On Point blog, page 2 of 2
SCOTUS: Test for federal habeas relief is even tougher than you thought
Randy White v. Robert Keith Woodall, USSC No. 12-794, 4/23/14, reversing and remanding Woodall v. Simpson, 685 F.3d 574 (6th Cir. 2012); case activity
It’s getting harder and harder to win a habeas case. Woodall requested an instruction forbidding jurors from drawing adverse inferences from his decision to not testify during the penalty phase of his capital murder trial. The majority opinion, authored by Scalia, held that SCOTUS precedent requiring a “no adverse inference” instruction was clearly established for the guilt phase of a trial, but not the penalty phase.
SCOTUS: “Offensive touching” qualifies as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” under federal gun law, 18 USC sec. 922(g)(9)
United States v. James Alvin Castleman, USSC No. 12-1371, 3/26/14, reversing and remanding United States v. Castleman, 695 F.3d 582 (6th Cir. 2012); case activity
As noted in our analysis of SCOTUS’s decision to grant certiorari, the issue in this case is:
Whether [Castleman’s] Tennessee conviction for misdemeanor domestic assault by intentionally or knowingly causing bodily injury to the mother of his child qualifies as a conviction for a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” under 18 U.S.C.
To aid and abet violation of 18 USC § 924(c), defendant must have advance knowledge about use a firearm during the offense
Rosemond v. United States, USSC 12-895, 3/5/14, vacating and remanding United States v. Rosemond, 695 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2012); Scotusblog page (includes links to the Court’s docket, the briefs, and commentary on the case)
Resolving an issue that had split the federal circuit courts, the Supreme Court holds that in a prosecution for aiding and abetting a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)–which prohibits the use or carrying of a firearm during a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime–
SCOTUS: The military controls all of the property within the boundaries of a military installation
United States v. Apel, USSC 12-1038, 2/26/14
United States Supreme Court decision, vacating and remanding United States v. Apel, 676 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2012).
Federal law makes it a crime to reenter a “military . . . installation” after having been ordered not to do so “by any officer or person in command.” 18 U.S.C. § 1382. A unanimous Court holds that the boundaries of the military installation covered by this prohibition include even a designated area for public protests and an easement for a public road through the installation:
Where a place with a defined boundary is under the administration of a military department,
SCOTUS: Police may conduct warrantless search of jointly-occupied dwelling if they first remove objecting occupant and then obtain co-occupant’s consent
Fernandez v. California, USSC 12-7822, 2/25/14, affirming People v. Fernandez, 145 Cal Rptr.3rd 51 (Cal Ct. App. 2012).
Docket here; SCOTUSblog analysis of decision here; Orin Kerr’s “Five Thoughts on Fernandez” here; On Point analysis of cert grant here
Police officers may, without a warrant, search a jointly occupied premises if one of the occupants consents to the search.
SCOTUS: No right to contest grand jury’s probable cause determination when challenging pre-trial freeze of assets
Kaley v. United States, USSC 12-464, 2/25/14
United States Supreme Court decision, affirming United States v. Kaley, 677 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2012)
In a 6-to-3 decision, the Supreme Court holds that when a post-indictment, ex parte restraining order under 18 U.S.C. § 853(e) freezes assets that are potentially subject to forfeiture but which the defendant needs to retain counsel,
SCOTUS: Trial lawyer’s failure to seek funds to hire better expert, based on mistaken belief about funding cap, amounts to deficient performance
Anthony Ray Hinton v. Alabama, USSC 13-6440, 2/24/14 (per curiam), vacating Hinton v. State, __So. 3d__, 2013WL 598122 (2/15/13).
Docket here.
Trial lawyers, listen up. Check your expert witness funding cap before settling for an “expert” you know is sub par.
In 1985, managers of 3 different restaurants were robbed and shot—each with two .38 caliber bullets. The first two managers died.
SCOTUS unanimously reverses 8th Circuit’s intepretation of causation required by mandatory minimum provision of Controlled Substances Act
Marcus Burrage v. United States, USSC 12-7515, 1/27/14, reversing United States v. Burrage, 687 F.3d 1015 (8th Cir. 2012).
Docket here. SCOTUSblog analysis here.
The Uniform Controlled Substances Act imposes a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence on a defendant who unlawfully distributes a Schedule I or II drug, when “death or serious bodily injury results from the use of such substance.”
When a defendant asserts a “mental status” defense, Fifth Amendment allows state to use court-ordered psych exams in rebuttal
Kansas v. Cheever, USSC No. 12-609, 12/11/13
United States Supreme Court decision, reversing Kansas v. Cheever, 284 P.3d 1007 (Kan. 2012).
The Supreme Court unanimously holds that “where a defense expert who has examined the defendant testifies that the defendant lacked the requisite mental state to commit a crime, the prosecution may offer evidence from a court-ordered psychological examination for the limited purpose of rebutting the defendant’s evidence.”
U.S. Supreme Court: Federal circuit court failed to give required “double deference” under AEDPA to state court’s resolution of ineffective assitance of counsel claim
Burt v. Titlow, USSC No. 12-414, 11/5/13
United States Supreme Court decision, reversing Titlow v. Burt, 680 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 2012)
When a state prisoner asks a federal court to set aside a sentence due to ineffective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining, our cases require that the federal court use a “‘doubly deferential’” standard of review that gives both the state court and the defense attorney the benefit of the doubt.