On Point: OT 13

McCullen v. Coakley, USSC No. 12-1168, 2014 WL 2882079 (June 26, 2014), reversing McCullen v. Coakley, 708 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

In this decision the Supreme Court strikes down a Massachusetts law making it a crime to stand on a public road or sidewalk within thirty-five feet of a reproductive health care facility. While all the justices agree the law violates the First Amendment, they do not agree on the reasons for reaching that result.

Riley v. California, USSC No. 13-132 (together with United States v. Wurie, USSC No. 13-212), 2014 WL 2864483 (June 25, 2014), reversing People v. Riley, No. D059840 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2013) (unpublished) (and affirming United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013)); Scotusblog case page (which includes links to briefs and commentary) and symposium page (additional opinion commentary)

Kevin Loughrin v. United States, USSC No. 13-316, 2014 WL 2807180 (June 23, 2014), affirming United States v. Loughrin, 710 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Resolving an issue that split the federal circuit courts, the Supreme Court holds that the section of the federal bank fraud statute that prohibits “knowingly execut[ing] a scheme … to obtain” property owned by, or under the custody of, a bank “by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,” 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2), requires only that the defendant intend to obtain bank property and that this end is accomplished “by means of” a false statement. Nothing in the statute requires proof of intent to defraud or deceive a bank.

Abramski v. United States, USSC No. 12-1493, 2014 WL 2676779 (June 16, 2014), affirming United States v. Abramski, 706 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Resolving a split between federal circuit courts of appeal, the Supreme Court holds that the prohibition in 18 U. S. C. § 922(a)(6) against making false statements about “any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale” of a firearm applies to a “straw” purchaser—a person who buys a gun on someone else’s behalf while falsely claiming that it is for himself—even if the true buyer could have purchased the gun legally.

Carol Anne Bond v. United States, USSC No. 12-148 (June 2, 2014), reversing United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149 (3rd Cir. 2012); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Avoiding a constitutional question about the limits on Congress’s power to pass legislation implementing an international treaty, a majority of the Supreme Court narrowly construes a federal statute enacted after ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention so that it does not cover the defendant’s conduct in this case. By limiting the statute’s reach, the Court’s construction will preclude federal prosecutors from using it to charge “a purely local crime[.]” (Slip op. at 2).

Esteban Martinez v. Illinois, USSC No. 13-5367 (May 27, 2014) (per curiam), reversing State v. Martinez, 990 N.E.2d 215 (Ill. 2013)

In this unanimous per curiam decision, the Supreme Court reaffirms two clear rules of criminal procedure: jeopardy attaches when the jury is impaneled and sworn; and a trial court’s dismissal of the case due to insufficient evidence is an acquittal. Added together, the two rules mean the defendant cannot be retried.

Freddie Lee Hall v. Florida, USSC No. 12-10882, May 27, 2014, reversing Hall v. State, 109 So. 3d 704 (Fla. 2012); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Because “intellectual disability is a condition, not a number,” and an IQ score is an approximation, not a final and infallible assessment of intellectual functioning, the Supreme Court invalidates Florida’s bright-line rule that a defendant is not intellectually disabled—and thus may be executed—if he has never scored below 70 on an IQ test.

Robers v. United States, USSC No. 12-9012, 5/5/14, affirming United States v. Robers, 698 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 2012); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and case commentary); On Point’s previous coverage.

Where a defendant is ordered to pay restitution under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA), the amount of restitution may be reduced by the value of “any part of the property that is returned” to the victim. The Supreme Court holds that a a defendant convicted of fraudulently obtaining a loan does not return part of the property to the defrauded lender when the lender takes title to the collateral securing the loan. Therefore, restitution is not reduced by the fair market value of the collateral at the time the lender took title.

Paroline v. United States, USSC No. 12-8561, 4/23/14, vacating and remanding In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749; Scotusblog page (includes links to the briefs and case commentary)

Resolving a split among federal circuit courts about how to determine restitution in child pornography cases under 18 U.S.C. § 2259, the Supreme Court holds that where a defendant possessed images of a victim who suffered losses from the continuing traffic in the images, but it is impossible to trace a particular amount of the losses to the individual defendant, a court should order restitution “in an amount that comports with the defendant’s relative role in the causal process that underlies the victim’s general losses.” (Slip op. at 21).

Navarette v. California, USSC No. 12-9490, 4/22/14, affirming People v. Navarette, No. A132343, 2012 WL 4842651 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2013) (unpublished); Scotusblog page (includes links to the briefs and commentary)

Validating the rationale employed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in State v. Rutzinski, 2001 WI 22, 241 Wis. 2d 729, 623 N.W.2d 516, the U.S. Supreme Court upholds the stop of a vehicle based on a 911 caller’s report that the vehicle ran her off the road, even though the police officer who located and then followed the vehicle observed no improper or erratic driving.