On Point: B. Opinions

Sila Luis v. United States, USSC No. 14-419, 2016 WL 1228690 (March 30, 2016), vacating and remanding U.S. v. Luis, 564 Fed. Appx. 493 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

The question presented in this case is whether the pretrial restraint of a criminal defendant’s legitimate, untainted assets—that is, assets not traceable to a criminal offense—needed to retain counsel of choice violates the Sixth Amendment. A majority of the U.S. Supreme Court answers “yes,” though for different reasons.

Jaime Caetano v. Massachusetts, USSC No. 14-10078, 2016WL1078932 (per curiam), vacating Commonwealth v. Caetano, 470 Mass. 774, 26 N.E.2d 688 (2015); SCOTUSblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Jaime Caetano obtained a stun gun in order to protect herself from an abusive boyfriend. When she was prosecuted for violating a Massachusetts statute that prohibited the possession of stun guns, she argued that the law violated her 2nd Amendment right to keep and bear arms.  The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled against her. SCOTUS, in one fell swoop, granted her cert petition and reversed. Here is the meat of its two-page per curiam opinion:

Michael Wearry v. Burl Cain, USSC No. 14-10008, 2016 WL 854158 (per curiam) (March 7, 2016); reversing the 21st Judicial District Court, Livingston Parish, No. 01-FELN-015992, Div. A, application for writ denied, 161 So.3d 620 (La. 2015); Scotusblog page

The state violated Wearry’s due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by withholding evidence that would have affected the credibility of witnesses implicating Wearry in a capital murder. Wearry is therefore entitled to a new trial.

Lockhart v. United States, USSC No. 14-8358, 2016 WL 782862  (March 1, 2016); affirming United States v. Lockhart, 749 F.3d 148 (2nd Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2), a defendant convicted of possessing child pornography must be given a prison term of at least ten years if the defendant “has a prior conviction … under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward.” Federal courts had disagreed about whether a conviction for “aggravated sexual abuse” or “sexual abuse” had to “involv[e] a minor or ward,” or whether the “minor or ward” language applied only to convictions for “abusive sexual conduct.” The Supreme Court holds, 6 to 2, that the phrase “involving a minor or ward” modifies only “abusive sexual conduct.”

Montgomery v. Louisiana, USSC No. 14-280, 2016 WL 280758 (January 25, 2016); reversing and remanding State v. Montgomery, 141 So.3d 264 (La. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

In Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), the Court held that sentencing laws mandating life without parole violate the Eight Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments with respect to those under age 18 at the time of their crimes; here the Court holds that Miller announced a new substantive rule that is retroactive on state collateral review.

Musacchio v. United States, USSC No. 14-1095, 2016 WL 280757 (January 25, 2016), affirming United States v. Musacchio, 590 Fed. Appx. 359 (5th Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Resolving a split among the federal circuits, a unanimous Supreme Court holds that when a jury instruction sets forth all the elements of the charged crime but incorrectly adds one more element, a sufficiency of evidence challenge is assessed against the elements of the charged crime, not against the erroneously heightened command in the jury instruction.

Kansas v. Carr, USSC Nos. 14-449, 14-450, 14-452, 2016 WL 228342 (January 20, 2016); reversing and remanding Kansas v. (Jonathan) Carr, 329 P.3d 1195 (Kan. 2014), Kansas v. (Reginald) Carr, 331 P.3d 544 (Kan. 2014), and Kansas v. Gleason, 329 P.3d 1102 (Kan. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

The Eighth Amendment does not require courts to instruct the jury deciding whether to impose the death penalty that the defendant does not have to prove mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.

Hurst v. Florida, USSC No. 14-7505, 2016 WL 112683 (January 12, 2016); reversing and remanding Hurst v. State, 147 So.3d 435 (Fla. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

In Florida the jury makes a recommendation as to whether to impose the death penalty, but the judge then holds a separate sentencing hearing and decides whether there are sufficient aggravating circumstances to justify the death penalty. This sentencing scheme is unconstitutional because “[t]he Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death. A jury’s mere recommendation is not enough.” (Slip op. at 1).

Bruce v. Samuels, USSC No. 14-844, 2016 WL 112684 (January 12, 2016), affirming Pinson v. Samuels, 761 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2) of the federal Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis must pay 20% of his or her existing income toward the filing fee of a case he or she files until the fee is paid. The federal circuit courts were split when it came to applying this requirement to prisoners who owed fees for more than one case. Some treated the 20% as a cap, so that the 20% would be taken out and applied to one case at a time till each fee was paid. Others assessed 20% per case, so that an inmate with, for example, three filing fees to pay would have 60% of his or her income taken. The Supreme Court unanimously adopts the second approach.

White v. Wheeler, USSC No. 14-1372, 2015 WL 8546240, 12/14/15 (per curiam), reversing Wheeler v. Simpson, 779 F.3d 366 (6th Cir. 2015); docket

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals failed to give proper deference to the state courts’ rulings when it granted habeas relief on the ground that the state courts unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent regarding removal of a juror in a death penalty case.