On Point: OT 09

U.S. v. Comstock, USSC No. 08-1224, 5/17/10

The federal scheme for detaining the equivalent of ch. 980 sexually violent persons beyond release date from federal prison, 18 U.S.C. § 1848, is a valid exercise of Congressional authority under the Necessary and Proper clause. In reaching this conclusion, the Court “assume(s), but we do not decide, that other provisions of the Constitution—such as the Due Process Clause—do not prohibit civil commitment in these circumstances.”

Graham v. Florida, USSC No. 08-7412, 5/17/10

In sum, penological theory is not adequate to justify life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders. This determination; the limited culpability of juvenile nonhomicide offenders; and the severity of life without parole sentences all lead to the conclusion that the sentencing practice under consideration is cruel and unusual. This Court now holds that for a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide the Eighth Amendment forbids the sentence of life without parole.

Renico v. Lett, USSC No. 09-338, 5/3/10

The state court’s conclusion of manifest necessity for mistrial where the foreperson reported inability to reach unanimity wasn’t unreasonable, hence grant of habeas relief is vacated:

… (T)rial judges may declare a mistrial “whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity” for doing so. Id., at 580. The decision to declare a mistrial is left to the “sound discretion” of the judge,

Padilla v. Kentucky, USSC No. 08-651, 3/31/10

In sum, we have long recognized that the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Hill , 474 U. S., at 57; see also Richardson , 397 U. S., at 770–771. The severity of deportation—“the equivalent of banishment or exile,” Delgadillo v.

Berghuis v. Smith, USSC No. 08-1402, 3/30/10

Defendants have Sixth Amendment right to impartial jury drawn from fair cross section of community. To establish prima facie violation of this “fair-cross-section,” requirement, a defendant must prove that: (1) a group qualifying as “distinctive” (2) is not fairly and reasonably represented in jury venires, and (3) “systematic exclusion” in the jury-selection process accounts for the underrepresentation. Various methods have been proposed to test underrepresentation,

Thaler v. Haynes, USSC No. 09–273, 2/22/10 (per curiam)

Nothing in Supreme Court caselaw clearly requires “that a demeanor-based explanation for a peremptory challenge must be rejected unless the judge personally observed and recalls the relevant aspect of the prospective juror’s demeanor.” In other words, there’s no requirement that the judge have been present during jury selection in order to evaluate a Batson claim defended by the prosecutor as based on the juror’s demeanor.