On Point: OT 11

Southern Union Company v. United States, USSC No. 11-94, 6/21/12, reversing 630 F.3d 17 (1st Cir 2010)

Criminal fines, no less than length of imprisonment, come within the “Apprendi” doctrine, such that a fine beyond the maximum statutory amount must be based on facts decided by the jury. Southern Union was tried for violating environmental laws carrying a fine of up to $50,000 per day in violation.

United States v. Alvarez, USSC No. 11-210 (6/28/12), affirming 638 F.3d 666 (9th Cir. 2011).

The Nation well knows that one of the costs of the First Amendment is that it protects the speech we detest as well as the speech we embrace.  Though few might find respondent’s statements anything but contemptible, his right to make those statements is protected by the Constitution’s guarantee of freedom of speech and expression.

Evan Miller v. Alabama, USSC No. 10-9646 / Kuntrell Jackson v. Hobbs, No. 10-9647, 6/25/12,  reversing 63 So. 3d 676 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010)

The two 14-year-old offenders in these cases were convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In neither case did the sentencing authority have any discretion to impose a different punishment. State law mandated that each juvenile die in prison even if a judge or jury would have thought that his youth and its attendant characteristics,

Sandy Williams v. Illinois, USSC No. 10-8505, 6/18/12, affirming People v. Williams, 238 Ill. 2d 125, 939 N.E. 268

A split Court (4-1-4) upholds against Confrontation objection, admissibility of expert testimony that a DNA profile, produced by a different lab, matched Williams’ profile. Because the rationale favoring admissibility doesn’t earn a clear majority of votes, the opinion should be approached with the following principle in mind, 

Parker v. David Eugene Matthews, USSC No. 11-845, 6/11/12, reversing 651 F.3d 489 (6th Cir. 2011)

In this habeas case, the United States Court of Ap- peals for the Sixth Circuit set aside two 29-year-old murder convictions based on the flimsiest of rationales. The court’s decision is a textbook example of what the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) proscribes: “using federal habeas corpus review as a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts.” Renico v.

Coleman v. Lorenzo Johnson, USSC No. 11-1053, 5/29/12 (per curiam), reversing 446 Fed. Appx. 531 (3rd Cir. 2011)

We have made clear that Jackson claims face a high bar in federal habeas proceedings because they are subject to two layers of judicial deference. First, on direct appeal, “it is the responsibility of the jury—not the court—to decide what conclusions should be drawn from evidence admitted at trial.

Alex Blueford v. Arkansas, USSC No. 10-1320, 5/24/12, affirming 2011 Ark. 8

Double Jeopardy doesn’t bar retrial on greater offenses, despite jury foreperson’s report of unanimous votes against those charges, after ensuing deadlock resulted in mistrial.

Blueford’s primary submission is that he cannot be retried for capital and first-degree murder because the jury actually acquitted him of those offenses. See Green v.

Holder v. Carlos Martinez Gutierrez, USSC No. 10-1542, 5/21/12, reversing 411 Fed. Appx. 121 and 399 Fed. Appx. 313

The Attorney General has discretion under 8 U.S.C. §1229b(a) to allow otherwise-removable aliens to remain in the U.S., if the alien satisfies three criteria: minimum of five years as a lawful permanent resident; continuous residence in the U.S. for at least seven years after lawful admission,

Patrick Wood v. Milyard, USSC No. 10-9995, 4/24/12, reversing 403 Fed. Appx. 335 (10th Cir 2010)

This case concerns the authority of a federal court to raise, on its own motion, a statute of limitations defense to a habeas corpus petition. After state prisoner Patrick Wood filed a federal habeas corpus petition, the State twice informed the U. S. District Court that it “[would] not challenge,

Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington et al., USSC No. 10-945, 4/2/12, affirming 621 F.3d 296 (3rd Cir. 2010)

A jail policy requiring that every detainee who will be admitted to the facility’s general population may be required to undergo close visual inspection while undressed is reasonable under the fourth amendment.

The question here is whether undoubted security imperatives involved in jail supervision override the assertion that some detainees must be exempt from the more invasive search procedures at issue absent reasonable suspicion of a concealed weapon or other contraband.