banning frequent inmate filers from commencing a case without paying the filing fee.
SCOTUS applies emergency aid exception to warrant requirement “without further gloss;” declines to adopt probable cause standard
Case v. Montana, USSC No. 24-624, 1/14/2026, affirming Montana v. Case, 2024 MT 165, 417 Mont. 354, 553 P.3d 985; Scotusblog page (with links to briefs and commentary)
SCOTUS unanimously holds that Brigham City v. Stuart‘s objective reasonableness standard for warrantless home entries to render aid applies “without further gloss” and was satisfied here. While SCOTUS affirms the Montana Supreme Court’s judgment, the Court does not adopt the lower court’s reasoning in full.
SCOTUS reverses COA order granting habeas relief because it relied on ground not raised by parties.
Terrence Clark v. Jeremiah Antoine Sweeney, USSC No. 25-52, 11/24/2025; Scotusblog page (with links to briefs and commentary)
SCOTUS reverses Fourth Circuit’s order granting habeas relief because the court relied on ground that was not presented by the parties.
SCOTUS: Mississippi statute mandating screening child witness from defendant violates right to confrontation.
Jeffrey Clyde Pitts v. Mississippi, USSC No. 24-1159, 11/24/2025; Scotusblog page (with links to briefs and commentary)
SCOTUS reverses conviction for child abuse because Mississippi law that requires screening at trial for child witnesses conflicted with the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee to face-to-face confrontation.
SCOTUS stays district court’s order preventing ICE agents from making investigatory stops without individualized reasonable suspicion
Noem v. Perdomo, USSC No. 25A169, 9/8/2025, Scotusblog page
SCOTUS stayed a district court’s order enjoining immigration agents from conducting stops in the Los Angeles area unless the agent has reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is within the United States in violation of immigration law.