On Point: B. Opinions

Stephen McFadden v. United States, USSC No. 14-378, 2015 WL 2473377 (June 18, 2015), reversing and remanding United States v. McFadden, 753 F.3d 432 (4th Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

The Supreme Court holds that in order to convict a defendant of distribution a controlled substance analogue, the government must prove that the defendant knew the substance was controlled under the federal Controlled Substances Act or the Analogue Act, or that the defendant knew the specific features of the substance that make it a controlled substance analogue.

Elonis v. United States, USSC No. 13-983, 2015 WL 2464051 (June 1, 2015), reversing United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321 (3rd Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

This case involved a prosecution of Elonis for threats he made in postings on his Facebook page, and it was being widely watched for the First Amendment question it raised. But the Court sidestepped the constitutional question, and holds instead that 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), the federal statute he was prosecuted under, requires the government to prove some sort of mental state regarding the threatening nature of the communication.

Mellouli v. Lynch, USSC No. 1034, 2015 WL 2464047 (June 1, 2015), reversing Mellouli v. Holder, 719 F.3d 995 (8th Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Resolving a split between federal circuit courts of appeal, the Supreme Court holds that the statute providing for deportation based on a violation of a state drug crime “relating to a controlled substance” is limited to “controlled substance” listed in the federal controlled substances schedule under 21 U.S.C. § 802. Thus, the Eighth Circuit was wrong to hold that any drug offense triggers the removal statute, without regard to the appearance of the drug on a § 802 schedule.

Coleman v. Tollefson, USSC No. 13-1333, 2015 WL 2340838 (May 18, 2015), affirming Coleman v. Tollefson, 733 F.3d 175 (6th Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Ordinarily, an indigent litigant may proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), which allows the litigant to file a civil action without paying fees or certain expenses. But under the federal Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, a “three strikes” provision precludes IFP status to a prisoner who “has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated …, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). But what if the prisoner is appealing one of the “strikes” and the appeal is still pending; does it still count as a “strike”? “Yes,” answers a unanimous Supreme Court.

Henderson v. United States, USSC No. 13-1487, 2015 WL 2340840 (May 18, 2015), reversing  United States v. Henderson, Case No. 12-14628, 2014 WL 292169 (11th Cir. 2014) (unreported); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

The Supreme Court unanimously holds that a defendant convicted of a felony retains “a naked right of alienation” in any firearms he or she owns and therefore may arrange for a court-supervised sale or transfer the guns without violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)’s ban on possession of a firearm.

City and County of San Francisco, et al. v. Teresa Sheehan, USSC No. 13-1412, 2015 WL 2340839 (May 18, 2015), certiorari dismissed in part, and reversing in part and remanding Sheehan v. City and County of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Because there was no precedent clearly establishing that it unreasonable to forcibly enter the home of a mentally ill person who is armed and potentially violent, the officers who entered Sheehan’s apartment are entitled to qualified immunity.

Rodriguez v. United States, USSC No. 13-9972, 2015 WL 1780927 (April 21, 2015), reversing United States v. Rodriguez, 741 F.3d 905 (8th Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Some lower courts have held that police may briefly prolong a completed traffic stop in order to conduct a dog sniff. The Supreme Court rejects that approach, and holds that a seizure justified only by a traffic violation “‘become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a ticket for the violation.” (Slip op. at 1, quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)). Thus, prolonging a traffic stop requires reasonable suspicion of criminal activity beyond the traffic infraction.

Grady v. North Carolina, USSC No. 14-593, 2015 WL 1400850, 3/30/15 (per curiam), reversing State v. Grady, 762 S.E.2d 460 (2014) (unpublished order); docket

The Supreme Court holds that a state conducts a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it attaches a device like a GPS bracelet to a person’s body without consent for the purpose of tracking the person’s movements.

Woods v. Donald, USSC No. 14-618, 2015 WL 1400852, 3/30/15 (per curiam), reversing Donald v. Rapelje, 580 Fed. Appx. 227 (6th Cir. 2014) (unpublished); docket

Trial counsel’s absence during about 10 minutes of testimony regarding evidence relating to Donald’s co-defendants—evidence trial counsel said he had “no interest in”—did not amount to a denial of counsel at a critical stage of trial justifying a presumption of prejudice under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). Thus, the Sixth Circuit erred in granting Donald habeas relief on that ground.

Yates v. United States, USSC No. 13-7451, 2015 WL 773330 (February 25, 2015); reversing 733 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page

In a four-one-four decision that is chock-a-block with nautical references and features some sparring about the canons and methods of statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court holds that the “anti-shredding provision” of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1519, applies only to records, documents, or similar types of “tangible objects” used to record or preserve information. Thus, Yates’s conviction—for destroying fish that were evidence of his alleged violation of federal fishing regulations—must be jettisoned: “A fish is no doubt an object that is tangible; fish can be seen, caught, and handled, and a catch, as this case illustrates, is vulnerable to destruction. But it would cut § 1519 loose from its financial-fraud mooring to hold that it encompasses any and all objects, whatever their size or significance, destroyed with obstructive intent.” (Plurality at 2).